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Abstract 
This thesis examines the political and social responses of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy 
between 1087 and 1106 to the issue of divided lordship. The central theme is the 
importance of the concept of political legitimacy in shaping the political culture and actions 
of the aristocracy during this period. The exclusion of significant sections of the cross-
Channel aristocracy from the consultation process in selecting a king in 1087 and 1100, ran 
contrary to the accepted political norms and created doubts over the legitimacy of Rufus' 
and Henry I's regimes that could be revived at moments of crisis. This found expression in 
the support given to Robert Curthose's challenge for the English throne in 1088 and 1101, 
but also in open rebellion in 1095. However, the limitations of violence as a means of 
effecting long-term change necessitated a search for a negotiated political settlement that 
would open the way for Normandy and England to enjoy co-existence as a permanent 
solution to the problem of divided lordship. This approach locates the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy firmly within the recent scholarship of the early and late medieval aristocracy, 
where political discourse is analysed primarily in terms of succession and legitimacy. 
Therefore, at the centre of this analysis are the contemporary and near-contemporary 
narrative sources, which display a firm understanding of contemporary theories of kingship 
and the politics. When brought into focus with charter evidence, specific aspects of the 
wider socio-political culture of the aristocracy, in particular religious patronage, marital 
strategies and inheritance patterns, can then be read as both responses to the wider question 
of the succession, and also as a commentary on contemporary politics. 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines the political and social responses of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy 
between 1087 and 1106 to the problem of divided lordship. An initial justification for a 
study of this nature is quite simply that despite the enormous amount that has been 
written on the aristocracy in the last thirty-five years, no systematic and detailed 
investigation of the aristocracy's response to the partition of England and Normandy has 
been attempted since John Le Patourel put forward his arguments for a politically and 
culturally homogeneous post-Conquest aristocracy. I In an article written as part of the 
novo-centenary celebrations of 1966 he wrote: 'Historians sometimes write as though 
they were thinking in terms of an English baronage and a Norman baronage ...... On the 
contrary, there was one, homogeneous Norman-French baronial society, whose interests 
extended through the length and breadth of the Norman 'empire' ...... in such a way that it 
is impossible to draw lines between them. This is why the Conqueror's division of his 
dominions in 1087 created so much difficulty; and the politics of 1087 to 1106 can only 
be understood against the background of a divided royal family and this 'one baronial 
society' .' 2 
Le Patourel expanded his theme in his Stenton Lecture of 1970 and gave it its fullest 
expression in 1976 with the publication of The Norman Empire. 3 The essential logic 
behind the creation of cross-Channel estates meant that the Anglo-Norman aristocracy, 
'with interests actual or potential in kingdom and duchy, must have been every bit as 
I The most recent discussions have been part of a wider analysis and can be found in, Green, Aristocracy, 
274-83; R. Bartlett, England Under the Norman and Angevin Kings 1075-1225 (Oxford, 2000), 4-21; 
Crouch, The Normans, 117-28, 130-5, 165-9. 
2 J. Le Patourel, 'Norman Barons', Feudal Empires Norman and Plantagenet (London, 1984), VI, 27. 
3 J. Le Patourel, Normandy and England 1066-1144 (Reading, 1971); The Norman Empire, (Oxford, 
1976) 
1 
much concerned for the continuing unity under one ruler as the royal family itself.'4 
With these concepts formed, Le Patourel was able to present a systematic and coherent 
view of the Norman aristocracy's response to partition after 1087 and provided a strong 
theoretical framework to explore the politics of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.' 
Other scholars, most notably the late Professor C. Warren Hollister, enthusiastically 
took up Le Patourel's thesis. In a series of important articles in the 1970s and 80s, 
Hollister provided an extended analysis of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy's relations 
with the Conqueror's sons, and took the notion of centripetal forces driving the 
integration of England and Normandy a stage further by arguing for the creation of an 
Anglo-Norman regnum.6 
Le Patourel was not alone in seeing the politics of the period between 1087 and 1106 
defined primarily by the tension between political loyalty and the distribution of cross-
Channel estates. Professor J. C. Holt produced some of the most influential essays on 
Anglo-Norman politics. Starting with 'Politics and Property' in the early 1970s, and 
including his Royal Historical Society Presidential Addresses of the early 1980s, Holt 
produced a corpus of work that examined the political culture of the governing elite 
from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, discussed primarily through the medium of 
the law and customs that governed the handling of their landed property. For Holt, the 
inherent instability in English politics after 1066 was largely due to the uncertainties that 
4 Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 197. 
, J. Le Patourel, 'The Norman Colonization of Britain', I Normanni e la loro espansione in Europa nell' 
alto medioveo (Spoleto, 1969),409-38; 'The Norman Succession, 996-1135', EHR, 86 (1971), 225-50; 
'What did not happen in Stephen's Reign', History, 57 (1973), 1-17. 
6 Hollister's articles are readily accessible in an edition of collected essays, Monarchy, Magnates and 
Institutions in the Anglo-Norman World. In particular see, 'Normandy, France and the Anglo-Norman 
Regnum', 17-57; 'AnglO-Norman Civil War: 1101',76-96; 'Magnates and "Curiales" in Early Norman 
England', 97-115. 
2 
surrounded succession to acquired or inherited lands, especially when applied to the 
. succession to England and Normandy. 7 
Though persuasively written and a major feat of scholarship in terms of the breadth and 
depth of ideas, Le Patourel recognised that his views would prove controversial. He was 
at pains to point out that he conceived of The Norman Empire as an 'essay in 
reinterpretation'" As such, though Le Patourel's impact on modem historiography has 
been profound, it needs to be stressed that he has been more influential in stimulating 
debate, rather than actually carrying the debate.9 The general response has been one of 
dissent. Leading the vanguard have been Professors David Bates and Judith Green. In 
the late 1980s, Bates gave a comprehensive reassessment ofLe Patourel's ideas, 
together with those of Hollister, through a detailed critique of The Norman Empire. 10 
Among his criticisms, Bates stressed that recent research on regional aristocracies 
showed that they operated for the most part independently of cross-Channel politics and 
royal and ducal govemment. Jl Bates also questioned the notions of 'Unity' and 
'Assimilation'; the two chapter headings Le Patourel used to analyse the relationship 
between England and Normandy, noting a 'precocious' administrative development in 
England and Normandy, but arguing that they were both were built upon significantly 
different bases.12 
7 The essays in question can be found in Colonial England. 
8 Le Patourel, Norman Empire, Introduction, 5. 
9 On the importance of The Norman Empire see, J. C. Holt, 'John Le Patourel', PBA, 71 (1985),583-96, 
esp.593. 
10 D. Bates, 'Nonnandy and England after 1066', ERR, 104 (1989), 851-80. 
II Bates, 'Nonnandy and England', 852, 854-55. It should be noted that Bates in turn attracted criticism 
from Francis West for his criticisms ofthe 'model' of colonisation used by Le Patourel, a tenn Le 
Patourel refrained from using, FJ. West, 'The Colonial History of the Nonnan Conquest?'. History, 84 
(1999),223. 
12 Bates, 'Nonnandy and England'. 875. 
3 
Concurrent with Bates' critique, Professor Judith Green questioned what she termed the 
'current orthodoxies of the late 1980s; integration and centripetal forces', though there 
may be some dispute as to whether integration and centripetal forces were, in fact, the 
current orthodoxies of the late 1980s.13 Green concluded her critique by noting that 'for 
aristocratic society as a whole, the multi-faceted relationship between England and 
Normandy was evolving over a longer time scale and was conditioned by factors other 
than strictly political.' 14 
The wider corpus of historiography in the 1990s saw further erosion ofLe Patourel's 
vision of a culturally and politically homogeneous aristocracy. A very selective 
bibliography would highlight Professor David Crouch's important article on the county 
societies of Leicestershire and Warwickshire. IS Crouch concluded that Norman 
immigration into these two counties had tailed off by the early twelfth century, and that 
the county elites had rapidly became local in their outlook and aspirations, essentially an 
embellishment of an argument that he had first advanced in the early1980s.16 Emma 
13 J. A. Green, 'Unity and Disunity in the Anglo-Nonnan State', HR, 63 (1989), 115-34. While Bates and 
Green were the first to provide detailed and explicit criticisms ofLe Patourel and Hollister's arguments in 
the late 1980s, the lineage of these criticisms can be traced in their work to the early 1980s. In Normandy 
Before 1066, Bates noted, 'despite his immense achievements in governing Nonnandy ... even William [the 
Conqueror] had not been able to detach the duchy from the political framework which was eventually to 
be turned into feudal dependence on the French king.' D. Bates, Normandy Before 1066 (London, 1982), 
251. More explicit criticisms can be found in, D. Bates, 'The earliest Nonnan writs', EHR, 100 (1985), 
266-84; and a review of Hollister's collected essays, Monarchy, Magnates and Institutions, Albion, 19 
(1987),592-3. Professor Frank Barlow took issue with many of Hollister's ideas, particularly his view on 
the nature of the aristocracy and its relationship with William Rufus, Barlow, Rufus, 209-213. Arguably, 
Professor Green had, by 1989, produced enough studies of her own to shake up any supposed 
orthodoxies. In particular see, 'Lords of the Nonnan Vexin', War and Government in the Middle Ages: 
Essays in Honour of J .0. Prestwich, ed. le. Holt and l Gillingham (Woodbridge, 1984),47-61; 'King 
Henry I and the aristocracy of Nonnandy' ,La France Anglaise au Moyen Age, Actes de III e congres 
national des soc;eles savanles (Poitiers, 1986), 161-73. 
14 Green, 'Unity and Disunity', 134. 
15 D. Crouch, 'Normans and Anglo-Nonnans: A Divided Aristocracy?', England and Normandy in the 
Middle Ages, ed. D. Bates and A. Curry (London, 1994),51-67. 
16 D. Crouch, 'Geoffrey de Clinton and Roger, Earl of Warwick: New Men and Magnates in the Reign of 
Henry 1', BIHR, 55 (1982), 113-24. 
4 
Cownie looked at the issue of religious patronage and the nature of the honor.17 She 
concluded that 'honorial society was by no means entirely centrifugal or centripetal in 
its nature, both forces were evidently at work.' IS Analysis of burial practices, the 
adoption of toponymics and the role of women, have all contributed to a framework of 
discussion, where the diversity of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy's experience in 
England is stressed.19 
Throughout this activity, there has always been an awareness of the need for further 
research into the nature of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy, something Le Patourel 
recognised in 1966, when noting that the subject still awaited its Namier.20 Nearly forty 
years on and the work of modem scholars, especially Katharine Keats-Rohan, have 
arguably gone some way to satisfy this demand.21 Yet the one striking feature of the way 
in which the aristocracy has been discussed during the last thirty-five years is the 
implicit acceptance of an Anglo-Norman aristocratic political culture that was defined in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and owes it shape and structure to the to the English tradition of 
administrative, legal and constitutional history.22 As such, many of the political events 
that occupy such a central space in contemporary and near-contemporary accounts, such 
17 E. Cownie, 'Religious Patronage and Lordship: the Debate on the Nature of the Honor', Family Trees 
and the Roots of Politics. The Prosopography of Britain and France from the tenth to the twelfth century, 
ed. K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Woodbridge, 1997), 133-46. 
18 Cownie. 'Religious Patronage', 140. 
19 The literature is extensive and can be found in detail in the bibliography. A flavour can be gained in, B. 
Golding, 'Anglo-Nonnan Knightly Burials', The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood. I 
(Woodbridge, 1986),35-48; J.C. Holt, 'What's in a Name? Family Nomenclature and the Nonnan 
Conquest', Colonial England, 179-97; P. Stafford, 'Women and the Nonnan Conquest', TRHS, 6th 
Series,4 (1994), 221-49. 
20 Le Patourel, 'Nonnan Barons', 29; Bates, 'Nonnandy and England', 852. 
21 See especially, K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, Domesday People. 
22 Cf. M. Strickland, 'Against the Lord's anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England 
and Nonnandy, 1075-1265', Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy, ed. G. Garnett 
and J. Hudson (Cambridge, 1994),54-79. 'Whatever the underlying disputes that led elements of the 
baronage to resort to arms, be it grievances over land, title or the disbursement of patronage, a desire for 
enhanced local autonomy, or support for a royal cadet or other dynastic rival, the failure of the political 
process and reversion to the mechanisms of war confronted opponents of the crown with a fonnidable 
series of dilemmas.' 
5 
as the rebellion of 1095, struggle to be understood or even accorded the importance that 
they deserve. 
Since the 1970s, the theoretical and methodological framework within which medieval 
political discourse is viewed has changed radically. The influence of anthropological 
and cultural studies is all too apparent in the work of scholars who stress the ability of 
the aristocracy to engage with complex political and legal problems.23 Nor is the 
influence of religion in shaping political culture and kingship ignored.24 This contrasts 
sharply with the more traditional view of Anglo-Norman politics and political culture, 
which has been heavily influenced by an administrative ideology ofkingship.25 This 
influence can be seen to have reached its zenith in the formation of the wider concept of 
a 'tenurial crisis' to explain the apparent instability in English political life in the 
century after 1066.26 
Studies on the political behaviour of the wider western European political elite have had 
a significantly different emphasis to their Anglo-Norman counterparts. On one level, it 
is important to recognise that the very foundations of political power remained the 
same: the control of land and office. Property retains its potential for understanding 
23 For example, see, S. Airlie, 'The Nearly Men: Boso of Vie nne and Arnulf of Bavaria' ,Nobles and 
Nobility in Medieval Europe: Concepts, Origins and Transformations, ed. A. Duggan (Woodbridge, 
2000),25-41; S. MacLean, 'The Carolingian response to the revolt ofBoso, 879-887', EME, 10 (2001), 
21-48; M. Innes, 'Charlemagne's will: piety, politics and the imperial succession', EHR, 112 (1997),833-
53; J. Nelson, 'England and the Continent in the Ninth Century: III, Rights and Rituals', TRHS, 14 (2004), 
1-24. 
24 For example, Y. Hen, 'The uses of the Bible and the perception of kingship in Merovingian Gaul', 
EME, 7 (1998), 277-90; J. Nelson, 'The Voice of Charlemagne', Belief and Culture in the Middle Ages, 
ed. R. Gameson and H. Leyser (Oxford, 2001), 76-88. 
25 Most recently, C. W. Hollister, Anglo-Norman Political Culture and the Twelfth Century Renaissance. 
Proceedings of the Borchard Conference on Anglo-Norman History, 1995 (Woodbridge, 1997), 1-16. See 
the comments of Stephen Marritt, 'King Stephen and the Bishops', ANS, 24 (2002), 142-3. See also, D. 
Bates, 'William the Conqueror and his Wider Western World', HSJ, forthcoming. 
26 J. C. Holt, 'Politics and Property', Colonial England, 113-159, esp. 148. 'The tenurial crisis of the 
Anglo-Norman period arose not because there was no law governing title and inheritance, or because 
kings flouted it, but because of the difficulties they encountered and created in applying it.' Most recently 
see, D. Crouch, The Reign of King Stephen 1135-1154 (London, 2000), 125, n. 9. 
6 
contemporary politics and political action. Yet analysis of the early and late medieval 
aristocratic political culture is defined primarily in terms that reflect contemporary 
sources, where discussions, disagreements and often violence turn on the axis of 
political legitimacy, and utilise analytical tools drawn from anthropology and sociology 
to explore the aristocracy as political actors. The dangers of insularity have been 
recognised, particularly by scholars of Anglo-Saxon England, and many aspects of 
English political life and kingship before 1066 are now firmly placed within a 
continental, post-Carolingian political and religious world.27 
The process of refining the framework of analysis for Anglo-Norman political culture is 
already under way. The work of George Garnett in relation to the importance of political 
ideas to pre-Conquest Normandy and post-Conquest England, and the exploration by 
Mark Philpott of the importance of canon law to the development ofthe English state, 
are but two examples of scholarship which could have a potentially dramatic impact on 
the way that Anglo-Norman aristocratic political behaviour is perceived, especially in 
stressing the intellectual context in which politics were conducted.28 Mention should 
also be made of the work of John Gillingham and Matthew Strickland. 29 
27 For example, J. Campbell, 'Observations of English Government from the Tenth to the Twetlth 
Century', Essays in Anglo-Saxon England (London and Ronceverte, 1986), 155-70; P. Wonnald, The 
Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, vol. 1: Legislation and its Limits (Oxford, 
1999). See also, D. Bates, 'Britain and France and the Year toOO', Journal of the British Institute in 
Paris, 28 (1999), 5-22. 
28 For example, G. Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda: Some Implications ofthe Nonnan Claim to the 
Throne of England in 1066', TRHS, Sth Ser., 36 (1985), 91-116; 'The Origins of the Crown', The History 
of English Law Centenary Essays on 'Pollock and Maitland', PBA, 89, ed. J. Hudson, (Oxford, 1996), 
171-214; "'Ducal' succession in early Nonnandy", Law and Government in Medieval England and 
Normandy, ed. G. Garnett and J. Hudson (Cambridge, 1994),80-110; M. Philpott, 'Eadmer, his 
Archbishops and the English State', The Medieval State. Essays Presented to James Campbell, ed. J. R. 
Maddicott and D. M. Palliser (London and Rio Grande, 2000), 93-107. 
29 For John Gillingham, see the collection of essays in, The English in the Twelfth Century (Woodbridge, 
2002). M. Strickland, 'Provoking or Avoiding Battle? Challenge, Duel and Single Combat in the Warfare 
of the High Middle Ages', Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings 
of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998),317-47. 
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Viewed from a different angle, David Crouch has recently begun to re-examine the 
aristocracy's response to Stephen's reign. 30 He has argued forcefully that the ruling elite 
was finding it impossible not to view the issue of the succession to the English throne in 
intellectual terms. Crouch argued that William of Malmesbury's Historia Novella 
unambiguously revealed the arguments that circulated amongst the aristocracy on the 
respective merits of Stephen and Mathilda as rulers. His conclusion stressed that tenurial 
explanations of rebellion failed to sufficiently explain the actions of the aristocracy in 
engaging in rebellion. In other words, Crouch has suggested that the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy of the mid twelfth century reacted and discussed the issue of succession in a 
way that the Carolingian or late medieval aristocracy would recognise. The obvious 
questions to ask therefore, and which this thesis attempts to answer, is how far the 
aristocracy of the 1090s and early 11 OOs thought in similar terms over similar issues; 
how far these concerns influenced their actions; what attempts were made to achieve a 
lasting political settlement and how the aristocracy adapted to changing political 
circumstances. 
To answer these questions, this thesis is divided into two sections. Part One is a series of 
largely self-selecting case studies that examine the major political events between 1087 
and 1106 through the careers and actions of those men who were the most intimately 
involved in them and often closest to the centre of political power. The case studies 
begin with the role of the sheriffs in the rebellions of 1088 and 1101. Chapter Four is 
devoted to Robert de Mowbray and the revolt of 1095. Chapter Five considers the role 
of Robert de BelH!me in the crisis of 1100-1102. Chapter Six, the last chapter in this 
section, considers the career of William of Mortain and his relations with Henry up to 
the Battle of Tinchebray in 1106. 
30 Crouch, The Reign of King Stephen, 121-32. 
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At this stage it is crucially important to stress that this thesis is not written in opposition 
to one of the major trends in the historiography of the last thirty years: the notion of 
heterogeneity. Varied political, tenurial, social and geographical interests and ambitions 
can define a heterogeneous aristocracy. Many of the factors that underpin the notion of 
heterogeneity can be seen in influencing the actions of these men at the centre of the 
case studies. For example, the support for Rufus and Henry I from the men who held the 
office of sherif fin 1088 and 1101 indicates that they regarded a Curthose kingship and 
the retrenchment of former lords and patrons as inimical to their interests. Their actions 
in supporting Rufus and Henry have been variously interpreted within a framework 
defined by the notion of the Conquest providing unparalleled opportunities for 'new 
men' to rise up the social ladder to previously unimagined levels of power and wealth.31 
Likewise, no one should doubt that calculations of vested self-interest did not influence 
the actions of Robert de Mowbray, Robert de Belleme or William of Mortain. 
The point of departure for this thesis, however, is the contention that a further layer of 
analysis must be considered to understand the actions of these men and the wider 
political discourse associated with the dispute for the English throne, which found 
expression in the accounts of contemporary and near-contemporary chroniclers. Rather 
than a framework based upon the notion of a tenurial crisis to explain the aspects of the 
political instability of the 1090s and early 11 OOs, it might be more appropriate to think 
in terms of a crisis of politicallegitimacy.31 In essence, the argument advanced in this 
thesis is that the partition of England and Normandy in 1087 created two separate cross-
Channel centres of power and legitimacy. Partition was clearly counter to the political 
311. A. Green. The Government o/England under Henry I (Cambridge, 1986), 143-4. 
32 This, of course, echoes the criticisms levelled at Professor Holt by Professor Edmund King on the 
publication of 'Politics and Property'. 'Debate: Politics and Property in Early Medieval England. The 
Tenurial Crisis of the Early Twelfth Century', Past and Present, 65 (1974), 110- 17. 
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preferences of many members of the cross-Channel elite who for a variety of reasons 
would have preferred a Curthose kingship. Yet crucially, the means by which Rufus and 
Henry were chosen as kings saw substantial sections of the senior cross-Channel 
excluded from that process and ran counter to the accepted values and norms of political 
behaviour, where consultation was needed if a king could claim to be a legitimate ruler. 
As such, many members of the aristocracy harboured doubts over the legitimacy of both 
Rufus' and Henry's kingship. On occasion these doubts expressed themselves in support 
for Robert Curthose's claim to the throne, but also, and as will be argued in Chapter 
Four, in political upheaval and violence unconnected to Robert Curthose, but firmly 
rooted in the politics of legitimacy. 
Part One of this thesis therefore begins with a chapter devoted to the aristocracy's 
attitude towards the English successions of 1087 and 1100 and an exploration of the 
values that governed the succession. The thrust of current debate has centred upon 
whether the transmission of the English crown was governed by customary aristocratic 
inheritance practices, based upon the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies.33 
Almost certainly this is something of a red herring. For example, Majorie Chibnall has 
demonstrated how William of Poitiers constructed a detailed legal argument in the 
Gesta Guillelmi to support the Conqueror's claim to the English kingship in 1066, 
which had to be proved and just 'by every law known to be learned' .34 William wrote 
with a firm understanding of the contemporary law and politics. Therefore, the argument 
presented in Chapter One is that contemporary and twelfth century writers had as firm 
an understanding of contemporary politics and kingship as William of Poi tiers. Their 
33 Holt, :Politics and Property', Colonial England, 113-159; E. Z. Tabuteau, 'The Role of Law in the 
SuccessIOn to Nonnandy and England, 1087.'HSJ, 3 (1991), 141-69; Cf. Garnett, 'Coronation and 
Propaganda', 115. 
34 M. Chibnall, "'Clio's Legal Cosmetics"; Law and Custom in the Work of Medieval Historians', ANS, 
20 (1999), 36. 
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accounts of the circumstances of Rufus' and Henry's accession, together with those of 
the political crises of the 1090s and 1100s, reflect the contemporary disputes over the 
succession of the one of Conqueror's sons to the English kingship, based not upon 
aristocratic succession customs but legal arguments rooted in canon law that emphasised 
the role of the aristocracy in the decision making process if a king was to have a claim 
of political legitimacy. 
Part Two of this thesis contains two chapters that are broadly defined as strategies of 
coping, though in essence they are much more than this. A further point of departure for 
this thesis is to suggest that those most intimately affected by the political instability 
generated after 1087 were perfectly capable of contemplating the permanent political 
division of England and Normandy as a viable and workable solution to that problem. 
To that end, a key component of analysis will be a reappraisal of the peace settlements 
of 1091 and 1101, the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester. The terms of these treaties 
make distinctly uncomfortable reading for those advocating the centripetal relationship 
between England and Normandy. Le Patourel regarded the settlement of 1091 as an 
'interesting experiment, made at the time when the political and social implications of 
the Norman conquest and colonization of England were only beginning to be 
understood. '3~ Hollister dismissed the settlement of 1101 as an anti-climactic 'truce' .36 
Neither judgement gave the settlements their due importance. Both treaties need to be 
viewed as part of the central narrative for this period and constitute the major effort on 
the part of the aristocracy to solve the problem ofinstability, based not upon the 
preservation of England and Normandy as a single cross-Channel political structure, but 
upon separation and co-existence. More than this, however, the accounts of the 
35 Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 198. 
36 Hollister, 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', MMI, 77. 
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negotiations surrounding the treaties and the terms of the treaties reflect the very nature 
of the political problems faced by the aristocracy and the capacity of the cross-Channel 
aristocracy to engage in a complex political discourse and arrive at potential solutions. 
Consideration of this allows the introduction into the debate of a different 
historiographical theme that has so far not affected the discussion of the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy; the concepts of the 'Feudal Revolution' .37 At its broadest, this offers an 
interpretative framework that acknowledges political change and the recourse to 
violence, yet also the need for conflict resolution and the peaceful co-existence of 
legitimate centres of power that might exercise overlapping claims on the loyalties ofa 
trans-regional aristocracy. The upheaval of the 1090s and early 1100s, though on 
occasion dramatic, should therefore not be seen as lying outside the political culture or 
experience of the aristocracy; or that it necessarily presented problems to the aristocracy 
that they were not equipped intellectually or with the practical experience to negotiate. 
Indeed, when all the evidence is combined with the concepts of political ritual and 
ceremony as a vehicle to explore the issue, a set of expectations on the conduct of 
politics and the rights and prerogatives of the aristocracy emerge to take centre stage. 
The final chapter explores the wider activities of the aristocracy during this period. The 
evidence suggests that the aristocracy was capable of rapidly adapting to the new 
political situation created after 1087. The political division of England and Normandy 
37 The literature on this topic is vast. However, note should be taken of, T. N. Bisson, "'The "Feudal 
Revolution''', Past and Present, 142 (1994), 6-42. The interplay of aristocratic violence and social 
change has proved controversial; see D. Barthelemy, S. D. White, T. Reuter, C. Wickham and T. N. 
Bisson, 'Debate: The "Feudal Revolution'" Past and Present, 152 (1996), 196-223; 155, (1997), 177-
225. The wider literature of La mutation de I 'an mil is vast. Of particular relevance in this context is, D. 
Barthelemy, La societe dans Ie comte de Vendome de I 'an mil auXIVe siecle (Paris 1993); La mutation 
de I'an mil: a-t-elle eu lieu? Servage et chevalerie dans la France des x et Xle siecles (Paris, 1997); P. A. 
Stafford, "'La mutation familiale": a Suitable Case for Caution', ed. J. Hill and M. Swan, The Community, 
the Family and the Saint (Tumhout, 1998), 103-25. An overview of the existing literature and debate can 
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did not mean a break in other cross-Channel links. Marriages continued to be contracted 
and religious patronage also continued, though both need to be integrated into the wider 
political narrative in order to understand the changes that took place between 1087 and 
1106. Moreover, they both serve as a vehicle with the potential to chart the perceptions 
of contemporary politics by those who gave endowments and contracted marriages, as 
the varied political and social interests ofthe aristocratic families involved dictated. 
Consideration must also be given to the growing distinction between acquisitions and 
patrimonies within aristocratic inheritance practices. The proliferation of divided 
inheritances after 1087 suggests that the Conqueror's actions may have laid the 
foundations within which this practice could develop from an evolving customary 
distinction in Normandy before 1066 into something more tangible. Indeed, the need to 
mitigate the effects of a divided political structure is likely to have given this process 
added impetus. The question may not be so much as to when an acquisition became a 
patrimony, or even the security oftide to an acquisition, but under whose authority and 
on what grounds these changes could apply.38 Though the picture is at times messy and 
contradictory, the aristocracy was perfectly able to contemplate the political separation 
of England and Normandy with a degree of equanimity, while demonstrating no lack of 
skill in maintaining cultural and familial links and adapting customary practices, all of 
which also provided the means to develop 'strategies of coping' to deal with the 
pressures created by conflicting centres of authority and legitimacy. 
The first chapter describes in detail the methodology and framework of analysis. It is 
appropriate at this point that the use and meaning of the collective noun 'aristocracy' is 
be found in, D. Bates,'England and the "Feudal Revolution''', II Feudalesimo Nell'Alto Medioevo 
(Spoleto, 2000),611-49. 
38 Cf. Holt, 'Politics and Property', Colonial England, 126.7. 
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given definition. It is not a noun contemporaries would have recognised, who instead 
make use of the likes of nobiles, pro ceres or optimates to describe those men from 
leading families who held land and exercised political power.39 Due to the nature of the 
evidence and the social and political importance of the men in question, the focus of this 
thesis is upon a narrow band of the aristocracy; the cross-Channel elite closest to the 
ruling family in terms of background, life-style and aspirations. Unlike later usage of the 
term, the use of aristocracy in the context of this thesis is not based upon notions of 
lineage.4o 
Chapter Three attempts to broaden the analysis by considering a particular stratum of 
the aristocracy, in this case the sheriffs and their response to the rebellion of 1088. To 
varying degrees, all previous approaches to these men have been influenced by the idea 
of the Conquest providing 'unparalleled opportunities for men of humble origins to win 
land for themselves' .41 Many of the prosopographical studies of royal officials can be 
located in a wider mainstream of historical thought throughout much of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, where discourse on English political society reflected Orderic's comments 
on 'men raised from the dust' .42 Though the importance of royal service as a source of 
power and patronage and an instrument of social change has long been recognised, Sir 
Richard Southern having first systematically explored it in the early 1960s, increasingly 
39 For example, OV, 2, 74; 3, 126, 178. For a discussion see, Green, Aristocracy, 8-19. 
40 See L. Stone and J. Fawtier Stone,An Open Elite? England 1540-1880 (Oxford, 1984),3-29; J. M. van 
Winter, 'The knightly aristocracy of the middle ages as a "social class''', The Medieval Nobility. Studies 
on the Ruling Classes of France and Germany from the Sixth to the Twelfth Century, ed. T. Reuter 
(Oxford, 1978),313-29. 
41 Green. The Government of England, 143-4. 
42 For example, Crouch, 'Geoffrey de Clinton', 113-123; R. V. Turner, 'Changing Perceptions ofthe New 
Administrative Class in Anglo-Norman and Angevin England: the Curiales and their Conservative 
Critics', Journal of British Studies, 29 (1990),93-5; J. C. Holt 'Feudal Society and the Family in Early 
Medieval England', Colonial England, 161-78; OV, 6, 616. ' 
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concerns have been voiced as to whether historians have fully understood the nature of 
the aristocratic society they have sought to explain.43 
A trend in recent scholarship has been to see the aristocracy in socially conservative 
terms, largely as a single body, though one defined by enormous variations in the 
wealth, status and responsibilities of its constituent members.44 There has also been a 
trend of analysing the aristocracy through its office holding and ethos of service, 
explored most adroitly by Katharine Keats-Rohan with a considerable debt to the 
seminal work of Karl Ferdinand Werner.4S The pleas for greater sensitivity in the 
analysis of the social and political elite are highly persuasive.46 Increasingly, the 
enterprise of conquest is regarded as an exercise in elitism, undertaken by a social and 
political elite. 
In this context, the question of reconciling new approaches to established frameworks of 
discussion is one of balance. The inability of many of Curt hose's supporters to get their 
English tenants to support them in 1088 is noticeable, yet it needs to be remembered that 
rebels of 1075 and 1082 had encountered similar problems. Nearly all the Normans who 
occupied the office of sheriff chose to support not only Rufus in 1088, but also Henry in 
1101. In many instances this pitted these men against their former lords in whose 
entourages they had started their careers. The dynamic at work here is one that can only 
be understood within a context where royal service and office-holding had provided an 
43 R. W. Southern, 'The Place of Henry I in English History', PBA, 48 (1962),127-70; reprinted, 'Henry 
1', Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970), 206-33; K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 'Normans, 
Non-Normans, Nobles and New Men: Social Elitism in the Period 1066 to 1135', Domesday 
Descendants, 8-38. 
44 See especially, Green, Aristocracy, 126-140; D. Bates, 'Kingship, government and political life to c. 
1160', The Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries 1 066-c.1280, ed. B. Harvey (Oxford, 2000), 79; D. Crouch, 
:~ntroduction', The Image of Aristocracy in Britain, 1000-1300 (London, 1992). 
K. F. Werner, Naissance de la noblesse (Paris, 1998); Keats-Rohan, 'Normans, Non-Normans, Nobles 
and New Men', 8-38. 
46 Keats-Rohan, 'Normans, non-Normans, Nobles and New Men', 38. 
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alternative form of power and influence to the more established networks of aristocratic 
power created in Normandy prior to 1066.47 Yet equally, it is astonishing that until now 
the question has not been asked as to whether these men supported Henry and Rufus 
because they accepted the legitimacy of their rule as English kings and not simply 
because it served their interests to do so. The mechanics of aristocratic power at its 
widest point may have been more subtle and fluid than simply the preservation or 
accumulation of complexes of estates and offices. 
From the approach outlined above it will come as no surprise that one recent trend in the 
analysis of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy rejected for this thesis is the concept of 
colonialism. John Le Patourel was the first to use that particular abstract noun to 
describe the Norman settlement in England. As such, it represented a profound change 
in the way the Norman settlement was perceived and has continued to exercise a 
profound influence. Professor J.C. Holt took up Le Patourel's legacy with some 
enthusiasm and extended it to areas such as buildings, language and law to produce a 
highly personal view of the Norman colonisation of England.48 Holt's conception of 
colonialism was significantly more developed than Le Patourel's, exemplified by Holt's 
view that the creation of the common law was a 'response to a colonial situation' whose 
'impetus was continental', yet 'the solution in the end was insular. '49 
As an intellectual thread to link the various aspects of the Norman settlement in 
England, colonialism is not without its merits. Yet the concepts of colonialism and 
47 Bates, 'Kingship, government, and political life' , 79. 
48 J. C. Holt, 'Colonial England, 1066·1215', Colonial England, 1.25. 
49 Holt, 'Colonial England', 18. 
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imperialism are not value-neutral. These terms are subject to vagaries of interpretation 
and definition, often becoming pejorative in their usage.so This, in turn, has influenced 
the way in which the Anglo-Norman aristocracy has been perceived.sl Moreover, the use 
of colonisation, even if appropriate, has been somewhat inconsistent. England may be 
thought a too obvious example and it needs to be questioned whether the term is 
appropriate for Norman expansion in northern France, raising the possibility of a 
'colonial' Maine, or 'colonial' Norman ducal ambitions in the Vexin. The activities of 
great frontier families, such as those of Belleme and Beaumont, sit uneasily in a colonial 
paradigm. Moreover, the methods and actions of the Normans' northern French rivals 
would also need to be viewed as 'colonial' ,52 If Brian Golding could be sceptical of the 
appropriateness of using colonial to describe Norman settlement in England, noting the 
shared common culture between the two, then it is doubtful that it would be appropriate 
as a framework to consider Norman expansion and ambitions within northern France 
itself,53 It must also be questioned whether the thrust of historiography in dismantling 
notions of empire can then allow a 'colonial' aristocracy to exist as an intellectual 
construct. With this in mind, it is doubtful whether the use of colonialism and 
imperialism actually contribute to historical understanding. 
Most critics of Le Patourel and the notion of homogeneity have been careful to stress 
that from 1066 onwards the aristocracy and their actions can only be readily understood 
within a cross-Channel context, while at the same time successfully rejecting Le 
Patourel's notion of 'empire', together with Hollister's view of an Anglo-Norman 
regnum,S4 In structural terms, and in the context of the notion of heterogeneity, this 
so M. Chibnall, 'Feudalism and Lordship', A Companion to the Anglo-Norman World, ed. C. Harper-Bill 
and E. M. C. van Houts (Woodbridge, 2003), 123-34. 
SI West, 'The Colonial History of the Nonnan Conquest?', 223. 
S2 Bates, 'Nonnandy and England', 857. 
S3 B. Golding, Conquest and Colonisation: The Normans in Britain 1066-1100 (Oxford, 1994), 179. 
54 Bates, 'Nonnandy and England', 851. 
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thesis will present an interpretation of the aristocracy that suggests that some sections 
undoubtedly welcomed the separation of England and Normandy as a means to further 
augment their careers, and to neutralise powerful competitors for local power and 
influence. On the other hand, other members of the aristocracy would clearly have 
welcomed the continuation of a cross-Channel political structure, based upon the ties 
and obligations already in existence before 1087. In simple terms, there is no doubt that 
the great cross-Channel families supported Curthose because they believed that a 
Curthose kingship would be beneficial to their interests. 
Yet the central contention is that structural analysis of cross-Channel institutions and 
organs of government, an administrative ideology of kingship that excludes and reduces 
ritual and ceremony, and a cross-Channel aristocracy whose political culture is defined 
by primarily by the laws and customs of landholding and inheritance does not fully 
appreciate the degree to which contemporaries thought about, discussed and acted upon 
concepts of political legitimacy. This, after all, might explain why, in the context of a 
looming succession crisis in the 1120s and 1130s, the problems faced by an earlier 
generation of the aristocracy in dealing with similar problems merited consideration. On 
the death of Queen Matilda in 1118, William of Malmesbury re-dedicated his Gesta 
Regum to her daughter, the Empress Matilda, with the hope that: 'In it you can also 
discover that none of those chronicled in this present book, whether king or queen, has 
more royal or more glorious claim to the hereditary crown of England than yourself. '55 
55 GR, 1,8. 'In eo etiam experiri potestis quod nul/us eorum quorum fiber presens continet memoriam, 
nec rex afiquis nec regina aliqua, regalius uel splendidius uobis Anglorum regni hereditarii iura 
expectauerit. • 
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Chapter 1 
Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis will be to analyse systematically the surviving evidence 
that relates to the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 in relation to the 
profound theoretical and historiographical changes of the last thirty years. In particular, 
the framework of anthropological, sociological and cultural studies now used to 
facilitate discussions on the wider medieval aristocracy, the nature of the political 
discourse they engaged in, and their political culture will be employed in this thesis. 
The aim is to add an extra dimension to the well-established picture of the Anglo-
Norman aristocracy as political actors, with an appreciation of the value and importance 
of ideas in shaping political culture and action. 1 
Definition is crucial in this context. Historians of the later medieval period have 
attempted to define the concept of political culture to analyse and explain political 
change and avoid some of the pitfalls of the concept, particularly its tendency to be 
subsumed into incoherent frameworks of analysis.2 One definition of political culture 
that has found favour with late medievalists is supplied by Dale Hoak in his study of 
Tudor political culture, who suggested that the difference between politics and political 
culture is essentially 'the difference between political action and the codes of conduct, 
1 On political culture as a concept, see, G. Gendzel, 'Political Culture: Genealogy of a Concept', Journal 
o/Interdisciplinary History, 28 (1998), 225-50; R. P. Fonnisano, 'The Concept of Political Culture', 
Journal o/Interdisciplinary History, 31 (2001),393-426. 
2 For a succinct summary of the history and use of the concept see, C. Carpenter, 'Introduction', The 
Fifteenth Century IV, Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain, ed. L. Clark and C. Carpenter 
(Woodbridge,2004),1-8. 
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fonnal and infonnal, governing these actions' .3 In this context, mention should be made 
of John Gillingham, Matthew Strickland and Maurice Keen, all of whom have 
attempted to ask questions about the 'codes of conduct' and the aristocratic thought 
world that governed political action. Themes of chivalry, knightly values and knightly 
obligations are not seen as 'mere tinsel gloss prettifying brutal realities', but aspects of a 
'fundamental political morality'.4 The capacity of political culture to provide a wide-
ranging framework to encompass many aspects of socio-economic and political change, 
including governmental and institutional, urban and rural, is beginning to influence 
approaches to the study of late medieval history. In this context, the entrenched 
positions, as well as the nuances of the 'Feudal Revolution' debate are, in effect, 
discussions and comparative studies of political cultures across different times and 
regions, though not expressed in those tenns. 
The importance of ideas in shaping a political culture cannot be ignored. Therefore, the 
aspect of political culture that this thesis focuses upon is quite simply the idea of 
political legitimacy. The effect is to suggest that the actions and motivations of those 
members of the Anglo-Nonnan aristocracy who questioned the legitimacy of Rufus' 
and Henry's kingship can thus be placed into the wider spectrum of political discourse, 
defined by discussions and disagreements over political legitimacy and succession that 
had been a central feature of political life for generations.' Without necessarily 
underplaying the political instability of the 1090s and early 1100s in any way, it can, 
nonetheless, be placed in its appropriate context and perhaps seen in tenns of the nonns 
of the political process in the early medieval west. 
3 D. Hoak, Tudor Political Culture (Cambridge, 1995), 1. Quoted by Carpenter, Political Culture in Late 
Medieval Britain, 1. 
4 Gillingham, 'Introduction', The English in the Twelfth Century, 22; M. Keen, Chivalry (London, 1984); 
~trickland, 'Provoking or Avoiding Battle?', idem 'Againstthe Lord's anointed'. 
Cf. D. Bates, 'The Conqueror's Adolescence', ANS, 25 (2003), 1.18. 
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In any discussion of this nature, contemporary and near contemporary histories must be 
at the forefront of consideration. John Le Patourel had Orderic's account of the dilemma 
faced by the senior members of aristocracy after the partition of 1087 at the heart of his 
argument for a politically and culturally homogeneous cross-Channel aristocracy.6 Since 
the 1970s, however, an understanding of the aims, nature and circumstances of 
historical writing in the twelfth century has grown, partly to address some profoundly 
entrenched prejudices.7 The most significant development has been the attempt to place 
the histories produced in the Anglo-Norman world into a wider intellectual context. In 
one pertinent example, C. Warren Hollister eloquently argued that the histories 
produced in the early twelfth century needed integration into the wider world of the 
twelfth century renaissance.' For Hollister, the 'new intellectual vision' of the 
renaissance propelled contemporary writers into a systematic investigation of theology, 
law and the human experience. As a result, these texts displayed a new interest in 
naturalistic cause and effect, with the ideas and assumptions of the twelfth century 
renaissance affecting and transforming political institutions and political culture. 9 
In many ways, Hollister's conclusions are remarkable. His discussion of political 
culture rested upon certain assumptions as to how politics and any attendant political 
culture might be defined. In quintessential fashion, he developed his argument on the 
basis of an earlier theme in his work, namely the administrative nature of Anglo-
Norman kingship and politics. This shaped his interpretation of the political instability 
of the 1090s, and especially the so-called 'civil war' of 1101, with the cleavage between 
6 Norman Empire, 197-200. 
7 Cf. Timothy Reuter and his criticisms of ' the standard trope of English medievalists: narrative sources 
unreliable, back to the archives'. 'The Making of England and Germany, 850-1050: Points of Comparison 
and Difference', Medieval Europeans, ed. A. Smyth (London, 1998),62-3. 
'C. W. Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Political Culture', Anglo-Norman Political Culture: Proceedings of the 
Borchard Conference on Anglo-Norman History, 1995, ed. C. Warren Hollister (Woodbridge, 1997), 1-
16. 
9 Hollister, Anglo-Norman Political Culture, 9-10. 
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curiales and great magnates defining each side. Tellingly, his discussion of political 
culture avoided the issue of how the histories under consideration portrayed the causes 
of dispute and violence, as well as conflict resolution among the political elite. 
The interest shown by twelfth century authors in the nineteen years following the 
Conqueror's death parallels the period in which many of these works were written, a 
time when the question of a successor to Henry was gaining momentum. The problems 
faced by an earlier generation of the aristocracy in dealing with similar problems clearly 
merited consideration. William of Malmesbury expressed his hope that the Gesta 
Regum might imitate previous histories, written to provide rulers with 'a sort of pattern 
for their own lives, from which they could learn .... ' 10 William also recognised the 
dangers of writing contemporary history, noting that 'truth is often disastrous and 
falsehood profitable'. 11 In this context, it is important to observe Alan Cooper's 
observation on the public nature of the writing of history in the twelfth century.12 The 
views and opinions expressed by these authors were not simply the academic 
speculations of a remote intellectual elite. They were aware that what they wrote would 
be discussed and evaluated by the wider political world.13 Likewise, Elisabeth van Houts 
has demonstrated how the Norman Conquest prompted continental contemporaries to 
both criticise the Conqueror and re-evaluate their own situations in the light of his 
success. 14 
It is axiomatic that the Benedictine monasticism of many writers profoundly shaped 
their outlook and attitudes. What is also clear is the degree in which they wrote their 
10 GR, 1,6. ' ... ut quasi ad uitae suae exemplum eis instruerentur aliorum ... '. 
II GR, 1, 540.' .. . sepe naufragatur ueritas et sufJragatur falsitas .. '. 
12 A. Cooper, ' 'The feet of those that bark that shall be cut ofr: Timorous Historians and the Personality 
of Henry 1', ANS, 23 (2000),47-67. 
13 GR, 1,8; Cooper, 'Timorous Historians', 67. 
14 E. M. C. van Houts, 'The Norman Conquest through European Eyes', ERR, 110 (1995), 832-53. 
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histories with a firm understanding of the contemporary theories of kingship and the 
practical conduct of politics. A cursory reading of the Gesta Regum reveals that William 
of Malmesbury's discussion of royal rights and responsibilities reflects closely ideas 
expressed in texts as diverse as the Irish tract on kingship known as Pseudo-Cyprian, the 
Carolingian capitularies and tracts produced in Germany during the civil war of the 
1070s and 1080s, to name but a few. l' All agreed that a king should maintain the peace, 
defend the realm, be pious and generous to the Church, and uphold justice. 
As was stated in the Introduction, George Garnett has done much to deepen the 
understanding of the intellectual climate in which politics were discussed and acted 
upon in the late eleventh century. In particular, his introduction into the discussion of 
William's claim to the English throne of the Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals, preserved in 
Trinity College, Cambridge, has opened a whole new vista of analysis for the politics of 
the late eleventh century and the central question of the English succession. The 
framework offered by the text of the Fourth Council of Toledo in Pseudo-Isidore on the 
need for consultation with the political elite for the selection of a king, that any king 
~ho is not chosen through consultation is to be regarded as at best illegitimate, if not an 
actual tyrant, is central to any understanding the actions of the aristocracy profiled in the 
case studies in Part One. Contextually, the emphasis on consultation was a major feature 
in many sources who discussed the Conqueror's own succession in 1066.16 
Despite the dangers apparent in writing contemporary history, William ofMalmesbury 
wrote with a deep awareness of the issue of political legitimacy and the dangers posed 
to the wider polity when anyone claiming political authority found their legitimacy 
U For Example, GR, 1, 190,238-40,254,348,492; I. S. Robinson, Authority and Resistance in the 
Investiture Contest: The Polemical Literature olLate Eleventh-Century Germany, (Manchester, 1978), 
114-50; Bates, 'William the Conqueror and His Wider Western World', HSJ, forthcoming. 
16 Gesta Guillelm/, 146-8. 
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questioned, especially when alternative sources of legitimacy were available. His 
account of the aristocracy's motives in attempting to achieve reconciliation between 
Robert Curthose and Henry I in 1101 has this view at its core. He explained that the 
baronial negotiators were motivated in seeking peace by the 'law of natural affection', 
which would be broken if brother were to meet brother in battle. 17 
The depth of William's classicalleaming provided him with a paradigm to explore the 
question of political legitimacy and the process of reconciliation. IS The law of filial 
affection or pielalis ius that William refers to is likely to have been known to him 
through two classical authors with whom he was familiar; Suetonius and Cicero.19 The 
integration of pielalis ius uiolandum into Malmesbury's text follows his standard 
method, explored by Neil Wright, of imitating a line or part of a line from a classical 
author into his narrative with a greater or lesser degree of modification. The line in 
question is from the life of Julius Caesar in Suetonius's De Vita Caesarum, where 
Suetonius created a speech for Caesar on the necessity of breaking the law only in the 
interests of fellow citizens.2o Suetonius had drawn this speech from Cicero's De Officiis, 
where Cicero had used a quotation of a speech by Eteoc1es from the Phoenician Women 
by Euripides.21 Elsewhere, William ofMalmesbury quotes the full speech when 
describing Henry'S motives in intervening in Normandy after the Treaty of Winchester. 
Henry, William states, subscribed to Caesar's opinion: 'If you must break the law, break 
17 GR, 1, 716-8, 'Sed satagentibus sanioris consilii hominibus, qui dicerent pietatis ius uiolandum si 
fraterna necessitudo prelio concurreret, paci animos accommodauere,reputantes quod, sl alter 
occumberet, alter infirmior remaneret, cum nullusfratrum preter ipsos superesset.' 
18 R. M. Thomson, William of Malmesbury (Woodbridge, 2003), 10. 
19 Thomson, William ofMalmesbury, 51-8, 207, 213. See also, N. Wright, 'William of Malmesbury and 
Latin Poetry. Further Evidence for a Benedictine's Reading', Revue Benedictine, 101 (1991), 122-53, esp 
125-6 where William's methods of borrowing and integrating Latin sources are discussed. Idem, 
"'Industriae Testimonium'" William of Malmesbury and Latin Poetry Revisited', Revue Benedictine, 103 
(1993), 482-531. 
20 Suetonius, Julius, 30, 5. 'si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia, violandum est: aliis rebus pietates 
colas'. 
21 Cicero On Duties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge, 1991),130-1; Euripides Phoenician 
Women, ed. and trans. E. Craik (Warminster, 1998),lines, 524-5. 
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it in the interest of your fellow citizens; in every other case, you should mind your 
duty' .22 
There are two implications arising from Malmesbury's use of this speech. First, is the 
context in which Cicero quotes the speech from Eteoc1es. Despite Cicero's apparent 
justification of realpolitik his work is, in fact, a critique of unjust actions in the service 
of political ambition.23 The overall message Cicero strives to convey is the tendency of 
ambitious Romans to succumb to tyranny, and he wants to convince his readers that this 
is not the path to glory or happiness. In this context, William of Malmesbury's use of 
this speech in full evidently provides a rationale for Henry's actions in intervening in 
Normandy. Yet the subtext to those who would have known the wider context of 
Cicero's message was possibly that there was a limit to what Henry could and ought to 
do in Normandy. Henry's intervention might even be construed as coming dangerously 
close to tyranny: an unjust action in pursuit of political ambition. This certainly was the 
case of Louis VI at the Council ofReims in October 1119, where Louis accused Henry 
of violently invading Normandy, which was part of his realm, of treating Robert 
Curthose, a vassal of Louis, brother and lord of Henry 'atrociously, without regard to 
justice or right', and keeping him in custody 'up to this day' .24 Moreover, the concerns 
over tyranny expressed by William of Malmesbury also found expression in slightly 
later sources, particularly John of Salisbury's Policraticus.2s 
22 GR, 1,706. 'Jlle Cesarianae sententiae assistens: 'Si uiolandum est ius, gratia ciuium uiolandum est; 
aliis rebus pietatem colas.' The insertion of ciuium by William of Malmesbury was his attempt to deal 
with the missing gratia in all early copies ofSeutonius, GR, 2, 359. 
23 A Commentary o/Cicero, A. R. Oyck (Ann Arbor, 1998),602-3. 
24 OV, 6, 256. 'Normanniam quae de regno mea est uiolenter inuasit, et Rodbertum ducem Normannorum 
contra omne Ius et/as detestabiliter tractauit. Hominem quippe meum sed/ratrem dominum que suum 
muftis modis molestauit, et ad ultimum cepit, et huc usque in carcere longo detinuit. ' Hollister, Henry I, 
266-7; Councils and Synods with Other Documents Realting to the English Church, ed. D. Whitelock, M. 
Brett and C. N. L. Brooke, vol. 1, A. 0.871-1204, Part 2, 1066-1204 (Oxford, 1981),718-9. 
2' John o/Salisbury Policraticus. O/the Frivolities o/Courtiers and the Footprints o/Philosophers, ed. 
and trans. C. J. Nederman (Cambridge, 1990), Introduction, 24-5; Book 8, Chapter 17, 190-1. ' .... the 
tyrant is, therefore, one who oppresses the people by violent domination .. '. Ioannis Saresberiensis 
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Malmesbury's use of pie tat is ius uiolandum in the context of the negotiations at Alton 
alludes back to Cicero's message and suggests a concern for tyranny. Arguably, the 
object of William's concern at this stage was Robert Curthose. His claim to the English 
throne in 1101 was certainly more justified than Henry's grounds for intervening in 
Normandy, hence William of Malmesbury does not repeat the speech in full, but a 
momentum for a Curthose kingship had clearly failed to develop in 1101 and to press 
his claim further would invite the accusations of tyranny and raise exactly the same 
issues oflegitimacy that had haunted Henry since his 'election' and coronation in 1100. 
Secondly, though there is no evidence that William ever read Euripides, his confidence 
in using him at third hand and the context in which he discusses the law of 'natural' 
affection and the dangers of fratricidal conflict, suggests a familiarity with the Oedipal 
myth and the fates of Oedipus' two sons, Eteocles and Polynices, who fought over their 
father's inheritance and subsequently destroyed one another. This particular set of 
brothers became proverbial in Roman thought as the most appalling example from 
antiquity of the dangers offratricide.26 Overall, the dangers to the wider polity of 
fratricidal conflict within the ruling family and the concerns that unjust actions in the 
pursuit of ambitions led to tyranny, were all contemporary political issues that arose 
from the partition of 1087 and the contested successions of Rufus and Henry, and which 
William of Malmesbury chose to explore through an analytical framework informed and 
shaped by classical authorities.27 
Episcopi Carnotensis Policratici, ed. C. C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1909), 675b. 'Dicitur autem quia tirannus 
est qui uiolenta dominatlone populum permit.' 
26 My thanks are due to Dr Costas Panayotakis ofthe University of Glasgow for this reference. 
27 Cf. OV. 4, 122. where Orderic uses the example of Eteocles and Polynices as part of his rhetorical 
discussion of aristocratic motives for rebellion in 1088. 
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Gaimar approached the problem from a similar, though far less sophisticated 
perspective.28 Like William, he leaves little doubt that the major determining factors in 
the revolt of 1095 were the continuing questions over the legitimacy of Rufus's 
kingship and the nature of the relationship between a king and senior members of his 
aristocracy, perhaps occasioned by Rufus's conduct in the early 1090s. Tellingly, 
Gaimar drew a direct parallel between the aims of the rebels in 1095 and those of 1075, 
and preceded his discussion of the revolt of 1095 with a reconstruction of Rufus's court 
where the main duties of the aristocracy to support the king were made explicit.29 Those 
who thought otherwise were described as being of Nero's lineage, 'rising today and 
falling tomorrow', another Roman example of tyranny and fleeting worldly glory.30 
Wace's account of the negotiations at Alton in July 1101 reveals that the search for a 
negotiated settlement rested upon the ability to construct a political framework that 
would recognise the legitimacy of Henry's kingship and also accommodate the claims 
of Robert Curthose and the concerns of the aristocracy with regard to the succession.31 
The advice given to Curthose by his advisors, once a momentum for his kingship failed 
to develop, reflected the framework of canon law contained in the Pseudo-Isidorian 
Decretals, especially the emphasis on the impossibility of any attempt to depose a 
crowned king.32 The inviolability of the king resounded in the messages the baronial 
negotiators relayed to Curthose; that he should not seek from Henry something 'he 
28 On Gaimar see, J. Gillingham, 'Kingship, Chivalry and Love. Political and cultural values in the 
earliest history written in French: Geoffrey Gaimar's Estoire des Engleis', The English in the Tweflth 
Century, 233-58. 
29 See below, Chapter 4. 
30 Gaimar, L 'Estoire, line, 6138. 
31 For Wace see, E. M. C. van Houts, 'Wace as Historian', History and Family Traditions in England and 
the Continent, 1000-1200 (Aldershot, 1999), X, 103-132; reprinted, The History o/the Norman People. 
Wace's Roman de Rou, trans. G. S. Burgess (Woodbridge, 2004), Introduction, 35-62. All page references 
are to this edition. 
32 Trinity MS B.16.44, 328; Decretals Psuedo-Isidoriannae et Capitula Angilramni, ed. P. Hinschius 
(Leipzig, 1863), 373-4; Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda' , 91-116. 
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should not do or which could not be done' and that Henry would rather be 'struck dead 
than be toppled from the kingdom' .33 
The author of the Brevis relatio chose to draw upon St Paul's Letter to the Romans to 
justify Henry's succession in 1100, criticising Robert Curthose for 'not thinking rightly' 
or suggesting that he had not understood the message of the Scripture with regard to his 
claim to the English throne in that 'there is no power except from God.'34 In many ways, 
this passage reflects Orderic's account of the Conqueror's death-bed speech, where the 
Conqueror was unsure of the means to transmit the English throne to his preferred 
successor, William Rufus, and entrusted it to God alone.3S Read in context, both texts 
suggest that canon law crucially provided the means to facilitate Rufus's succession, 
and a template for the resolution of the crisis of 1101. The appearance ofSt Paul's letter 
in the earliest version of the Brevis relatio, with a possible date of composition as early 
as 1114-1120, suggests that the text may even have been one of the authorities referred 
to at Alton.36 The author of the Brevis relatio may well have drawn upon the testimony 
of Abbot Ralph (1107-24), who knew both the Conqueror and Lanfranc, and who may 
well have had access to men who had been at Alton.37 
It is no coincidence that the author of the Warenne Chronicle used the same text, 
referring to verses one and two from chapter thirteen of St Paul's letter.38 The narrative 
employed in the Warenne Chronicle projected William ofMorta~n, together with Robert 
33 Waee, lines 10413-8. 'e al rei chose ne quesist que Ii reis faire ne deiist ne que faUe estre ne peiist, ker 
eois qu'il esteit coronez ne deveit estre desposez.' 
4 Brevis relatio, 37. 'Audiens itaque quod Henricusfrater suus rex Anglorum esset constitutus cepit 
indignari aduersus ilium multumque ei minar; quod regnum Ang/ie suscipere ausus fuisset non reele 
ffgitans neque intelligens qoud Seriptura dicit: 'quia nulla potestas nisi a Deo est .. ' 
OV, 4, 90-4. 
36 Brevis relatio, Introduction, 12-13. 
37 The History of the Norman People, Introduction, 24. 
38 Romans, 13, 1-2; Liber Hyda, 304. 'Non est potesta nisi a Domino; qui resistit polestati Dei ordinationi 
resistit. ' 
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de Beneme and William II de Warenne, though the chronicle is at pains to note that the 
latter's involvement was only temporary, as refusing to accept the legitimacy of Henry's 
kingship, and as a result becoming alienated from him.39 The most recent editor of the 
text, Elisabeth van Houts, has suggested that the chronicle stands as a testimony to 
family memories. 40 Its purpose was to project William I and William II de Warenne as 
staunch supporters of the Conqueror, Rufus and Henry I during a later crisis for the 
family under Henry II. Though it is possible to trace the various Anglo-Norman 
chronicles used by the author, Eustace of Boulogne, chaplain to King Stephen and 
chancellor to William IV de Warenne, much of his information reflected historical 
traditions within Normandy in the mid twelfth century. Of greatest significance is the 
fact that the chronicle contains information on William of Mortain that is unique. It is, 
for example, the only source to record the offer of Henry's sister-in-law in marriage. 
The source of the information on William may well have been the visit of Eustace to 
southern Normandy in the 1150s, with a visit to Tinchebray itself in 1158.41 
Orderic used the Old Testament to give a surprisingly sympathetic account of the 
problems and responsibilities of the aristocracy occasioned by the partition of England 
and Normandy. His method was to draw a comparison between the events of 1087 and 
the division that befell the Israelites under Rehoboam, Solomon's son and designated 
successor as king of a united kingdom of Israe1.42 In the Old Testament account, 
Rehoboam had travelled to Shechem to be confirmed as king as a united kingdom of 
39 Elisabeth van Houts has established that the text known as the 'Hyde' Chronicle should now be 
regarded as the Ware nne Chronicle. E. M. C. van Houts, 'The Warenne View of the Past 1066-1203', 
ANS, 26 (2004), 103-121. A new edition and translation of the Warenne Chronicle by Dr van Houts is 
forthcoming. However, all references in this thesis refer by page number to the Rolls Series edition, Liber 
de Hyda: Liber Hyda, 304-6. 'Quidam autem et maxime potentiores superbia elati, nec sicut dominum 
suum nominant, nec sicut regem suum honorant.' 
40 van Houts, 'Warenne View of the Past', 113. 
41 van Houts, 'Warenne View of the Past', 113; Eye, 8, nos 11, 12. 
42 Ov. 4, 122. See also, E. Megier, 'Divina Pagina and the Narration of History in Orderic Vitalis' 
Historia Ecclesiastica', Revue Benedictine 110 (2000), 106-23. 
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Isreal. Before this could happen, delegates from the Ten Tribes of Israel had demanded 
an end to the levy of forced labour as a condition of accepting Rehoboam, who in tum 
sought advice from the 'old men', as the counsellors who had served his father are 
described, and the youths he had grown up with. He rejected the advice given to him by 
his father's advisers to end the levy, in favour of the advice of the youths who 
advocated more oppression. On hearing of Rehoboam's decision, nine of the Ten Tribes 
of Israel rose in rebellion and elected Jeroboam, one of Solomon's generals as their 
king, with the result that the nation of Israel divided in two, with only the tribe of Judah 
maintaining its loyalty to the Davidic dynasty.43 
What is important to recognise is that Rehoboam's fate, together with that of the united 
kingdom ofIsrael, had been sealed by Solomon's own transgression of God's law, for 
which God had judged that he would 'tear the kingdom ... out of the hand of your son. '44 
Rehoboam's decision not to follow the advice of his father's counsellors resulted in the 
prophesied split, yet as chapter 12, verse 15 states 'for it was a tum of affairs brought 
about by the Lord that he might fulfil his word' .4S It would appear as though Rehoboam 
is as much a victim of his father's choices, as he is of his own. Rehoboam's mistake in 
listening to 'youthful counsels' had compounded his father's mistakes in transgressing 
God's law, by rejecting the advice of those mature counsellors who could foresee the 
dangers ahead. 
The implication from Orderic's use of the Old Testament in this way is that he felt the 
Conqueror had made a mistake in dividing England from Normandy, compounded by 
not listening to those who wanted to maintain a union. As part of his rhetoric in 
43 Kings, 1,12, I-IS. 
44 Kings, I, II, 11-13. 
4' Kings, 1, 12, IS. 
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explaining aristocratic motives in 1088, Orderic has members of the cross-Channel 
aristocracy form an inviolable league to oppose Rufus and avoid being destroyed by 
'youthful counsels' .46 In 1101, Henry avoids further 'youthful counsels' by adhering to 
the advice of his mature counsellors, especially Robert, count of Meulan.47 The 
emphasis Orderic placed on avoiding making a bad decision worse, suggests that he 
looked to the upper echelons of the aristocracy to deal with the consequences of the 
Conqueror's decision and work for a cross-Channel union. With Henry as king, support 
from members of the cross-Channel aristocracy for Curthose was something of an 
embarrassment that it had not been under Rufus. However, those members of the 
aristocracy who supported Henry were still regarded by Orderic as working to mitigate 
the effects of the Conqueror's decision. Orderic's use of this passage suggests that he 
not only recognised the political role of the upper echelons of the aristocracy in having 
to deal with the consequences of the Conqueror's decision to divide England from 
Normandy, but also the need to guide his sons and successors through largely uncharted 
political waters. 
The influence of canon law on the intellectual climate of the eleventh century and the 
practical conduct of politics has already been noted. In part, this can be traced through 
two further sources used in this thesis: the De iniusta vexacione and Eadmer's Historia 
Novorum. The De iniusta is a crucial text when attempting to broaden the analysis of 
this thesis and address the issue of whether the concern over the succession and 
legitimacy found expression throughout the aristocracy as a whole, and in particular the 
men who occupied the office of sheriff in 1088 and 1101, where a possible total of nine 
:~ OV, 4, 122. ' .... prudenter precauere ne per cons ilium iuuenile pereamus'. 
OV, 5,298. 
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I, 
surviving or former sheriffs are identified in the De iniusta.48 Mark Philpott's recent 
examination of the text not only allows it to be used with confidence, but crucially his 
wider conclusions on the influence of canon law within England provides the context 
for many of the arguments put forward in this thesis.49 
Eadmer's monasticism has not endeared him to all historians.so Yet equally, there has 
been an acknowledgement of the complexity of Eadmer's text and the influences on 
many of the ideas he expressed, including canon law.51 In many ways, Eadmer's account 
of the crisis of 1101 is as important for his silences and distortions as what he does say. 
The interpretation offered in Chapter Seven suggests that Anselm was largely 
ineffectual in persuading sections of the aristocracy not to oppose Henry in 1101, 
precisely because the arguments that Anselm are likely to have used at Alton, based 
upon on Pseudo-Isidore in Lanfranc's copy, were precisely the arguments used to 
question Henry's legitimacy as king and the circumstances of his 'election' and 
coronation. Elsewhere in his history, Eadmer had used the same collection of canon law 
to demonstrate how Anselm's arguments at Rockingham in 1095 fully in accordance 
. 
with canon law. S2 
By focusing on the question of political legitimacy to explore the politics of the 1090s, 
an attempt can also be made to reconcile conflicting evidence and reassess its worth. In 
particular, the De Obitu Willelmi, though criticised by L. J. Engels, nevertheless remains 
48 See below, Chapter 3. 
49 M. Philpott, 'The De iniusta vexacione Willelmi episcopi prim; and Canon Law in Anglo-Durham', 
Anglo-Norman Durham 1093-1193, ed. D. Rollason, M. Harvey and M. Prestwich (Woodbridge, 1998), 
125-37. 
so See, for example, Gillingham, 'Kingship, Chivalry and Love', The English in the Twelfth Century, 57. 
51 For example, S. N. Vaughan, 'Eadmer's Historia Novorum: A Reinterpretation', ANS, 10 (1988), 259-
89; M. Staunton, 'Eadmer's Vita Anselmi: A Reinterpretation', JMH, 23 (1997), 1-14; M. Philpott, 
'Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State', 93-107. 
52 Eadmer HN, 57; Philpott, 'Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State', 105. Full references can be 
found in n.7l. 
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significant in this context.S3 Elisabeth van Houts has argued that the text is a later piece 
of propaganda, written after Rufus had retrieved the royal regalia from Saint-Etienne, to 
make it seem as though the Conqueror had given them to Rufus on his death-bed.'4 
Though this has been criticised by Barbara English, Rufus's motives in retrieving the 
regalia are self-evident in the context of Rufus being the de facto ruler of England and 
Normandy in the absence of Robert Curthose, and within a few years of the revolt of 
1095, where any attempt to bolster the legitimacy of his kingship would have found 
favour. ss Moreover, the possible choice of the texts on which the De obitu Willelmi was 
based, the Vita Ludovici imperatoris by the so-called Astronomer and the Vita Karoli 
Magni by Einhard, not only provides, as H. E. J. Cowdrey suggests, a Carolingian 
context in which to assess William the Conqueror's life and achievements, but also 
provides further evidence that contemporaries were well aware of the practical conduct 
of politics and what was required of a ruler. 56 
Less theoretical perhaps, the 'E' version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle contains the 
crucial information that allows the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester to be 
reconstructed.57 With a point of composition near to the events that they describe, the 
entries are remarkably fresh and offer a less retrospective analysis of the events in 
question than many of the histories written in the twelfth century. For that reason alone 
they are significant. Yet the crucial aspect to the Chronicle is the possible sources of its 
53 GND, 2, 184-90; L. J. Engels, 'De obitu Willelmi ducis Normannorum regisque Anglorum: texte, 
modeles et origine', Melanges Christine Mohrmann (Utrecht, 1973),209-55; GND, 1, Introduction, 63-6. 
54 GND, 1, Introduction, 64; RRAN, 1, no. 397; Les actes de Guillaume de Conquerant et de la reine 
Mathilde pour les abbayes caennaises, ed. L. Musset, Memoires de la Societe des antiquaries de 
Normandie, (Caen, 1967), no. 24. The text of the charter reveals that Rufus retrieved the regalia on the 
advice of the leading magnates and churchmen on both sides of the Channel. ' ... procerum et 
religiosarum personarum Anglie et Normannie consilio .. '. See below, Chapter 7. 
55 English, 'Anglo-Norman Succession', 226-7. 
56 H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Death-bed Testaments', in Fiilschungen im Mittelalter, MGH Schriften Band 33, 4 
(Hannover, 1998),716-24. 
57 In general see, The Anglo Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 7, MS E, ed. Susan Irvine 
(Woodbridge, 2004), Introduction, esp. 74-8; The Peterborough Chronicle 1070-1154, ed. C. Clark 
(Oxford, 1970), Introduction, esp. 21-24. 
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information. The difficulty in establishing where the entries for before 1121 were 
written is well known.58 Christ Church, Canterbury, is the last place for which an 
archetype of E can be located for before 1080. 59 Yet the claims of a London or 
Westminster bias are hard to ignore, especially for the period between 1087 and 1106.60 
What is clear from the entries is that the author or authors of the entries during this 
period clearly had access to information that must have come through royal conduits, 
particularly where the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester are concerned. Not only is this 
evident in the amount of detail that is supplied, but when compared with other sources 
the Chronicle can be seen to brush over inconvenient facts. For example, under its entry 
for 1091 the Chronicle is clear that Rufus went to Normandy for his brother's 
'discomfiture'.61 The next line in its entry then mentions the reconciliation between the 
two brothers, which came about while Rufus was in Normandy.62 However, the 
evidence from other sources, particularly William of Malmesbury, who had access to 
other sources of information and based his account of Rufus's kingship on these 
sources, not only points toward negotiations having been concluded before Rufus 
crossed the Channel, but also suggests that a degree of pressure may have been applied 
to Rufus and Curthose to agree to a settlement. 63 
When discussing the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle it is pertinent to mention Paul Hayward's 
recent evaluation of the Acta Lan/rand, and the date of its composition to around 
58 Peterborough Chronicle, Introduction, 22-3. 
59 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 7, MS E, Introduction', 85. 
60 Peterborough Chronicle, Introduction, 22-3. 
61 ASC, E, 1091. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 7, MS E, 102. 'Candelmeessan heferde 
for his broDeer unPearfe ut ofEnglalande into Normandige.' 
62 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 7, MS E, 102. 'Onmang pam pe he peer wees, heora 
sehte togeedere eode ... ' . 
63 For a full argument and references, see below, Chapter 7. However, note should be taken of William of 
Malmesbury's observation that the negotiators were men of more sense and concerned to protect their 
own interests in 1091. GR, 1,548. 'Pauci quibus sanius consilium, consulentes suis commodis quod 
utrobique possessiones haberent.' For William's sources, GR, 2, 13. 
34 
1110.64 Though Hayward's overall conclusion, that the text was compiled to lend 
support to the archbishopric's claim to patriarchal authority must be borne in mind, the 
Acta remains significant in that it supports the interpretation outlined throughout this 
thesis that the question of succession to the English kingship and the legitimacy of a 
king was dependent upon consultation with the political elite and the means of selecting 
a king.6s In this context, the choice of the verb eligere to describe Lanfranc's actions in 
1087 is crucial, whether as an accurate reflection of the events of 1087, or as a later 
gloss designed to support Canterbury's claims to patriarchal authority. 
When viewed as a whole, the texts under discussion constitute a significant body of 
analysis that point very clearly to the politics between 1087 and 1106 being defined by 
concerns over the legitimacy of Rufus and Henry's kingship and expressed within a 
general framework where contemporary theories of kingship were understood. Many 
amongst the Anglo-Norman political elite were concerned about the criteria and process 
used to select an English king and the rights of the aristocracy within this process. Many 
writers reflected these concerns and some, especially Orderic, were also acutely 
sensitive to the dilemma faced by the senior aristocracy and developed a cross-Channel 
perspective for their analysis. 
Nearly all the sources reflect the attempts made to resolve the issue. This invites 
engagement with two strands of historiography that have yet to intimately touch upon 
consideration of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy as political actors. Recourse to violence 
in 1088 and 1101, coupled with the recognition of the need to accept co-existence 
64 P. Hayward, 'Some reflections on the historical value of the so-called Acta Lanfranci, HR, 77, no.196 
(2004), 141-60. 
65 Acta Lanfrancl, 87 ' .. . mortuo rege Willelmo trans mare, fllium eius Willelmum, sicut pater constituit, 
Lanfrancus in regem elegit et in ecclesia beati Petri, ... sacrauit et coronauit .' See also, B. English, 
'William the Conqueror and the Anglo-Norman Succession', HR, 64, (1991), 231, n. 40. 
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immediately suggests that any study of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy has much to 
contribute to the concepts and historiography of the so-called 'Feudal Revolution'.66 In 
this context, the attempted settlements of 1091 and 1101 must be seen as a genuine and 
ongoing attempt by the aristocracy to solve the problems ofinstability, by seeking to 
accommodate the rights and responsibilities of all the Conqueror's sons within a 
framework that stressed the separate political and legal co-existence of England and 
Normandy. As such, this approach to the problem has to be located within the practical 
experience and political culture of the aristocracy. 
Further consideration of these themes invites engagement with the historiography of 
ceremony and ritual. To do so is to largely react against many of the most influential 
aspects of Anglo-Norman historiography of the last thirty years, which has emphasised 
a centralised and administrative ideology of power, government and kingship. At the 
outset, it must be recognised that this is a highly contentious subject. Philippe Buc has 
led a chorus of criticism centred upon the way historians have applied the 
anthropological treatments of ritual to early medieval society, choosing to focus his 
attack upon the functionalist assumptions within this historiography, particularly with 
regard to the notion that any society is best regarded as an organism that seeks 
homeostasis, with rituals fulfilling the function of minimising conflict. Historians are 
charged with seeking an excessively rigid correlation between changes in ritual practice 
and changes in social or political structures. A further accusation is that historians have 
underestimated the extent to which medieval authors are best regarded as clerical 
66 See below, Introduction, n 39. 
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polemicists, who used descriptions of rituals as literary conventions to advance their 
cause.67 
The simple answer to these criticisms is to emphasise that the concept of ritual, when 
allied to the observations relating to the contemporary theories of kingship and the 
practical application of politics, which are evident within the texts, locates the disputed 
successions of 1087 and 1100 within a continuum of change that has to include the 
Conquest itself. The elevation of the Conqueror to the English kingship profoundly 
altered his relationships with his sons, the aristocracy, and in turn, their own 
relationships with the Conqueror's heirs and successors. The political difficulties of the 
1070s and 1080s within the Anglo-Norman polity, explored in Chapter two, can be seen 
as indicative of this process. Quite simply, the persistence of political rituals in the 
midst of so much change and disruption indicate a contemporary consensus as to their 
function. 
Ritual offers a legitimate form and medium through which contemporary politics and 
political culture can be analysed. For example, the histories that recorded the events in 
the year after Henry had been crowned, when analysed through the medium of ritual 
and ceremony, offer a more layered history. Chapter seven outlines the arguments in 
full, but it is noticeable that upon hearing of Henry's accession Robert Curthose 
displayed his indignation, while Henry continued and emphasised the ritual practices of 
English kingship with the ceremony of crownwearing. The negotiations at Alton 
followed a refusal to offer battle and thus paved the way to a negotiated settlement, with 
the appointment of negotiators who were trusted and knew how to act in accordance 
67 A succinct summary of the arguments and a bibliography of further writings can be found in, P. Buc, 
The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory (princeton, 2002); 
'Political Rituals and Political Imagination in the Medieval West from the Fourth Century to the 
Eleventh', The Medieval World, ed. P. Linehan and J. Nelson (London, 2001), 189-213. 
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with contemporary political values. The use of oaths and guarantors to secure the 
agreement reflected contemporary forms and usage. 
Even where sources are in disagreement, ceremony and ritual provide the vehicle to 
assess conflicting evidence. A prime example comes from Orderic's account of the 
negotiations at Alton. Unlike other sources, Orderic maintained that neither Henry nor 
Curthose trusted the baronial negotiators in 1101, preferring to negotiate alone and on a 
basis that secured peace.68 The incidental information Orderic provides, particularly that 
the peace between the two brothers was sealed with a formal kiss of peace, shows that 
Orderic displayed an awareness of contemporary political rituals and practices.69 As a 
political symbol, kiss-centred rites had a prominent place in customary practice. 
Lanfranc's Monastic Constitutions set out the ritual by which a layperson was to be 
admitted to a house, noting that he shall take 'into his hand a book of gospels' and 
receive the kiss of peace, which is not given when the applicant is a woman.70 
Significantly, Orderic would not have been unaware of the secular connotations ofthe 
kiss, having access to a text where the kiss was noted as a symbol of reconciliation, and 
where contravention and abuse of its meaning were criticised.71 
Emphasising underlying continuity within change is an equally effective way of 
suggesting that charters still remain central to the study of the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy. The approach of this thesis is to bring them into focus with narrative 
sources and examine them in the context of what the narrative sources reveal about the 
political and cultural changes of the 1090s and 1100s. In this context, one particularly 
68 OV, 5, 318. 
69 See, K. Petkov, The Kiss of Peace. Ritual, Self and Society in the High and Late Medieval West 
(Leiden, 2003), esp. 12-79. 
70 The Monastic Constitutions ofLanfranc, ed. D. Knowles (London, 1951), 114.15. 
71 GND, 1,92. 
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important set of charters is the double confirmations that survive for the period after the 
Treaties ofRouen and Winchester. In the immediate aftermath ofthe treaty negotiations 
of 1091, a double confirmation was drawn up to an exchange of property between abbot 
Gilbert of Saint-Etienne and William de Tournebu. Confirmation was given in identical 
documents, with changes to the order in which the names of Rufus and Curthose appear 
in the appropriate places in each text.72 A separate document within the cartulary of 
Saint-Etienne sets out the details of the exchange more fully and shows that the 
agreement was reached in the presence of some very influential figures, in particular, 
Robert, count of MeuIan, his brother Henry, earl of Warwick, the bishop of Durham and 
Robert fitz Harno. The text also mentions that the abbey had the seals of the two 
brothers as witness to the exchange." 
In 1101, a double confirmation reaffirmed grants of Rufus to the abbey ofSt Peter's 
Bath and Bishop John, while a confirmation was given to Curthose's grant of a Sunday 
market and annual fair at Cheux to the abbey of Saint Etienne.74 As the 1101 
confirmation concerned an English religious institution and can be dated to September 
1101 while Curthose was still in England, the confirmation may have proved a useful 
hallmark of Curt hose's acceptance of Henry's kingship.7s 
What both of these double confirmations may signal is that the treaties of Rouen and 
Winchester were each regarded as having settled the issues at stake, with each brother 
72 Saint Etienne, fol.47 r-v; D. Bates, 'Four Recently Rediscovered Nonnan Charters', AN, 45 (1995), 
Appendix, no.3. 
73 Saint Etienne, fol. 37. Bates, 'Four Recently Rediscovered Nonnan Charters', 39. 
74 D. Bates, 'A Neglected English Charter of Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy' ,BIHR, 139 (1986), 
122-4; Saint Etienne, 21v-21r, 22v; Haskins, NI, Appendix, no 3. 
" On the dating see, Bates, 'A Neglected Charter', 121; ASC, E, 1101. The Chronicle states that Curthose 
remained in England until after Michaelmas. A third double confirmation, as in the case of the 1091 
preserved at Saint-Etienne, also survives. This time, Henry confirmed a grant of a Sunday market and 
annual fair at Cheux by Curthose. Saint Etienne, fol. 22v. Robert's grant can be dated to 1102, which 
suggests that Henry's confinnation belongs to the same period. RRAN, 2, no.621; Bates, 'A Neglected 
Charter' • 122. 
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assigned their respective rights and responsibilities within a wider cross-Channel 
pOlity.76 It may be supposed that the diplomatic form of a double confirmation was well 
known and would fit the immediate circumstances of 1091 and 1101, and also the 
possibility that either brother on each occasion could still inherit each other's lands until 
a lawful heir was produced. 
Chapter Eight uses charter evidence to show that religious patronage can be read as a 
commentary upon the political situation. In this way, charters provide the link between 
the local, regional worlds and wider cross-Channel concerns of the aristocracy. One 
particular example is the sudden death of Hugh de Montgomery in 1098 and the 
subsequent claim by his elder brother to his English earldom. In the absence of children 
from marriage, it is likely that the youngest Montgomery brother, Amulf, had been 
regarded as Hugh's designated heir up to his death. Amulfwas included in Hugh's grant 
of the collegiate church of Quatford to the abbey of La Sauve Majeure in 1094.77 The 
monks of La Sauve Majeure then had to obtain Robert de Belleme's confirmation once 
he became earL'8 Arnulfalso witnessed a charter of Walter of Dunstanville, Hugh's 
dapifer, and his wife in favour of La Sauve Majeure.79 A notice in the cartulary of Saint-
Martin de Sees records a gift Arnulfmade to the abbey, and contains the dedication that 
the gift was for his parents, lord, friends and 'very dear brother Hugh.,go It may be 
significant that upon hearing of Hugh's death, Arnulf gave Saint-Martin a gift of the 
church of St Nicholas at Pembroke and twenty carucates of land from his own resources 
76 Bates, 'A Neglected Charter', 123. 
77 CDF, no.1234; RRAN, 1, no. 410. Grand Cartulaire de La Sauve Majeure, ed. C. Higounet and A. 
Higounet-Nadal (Bordeaux, 1996), no 1356. 
78 CDF, no.1237. Grand Cartulaire de La Suave Majuere, no 1354. 
79 CDF, no.1238. For the identification of Walter see K. Thompson, Cross Channel estates of the 
Montgomery-Bellemefamily, c. 1050-1112, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Wales (1983), 273, 
no.72. 
80 Livre Blanc, fo.79/93v; Chandler, 'Last of the Montgomerys', 9. 
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and not from the earldom of Shrewsbury itself. H. The prominence of Amulf in these 
acta suggests that he may have been regarded by the recipients of gifts over the 
previous four years as Hugh's heir in the absence of children, but he had to be careful 
not to gift resources that were not in his power. 
It is almost certainly within this context that references to both Robert and Hugh de 
Montgomery occur in the foundation narrative of Shrewsbury Abbey. Two distinct 
verbs describe Hugh's and Robert's respective successions, succedere and suscipere. 82 
Both brothers are described as succeeding their father as his heirs, yet the compilers of 
the text may well have been aware of the difference in the nature of Hugh and Robert's 
elevation; with Hugh designated as the heir to Shrewsbury long before his father's 
death, while Robert's succession was more political and therefore subject to the use of 
suscipere. The author of the Brevis relatio uses the same verb to state that Henry had 
'dared to receive the kingdom of England in 1101.83 Orderic used the verb requare to 
describe Robert's approach to Rufus, perhaps indicating, as J. F. A. Mason pointed out, 
that Robert could hardly have been expected to succeed Hugh.84 The Waverley annalist 
noted that Robert became his brother's heir.85 Robert de Belleme's petition originated 
from the successful relationship he had developed with Rufus, while Rufus was the de 
II Livre Blanc, 1051123r; CDF, no.666. 
82 U. Rees, The Shrewsbury Cartulary, 2 vols. (Aberystwyth, 1975), 1, no 35. 'Hugo et Robertusfllii eius 
qui post patrem in hereditate successerunt quisque in tempore suo.'; 'Robertus de belismo qui post 
eundem venerabilem hugonemfratrem suum comitatu suscepit honorem .... •. 
83 Brevis relatio, 37. ' ... quodregnum Anglie suscipere aususfuisset .... • 
84 ov. 5,224; J. F. A. Mason, 'Roger de Montgomery and his sons (1067-1102)', TRHS, 5th Ser .• 13 
(1963), 1-28, 18. 'Quo defuncto Robertus Belesmensisfrater eius Guillelmum Rufum requisiuit .... •. The 
only other instance in which Orderic uses this same verb is in a similar set of circumstances where Richer 
de L' Aigle petitioned Henry I for his father's English lands but was refused in favour of his younger 
brothers Geoffrey and Engenulf, who were then serving in the royal household. OV, 6,196. 'Securus 
itaque Richerius curam adiit, regem Angliae de haereditate sua iterum requisivit, sed nichil optinuit, 
mestusque recessit'. 
85 Annales Monastiei, ed. H. R Laud, 5 vols (London, 1864-9),2,207. 'Et Robertus de Belesmefrater 
ejusfactus est haeres ejus,' 
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facto ruler of Normandy and England after 1096.86 Rufus was able to use the flexibility 
in the aristocratic inheritance customs to allow Robert to gain his younger brother's 
earldom. 
As well as the documentary form and language, the question of attestations to charters 
must be addressed. Debate of the use of witness lists turns upon an axis between 
empiricists, who analyse the number of attestations any individual may make and argue 
that this is an indicator of political importance, and those who stress documentary 
provenance and purpose. In the context of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy and the 
politics of the 1090s and early 1100s the dominant empiricist has been C. Warren 
Hollister. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hollister undertook a wide analysis of relations 
between the Anglo-Norman aristocracy and the sons of the Conqueror.87 Using a 
methodology based upon a comparison of witness lists to surviving royal acta from the 
Conqueror's reign to that of his son, Hollister concluded that a dangerous schism had 
been created between the cross-Channel magnates and a newly risen administrative 
elite, whom Hollister termed curiales. The prominence of these curiales in the surviving 
texts could only be explained by the gradual eclipse of the great magnates at the heart of 
the royal entourage and therefore the centre of political power. At the time of Rufus's 
death, the split between magnates and curiales was as pronounced as ever, manifesting 
itself in the decisions made by the aristocracy to support either Henry or Curthose. As 
Hollister succinctly summarised 'the war of 1101 pitted the curiales of the previous 
reign against the non-curial magnates.,a8 
86 For a detailed argument, see below, Chapter 5. 
17 In particular see, 'Magnates and "Curiales"', 97-116; 'Normandy, France and the Anglo-Norman 
Regnum', 17-58; 'Henry I and Robert Malet', 129-136; 'The Taming ofa Turbulent Earl', 137-144. All 
Eage references are to the collected edition of Hollister's essays. 
8 Hollister, 'Magnates and "Curiales'" MMI, 114. For critiques of the statistical approach undertaken by 
Hollister see, Barlow, Rufus, 210-213; D. Bates, 'The Prosopographical Study of Anglo-Norman Royal 
Charters', in F ami/y Trees and the Roots of Politics. The Prosopography of Britain and France from the 
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I: 
The whole weight of Hollister's concept of a civil war rested upon the statistical 
analysis of the witness lists to surviving royal acta for Rufus, calendared in the first 
volume of the Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum, and the errata and addenda of 
volume two. In the context of the late 1080s and 1090s, issues of documentary loss, the 
overwhelmingly decentralised nature of the production of writs and the preservation 
policies of religious institutions, makes statistical analysis essentially meaningless. The 
temptation is to read the texts in a way that confuses form with function, and in the 
context of witness lists, to confuse those entrusted with supplying documentary 
authority to a text, with those who may be thought to have exercised an influence on the 
direction of royal policy.89 Diplomatic scholarship now stresses the social, political and 
legal context in which texts were produced. There is recognition of the value of reading 
these texts as narratives, and for the barriers between them and other sources to be 
broken down.9O 
Within this framework, it appears as though the beneficiaries of writs in the 1090s 
valued them as supplying a form of warranty in the preservation oflands, rights and 
privileges. Many of the concessions granted or confirmed to institutions were extremely 
minor, and would hardly have come to the attention of royal administration unless it had 
been for the efforts of the beneficiaries themselves.91 Ifread as a narrative on the social 
conditions prevalent in England in the 1090s they reveal a society still struggling to 
come to terms with the trauma of defeat and conquest. The historiography on the 
Tenth to Twelfth Century, ed. K.S.B. Keats-Rohan (Woodbridge 1997),89-102. Especially important is 
the appendix to Henry I, where Hollister maintained the value of his approach. Hollister, Henry 1,499-
506. 
89 Barlow, Rufus, 211. 
90 D. Dates, Re-ordering the Past and Negotiating the Present in Stenton's First Century (Reading, 2000), 
4. 
91 R. Fleming, Domesday Book and the Law. Society and Legal Custom in Early Medieval England 
(Cambridge, 1998),33. 
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gradual expansion of royal involvement in local affairs and the link between the 
Domesday inquest, writs and royal administration is well established.92 However, the 
language adopted in the drafting of many of the writs suggests a cultural shift in the 
perceptions of their beneficiaries' vis-a-vis royal administration, stimulated by the 
Domesday inquest itself. 
The abbey of Bury St Edmunds provides the clearest example. Bury had a tradition of 
obtaining confirmatory writs on the accession of each new abbot or king, and two writs 
early on in Rufus's reign confirmed Abbot Baldwin in his lands with sake and soke. 93 
The difference from previous writs however, lay in the language of the injunction that 
the abbot was to have his lands as they were on the day when the king's father was alive 
and dead, a reflection of the linguistic formula used in the Domesday Book.94 Nor are 
any of the Bury St Edmunds writs exceptional. Other Bury 8t Edmunds charters display 
the influence of Domesday in their drafting, particularly in the use of the clause tempore 
patris mei.9' This undoubtedly reflected a conceptual link to the use of tempore Regis 
Edward; and tempore Regis Willelmi within Domesday, and is often used in conjunction 
with these and similar clauses in the Bury texts.96 Moreover, this language can be found 
in writs drawn up at other institutions. Three writs preserved at Abingdon used the same 
wording and expressions as Bury 8t Edmunds to refer to the time of William the 
92 For example see, Fleming, Domesday Book, 68-83; D. Bates, 'Two Ramsey Abbey Writs and the 
Domesday Survey', HR, 63 (1990),337-9; D. RotTe, Domesday: The Inquest and the Book (Oxford 
2000). 
93 Feudal Documents from the Abbey of Bury St Edmunds, ed. D.C. Douglas, The British Academy, 
Records of the Social and Economic History of England and Wales, 8 (London, 1932), nos 12, 13; 
calendared, RRAN, I, nos 291, 293; Cf. Bates, Regesta, no. 34; F. E. Harmer, Anglo-Saxon Writs 
(Stamford, 1988), nos 8, 11, 12. 
94 Feudal Docs. nos 12, 13. ' .. die qua pater meus vivus et mortuus'; RRAN, 1, nos 291, 293. 
9' Feudal Docs. no.15. ' .... et omnes ilIos homines quos habuit in tempore Regis Eadwardi at in tempore 
Regis patris mel ... '; RRAN,l, no. 294. 
96 Feudal Docs. no. 15. ' .. sicuti JEdwardus rex et post eum Willelmus rex pater meus sibi concessit.'; 
RRAN, 1, nos 294, 392. 
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Conqueror and Edward the Confessor.97 Overall, writs drafted at Lincoln, Ramsey, 
Westminster and Thomey Abbey use similar tenns.98 The adoption of this language also 
appears to have been used to express episcopal authority. A writ to Bishop Robert Bloet 
excused him from pleading for any churches or lands that Bishop Remigius had been in 
possession of on the day when he was alive and dead.99 
Undoubtedly this is much more than simply the adoption of a new administrative lingua 
franca. The language used in the writs emphasised a continuum of legitimacy across the 
Conquest and two changes of regime. As such, institutions that appear to have had a 
policy of record keeping under the Conqueror continued to keep records under Rufus 
and may have increased their rates of preservation. 100 In some instances it is possible to 
ally the preservation of texts to evidence of sophisticated archival practices.101 The 
practice of witnessing writs by prominent members of the king's entourage had 
developed slowly over the Conqueror's reign to convey the impression that the writ in 
97 J. Hudson, Historia Ecclesie Abbendonensis, 2 vols (Oxford, 2002), 2, nos 19,31,51. • .... tempore 
regis Eadwardi et patris mei .... '; calendared, RRAN, 1, nos 289,359,390; 
98 The list is far from exhaustive. For Lincoln see, Registrum Antiquissimum of the Cathedral Church of 
Linco/n, ed. C. W. Foster, 12 vols, Lincoln Record Society (Lincoln, 1932), 1, nos 12,8,9; calendared, 
RRAN, 1, nos 406,305,467; Ramsey, Cartularium Monasterii de Rameseia, ed., W.H. Hart and P.A. 
Lyon,3 vols, RS (London, 1884), nos 146, 148; calendared RRAN, 1, nos 295, 296; Westminster, 
Westminster Abbey Charters 1066-c. 1214, ed. E. Mason, London Record Society (London, 1988), nos 
306,436; calendared, RRAN, I, nos 306, 436. 
99 Registrum Antiquissimum, no. 9; RRAN, 1, no. 467. ' .... de quibus Remigius episcopis saisitus fuit de 
~ua vivvus et mortuusfuit.' 
00 For Example, Ramsey abbey has two surviving writs for the Conqueror, while this figure jumps 
dramatically to nineteen under Rufus. Bates, Regesta, nos 221, 222; RRAN, 1, nos 295, 296, 321, 322, 
329,330,331,332,354,373,383,413,419,447,448,449,461,462,469. 
101 Bury st. Edmunds was an abbey with an incentive to have good records in the years after 1066 given 
the scale of encroachments on to its estates. See, Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman 
England, 66·79. Bury appears to have had an active preservation policy across the regimes of both the 
Conqueror and Rufus. Five Latin and four Old English writs were preserved from the Conqueror's reign, 
in comparison to seven writs for Rufus. Bates, Regesta, nos 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 54; Feudal 
Docs. nos 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19; calendared, RRAN, 1, nos. 291, 293, 392, 294, 393, 395, 394 
respectively. Bury appears to have developed experience in the use of its archive. The abbey preserved a 
writ of the Conqueror on the grounds that it confirmed a bilingual diploma that upheld the monastery's 
rejection ofthe claims by bishop Arfast for the abbey to be his see. According to the narrative of the 
diploma, Arfast lost his claim because he could not produce documents or witnesses in support. This 
sophisticated bureaucracy continued into Rufus's reign, with one writ granting sake and soke and all the 
customs of the abbey. It was drafted with explicit reference to the same grants that were contained in 
previous writs of Edward the Confessor, William the Conqueror and Rufus. Bates, Regesta, nos 39,40; 
Feudal Docs. no. 18; calendared, RRAN, 1,292. 
45 
question reflected the king's will.t02 Moreover, these writs were drafted in order to be 
read out in local assemblies and courts, and thus presented a means to articulate 
increasing royal involvement into a local world, whose structures oflaw and 
government were still dominated by great magnates, but also open to abuse by the 
sheriffs and other royal officials. tOl 
In this context it is possible to explain why the majority of royal acta that survive for 
Rufus's reign are in the form of writs, which in itself means that the witnesses to these 
texts have to be seen not only in the context of the diplomatic form of the texts, but also 
in the context of a local world, where religious institutions were vulnerable to 
infringements from great magnates and royal officials alike. The response to the 
Domesday inquest was to adopt its concepts as the means to give an existing policy of 
seeking writs as a form of warranty added emphasis and impact. Great magnates 
appeared to attest fewer documents under Rufus, not because they were being 
systematically excluded from power, but because a far higher number of documents 
were preserved that would not have ordinarily required their attestation. Overall, and 
given the conceptual framework in which Hollister viewed the cross-Channel 
aristocracy and the methodology he employed to interpret surviving royal acta, 
Hollister's analysis undoubtedly underplayed the anxieties that contemporaries felt on 
the issue of succession, an anxiety that continued to be expressed in the texts written in 
the twelfth century. 
By bringing the surviving evidence into focus with each other, and by addressing the 
profound historiographical changes, it becomes clear that the issues the aristocracy dealt 
t02 Dates, 'Prosopographical Study'. 100. 
t03 H. Tsurushima, 'Domesday Interpreters',ANS, 18 (1995),201-22; R. Abels, 'Lord Seeking, and the 
Nonnan Settlement of the South-East Midlands', ANS, 19 (1996), 19-50. 
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with during this period were the very stuff of high politics; regime change, succession 
and political legitimacy. All had been a feature of political life for generations and those 
who wrote about then knew precisely what the issues were and approached them with 
sophisticated systems of thought and analysis, even if the circumstances in which they 
wrote necessitated careful expression. Crucially, this explains the extent to which so 
many members and families of the political elite felt propelled to oppose the kingships 
of both Rufus, and then Henry, when the very notion of enjoying estates and political 
power under divided lordship was something they had experience of and practised for 
themselves. By placing the texts that discuss these issues at the forefront of any 
analysis, the actions of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 can be 
understood and placed into their appropriate context. 
Acceptance of this immediately belies the notion ofa homogeneous aristocracy 
responding to centripetal forces within the Anglo-Norman polity. In this, the 
historiography of the last twenty years, which has criticised the notions of homogeneity 
in structural terms, can be brought into focus with a historiography that has attempted to 
delve into the thought world of the wider western European aristocracy, and in 
particular, its efforts to deal with such complex concepts such as violence, rights and 
responsibilities. 
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PART ONE 
CASE STUDIES 
Chapter 2 
The Cross-Channel Aristocracy and Attitudes to Succession: 
1087 and 1100 
Any analysis of the political actions of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 
1087 and 1106 has to have as its starting point a discussion ofthe politics of 
succession and the attitudes of the cross-Channel aristocracy to the accessions of 
William Rufus and Henry I. The resulting themes of succession and legitimacy, 
power and kingship, loyalty and lordship are hardly new grounds for discussion. 
Yet examination of these themes within the interpretative framework set out in 
the Introduction, which seeks to re-define Anglo-Norman political culture 
primarily in terms that reflect the concerns expressed in contemporary and near 
contemporary sources, where discussion, disagreements and often violence tum 
on the axis of political legitimacy, is the essential foundation for the wider 
analysis undertaken in this thesis. It is also important to recognise that the use of 
new methodological approaches to the study of Anglo-Norman political 
discourse, particularly the concepts of ceremony and ritual, offer new insights 
into the way politics were conducted with clearly defined, but largely unwritten 
rules. I As such, it is crucial to have a wide understanding of the concept of 
political legitimacy, both in terms of the wider intellectual milieu in which 
politics were discussed, with clerical theorists looking to canon law, but also in 
I G. Althoff, Family, Friends and Followers. Political and Social Bonds in Early Medieval 
Europe (Cambridge, 2004), 136-9. However, the dangers voiced by Philippe Buc on the use and 
interpretation of ritual need to borne in mind. For detailed discussion, see above, Chapter 1. 
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terms of secular aspects of the concept as it would have been understood by the 
leading members of the aristocracy and as it governed political relations.2 
At the outset it is important to recognise that the issues under consideration are 
the very essence of medieval politics and this perspective must be maintained.3 
Given their often-contentious nature there is an understandable temptation to 
view the succession politics of the late eleventh century in a retrospective 
fashion, largely as a series of political 'crises'.4 Yet crisis is undoubtedly too 
strong an adjective to explain the politics surrounding the successions of 1087 
and 1100 and the upheavals in the Anglo-Norman polity that followed, dramatic 
and violent though they may have been. The simple fact is that many of Rufus's 
2 Most recently, see, BjOrn Weiler, 'William of Malmesbury on Kingship', History, 90, no. 297 
(2005),3-22, esp. 5-6. Of particular importance for the religious and theoretical aspects of 
kingship are E. H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology 
(Princeton, 1955); idem, Laudes Regiae: A Study in Liturgical Acclamations and Medieval Ruler 
Worship (Berkley, 1946); H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'The Anglo-Norman Laudes Regiae', Viator, 12 
(1981),39-78. See also the collected essays of J. L. Nelson, particularly, Politics and Ritual in 
Early Medieval Europe. (London, 1986), especially, 'National Synods, Kingship as Office, and 
Royal Anointing: An Early Medieval Syndrome', 239-57; 'Symbols in Context: Rulers' 
Inauguration Rituals in Byzantium and the West in the Early Medieval Period', 259-81; 
'Inauguration Rituals', 283-307; 'Ritual and Reality in the Early Medieval Ordines, 329-39. See 
also, 'Hincmar of Reims on King-making: The Evidence ofthe Annals ofSt. Bertin, 861-882', 
Coronations: Medieval and Early Modern Monarchic Ritual, ed. J. M. Bak (Berkley, 1990), 16-
27,33-5. 
3 See especially the comments of John Gillingham on the continuing flow of acquisitions after 
1066, he remarked that these were caused by the 'succession wars of William II's, Henry I's and 
Stephen's reign, i.e. by the ordinary accidents of medieval politics.' 'Some Observations of Social 
Mobility in England between the Norman Conquest and the Early Thirteenth Century', English in 
the Twelfth Century, 264-5. 
4 For example, N. J. Higham, The Death of Anglo-Saxon England (Stroud, 1997), 152. In much 
ofthe literature there is something approaching a tautology in relation to the discussion of 
succession politics, whether expressed as the 'crisis' of 1066, or the 'protracted' succession 
disputes of the late eleventh century or the 'struggles' of the tenth century. For example, P. 
Stafford, Queen Emma and Queen Edith. Queenship and Women's Power in Eleventh Century 
England(Oxford, 1997),87-8; E. John, 'Edward the Confessor and the Norman Succession', 
EHR, 94 (1979), 241-67, who comments: 'But to be intelligible the Norman Conquest needs to 
be understood as the climax of a crisis that had been going on for generations.' One has to ask at 
what stage an ongoing sense of 'crisis' becomes the new norm. However, this is not to deny that 
issues of succession and injected a degree of urgency into the political process. Stuart Airlie's 
definitions of a crisis as the 'acceleration of the historical process' and a 'general sense of 
emergency' is significant. S. Airlie, 'The Nearly Men: Boso of Vie nne and Arnulf of Bavavria', 
26. See also, the comments of Santiago Castellanos and Ii'iaki Martin Viso on the overall 
dynamism of political power and the opportunities and dangers this presented. 'The local 
articulation of central power in the north of the Iberian Peninsula (500-1000)', EME, 13 (2005), 
1- 42. 
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and Henry's predecessors as English kings, including their own father, had 
gained the throne, either through an effective coup d'etat or with the support of a 
faction in the face of opposition from other claimants.' Indeed, the example of 
the Conqueror's own accession and that of his father to the ducal title in 
Normandy revealed that even relatively stable succession patterns could be 
manipulated.6 Therefore, rather than view the disputed successions of 1087 and 
1100 as departures or crises in the ordinary flow of political discourse there is a 
strong case for suggesting that both must be viewed as a normal and integral 
parts. As such, many of the issues associated with the English succession in the 
later eleventh century, and which attracted comment in the Anglo-Norman world, 
also resonated in a wider European context.' Though many of the issues faced by 
the Anglo-Norman aristocracy in 1087 and 1100 had potentially grave 
implications, it should not be imagined that the leading members of the 
aristocracy were confronted with a situation that presented challenges to them 
that could not be met.' The choices and decisions made in 1087 and 1100 were 
the actions of rational men in difficult, but not unprecedented circumstances. 9 
.5 F. Barlow, The Godwins (London, 2002), 91. 
6 Bates, Normandy Be/ore 1066, 150; Garnett, "Ducal' Succession', 108-109. 'Robert the 
Magnificent had to make his accession appear to confonn with custom, even if it did not.' See 
also, F. Lifshitz, 'Dudo's Historical Narrative and the Nonnan Succession of996', JMH, 20 
(1994), 101-20. 
'The work of Elisabeth van Houts and Jane Martinedale, cited in the Introduction, remains 
seminal in this context. Most recently, see, D. Bates, '1066: does the date still matter?', HR, 78, 
no. 202 (November, 2005), 460-1. 
, Marjorie Chibnall's observations on the Conqueror's claim to the English throne, particularly 
that it had to be proved right and just 'by every law known to be learnt', should be juxtaposed 
with the simple fact that many of the Conqueror's most intimate supporters and counsellors in 
1066, who would have been exposed to this sort oflegal argument while deliberating the merits of 
his claim, were also prominent rebels in 1088, including Odo of Bayeux, Robert of Mortain and 
Geoffrey of Coutances. Chibnall, 'Clio's Legal Cosmetics', 36. The evidence explored in Chapter 
7, on the skill of the aristocratic negotiators in 1091 and 110 I, should also be borne in mind. 
9 This, of course, echoes the recent arguments of Professor David Crouch for the aristocracy in 
the context of Stephen's reign, The Reign o/Stephen, 121-32,233-4. See above, Introduction. 
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"\ 
With this in mind, much of the historiography of the last thirty-five years relating 
to the successions of Rufus and Henry I can be placed in its appropriate context 
as a preliminary for a new discussion. Much of the existing framework is firmly 
rooted in the constitutional, administrative and legal traditions of Anglo-Norman 
historiography and primarily looks to the inheritance practices of the aristocracy 
and what emanates from this as the source of political dispute. Professor J. C. 
Holt gave the tide momentum and built upon the initial observations of Genestal 
by focusing upon the distinction between acquets and propres, an analytical 
framework which treated Normandy as a patrimony and had Curthose succeeding 
the Conqueror as his eldest son and heir, while England was treated as an 
acquisition which the Conqueror chose to pass onto his younger son, William 
Rufus. 10 Emily Zack Tabuteau followed this line of reasoning to produce an 
important study that massively expanded this argument, weaving a textured 
analysis of the interplay between political considerations and customary legal 
constraints that she argued lay behind the Conqueror's actions in 1087.11 In a 
context where most of the sources are perceived to be contradictory and 
somewhat inconclusive the attraction ofthis framework is obvious. As such, it 
continues to exert a profound influence. 12 
Despite Professor Holt's optimism that not much is left to be debated, there is a 
compelling argument for the successions of 1087 and 1100 to be explored 
10 R. Genestal, 'La formation du droit d'ainesse dans la coutume de Normandie', Normannia, 1 
(1928), 168; Holt 'Politics and Property', Colonial England, 113-59. See also, Garnett, 
'Coronation and Propaganda', 114. 
11 E. Z. Tabuteau, 'The Role of Law in the Succession to Normandy and England, 1087', HSJ, 3 
(1991), 156-68. 
12 For example, Bartlett, England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 8-9; D. Carpenter, The 
Struggle/or Mastery: Britain 1066-1284 (London, 2003), 125. On the nature of the sources see, 
Bates, Conqueror, 176. 
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anew.13 It should be noted that the emphasis on aristocratic inheritance practices 
to explain the Anglo-Norman succession has always been questioned. John Le 
Patourel openly questioned the extent to which the Conqueror would have been 
influenced by the 'laws of inheritance' of those whom he ruled, and thus 
provided the catalyst for Emily Zack Tabuteau's study.14 Professor Holt reflected 
upon his earlier arguments and questioned the extent to which the distinction 
influenced the Conqueror's decision in settling his own succession. IS 
Many scholars remain to be convinced that aristocratic inheritance practices offer 
a suitable framework to explore the issue, or whether succession to a kingdom or 
duchy can be seen in the same context as aristocratic succession.16 Professor 
David Bates has suggested that the 'balance of probability' favours Orderic's 
account for 1087, with the underlying assumption being that no arrangements had 
been made for the English succession.17 Barbara English reached similar 
conclusions. II Most recently, both Michael Evans and David Crouch have 
avoided discussing the issue at length, yet both have noted the inventiveness of 
contemporaries in dealing with the issue of succession, especially when faced 
with the intertwined problem of sons competing for a share of an inheritance in 
which the constituent parts are regarded as separate and indivisible units, yet the 
integrity of the whole is questionable. 19 
13 Holt, Colonial England, 158. 
14 Le Patourel, 'The Nonnan Succession', 230; Normandy and England, 4-5; Tabuteau, 'Role of 
Law', 143. 
IS Holt, Colonial England, 149. 
16 See especially, Barlow, Rufus, 41-9. 
17 Bates, Conqueror, 176-9. 
II B. English, 'William the Conqueror and the Anglo-Nonnan Succession', HR, 64, no. 155 
(1991), 222. 
19 M. Evans, The Deaths of Kings. Royal Deaths in Medieval England (London, 2003), 4; 
Crouch, The Normans, 205-6. 
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It might be argued that reliance upon inheritance customs to examine the issue of 
succession is actually a bar to historical understanding.20 The fundamental 
objection in using the framework of acquets and propres is its inherent tendency 
to marginalise the political dimensions of succession and the very real problems 
and concerns faced by the aristocracy. For example, Emily Zack Tabuteau saw no 
inherent contradiction in discussing Curthose's claim to Normandy in largely 
political terms, yet invoked a legal rule 'about patrimony and conquest' to 
discuss Rufus's succession.21 In methodological terms, these discussions have 
also remained largely immune to wider developments in Anglo-Norman 
historiography, especially the importance of political ideas and the influence of 
canon law on the development of the English state; both have stressed the 
intellectual context in which the politics of the late eleventh and early twelfth 
century were conducted, and especially the importance of the concept of political 
legitimacy.22 
Of course it is nonsense to suppose that the leading members of the Anglo-
Norman political elite needed to look solely to canon law and theoretical 
pronouncements for a framework of political legitimacy. Arguments about 
political legitimacy, succession and rule had been a feature of political life for 
generations throughout much of Europe.13 Any analysis of the political conduct 
20 Strevett, 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', 168. 
21 Tabuteau, 'Role of Law' , 155. Cf. 152, 'It is not impossible that beyond these dynastic 
considerations, a specific rule of private law operated to require William to leave Nonnandy to 
Curthose.' 
22 For example, Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda'; 'The Origins of the Crown', The History 
o/English Law Centenary Essays on 'Pollock and Maitland'. PBA, 89, ed. J. Hudson (Oxford, 
1996), 171-214; M. Philpott, 'Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State', The Medieval 
State. Essays Presented to James Campbell, ed. J. R. Maddicott and D.M. Palliser (London and 
Rio Grande, 2000), 93-107; H. E. J. Cowdrey, Lanfranc. Scholar, Monk and Archbishop 
(Oxford, 2003), 219. 
23 For a recent example of the importance of the concept to changing historical perceptions, see, 
Bates, Conqueror's Adolescence, S. 
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of the aristocracy between 1087 and 1106 which seeks to argue that leading 
members of the aristocracy had a view about political legitimacy which ran 
counter to that held by William Rufus and Henry I and their supporters, therefore 
has to have at its heart a definition and examination of political legitimacy 
defined as much by the secular aspects of the concept, as by the religious. 
Discussions of the whole process by which English kings acceded to the throne 
in the eleventh century must take centre stage, particularly the crucial importance 
of designation as a source of political strength and legitimacy. The interaction of 
designation with considerations of prior obligations of lordship and homage, and 
the effects these had on the political process must also be integral. 
One defining feature of the conduct of the magnates profiled in Part One of this 
thesis, and whose actions are at heart of the political upheaval of the late 1080s 
and 1090s, is the strength of their personal or family commitments to Robert 
Curthose, commitments which informed the conduct of these men and the 
choices they made as political actors. The consistent support given to Curthose in 
his two challenges for the English throne testify to the remarkable degree of 
coherence that had been engendered throughout the cross-Channel aristocracy 
and which withstood quite remarkable political pressures. Yet this consistency 
also fits into the wider pattern of succession politics for the eleventh century, 
identified by Pauline Stafford, where political systems are placed under strain, 
not by the actions of disputing a succession per se, but by the protracted nature of 
the dispute and the re-appearance on the political scene of those who challenged 
S4 
for possession of the throne.24 To the list of iEthelrred in 1014, Harthacnut in 
1040 and Edward the Confessor in 1041 can be added Robert Curthose in 1087 
and 1100. Therefore, and what this thesis seeks to argue, is that the concept of 
political legitimacy is crucial to understanding the politics of the late 1090s and 
early 11 OOs. It provides a more coherent framework for exploring the conduct of 
the aristocracy as political actors. Doubts over the legitimacy of both Rufus's and 
Henry's kingships and, on two occasions, a belief that Robert Curthose had a 
preferable claim to the English throne lay, behind much of the dynamism and 
instability that punctuated the nineteen years between 1087 and 1106. It also 
makes the efforts by the leading members of the cross-Channel elite to achieve 
lasting peace settlements in 1091 and 1101 even more remarkable and deserving 
of a central place in any analysis. 
Contemporaries and near-contemporaries certainly analysed events in these 
terms. Those writing in the early twelfth century showed an awareness that the 
issues faced by an earlier generation were worthy of study in contemporary 
circumstances, and whose views on contemporary political issues informed their 
analysis of the past.2' The most explicit example came from the pen of Or de ric. 
He constructed two rhetorical scenes where the problems associated with royal 
succession and the partition of England and Normandy was spelt out. In the first 
scene, Orderic crafted a death-bed speech for the Conqueror where he recorded 
what he thought were the doubts expressed by the king in relation to the 
succession to the English throne. William recognised that he had won his crown 
by violence and not through hereditary succession; being a king was a completely 
24 P. Stafford, Unification and Conquest (London, 1989), 80. 
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new departure for the Nonnan ducal family; and he did not know the means to 
transmit the kingship, so entrusted it to God alone, though expressing the hope 
that William Rufus would rule in England if God willed it.26 
In a second scene, Orderic presented the arguments he thought had been put 
forward by sections of a rebellious aristocracy to justify its actions in opposing 
Rufus in 1088. It was claimed that Curthose was the first born, weaker and more 
pliable in character, and the aristocracy had already sworn fealty to him for their 
Nonnan lands. They doubted whether it was possible to serve two lords who 
were in the eyes of the conspirators, so different and lived so far apart. The 
dangers to the aristocracy of this situation were clearly spelt out, both in terms of 
compromising their oaths to Rufus and Curthose and the material dangers this 
presented to them.27 
In essence, these two scenes sum up the problems faced by the cross-Channel 
aristocracy. The Conqueror's death-bed scene, though highly rhetorical and 
amended over a period of time, reflects the underlying uncertainty behind the 
succession process.28 Though both in 1087 and at the time Orderic was writing 
the rules and customs governing the succession process were relatively 
undefined, a general consensus on the constitutive parts of the process, best 
described as 'eligibility by birth, designation by the late king, election or 
recognition by the secular and ecclesiastical magnates, and consecration by the 
2' For example, M. Chibnall, The World of Or de ric Vitalis (Woodbridge, 1996), 182-8; Weiler 
'William ofMalmesbury', S. For a more detailed analysis see above, Chapter 1. 
26 OV, 4, 90-94. 
27 OV, 4, 122-6. 
28 For Orderic's various attempts to add to his death-bed scene for the Conqueror, see, Cowdrey, 
'Death-bed Testaments', 722. 
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church', had emerged.29 What the successions of 1087 and 1100 reveal quite 
clearly is the variable weight that could be attached to each of these criteria in 
changing political circumstances, and the opportunities and problems this 
presented, both to the aristocracy as a whole and to those claiming or in 
possession of the throne.30 When viewed in a longer perspective, these 
constituent parts can be equated to a process with a series of stages that both 
shaped and responded to shifting political priorities. 
In terms of eligibility, all three sons of the Conqueror had claims to the throne. 
Significantly, the claims of the youngest son, Henry, appear to have been ignored 
until the death of Rufus in 1100. It is arguable that in terms of the emerging legal 
doctrine of porphyrogeniture, the right of having been born of a reigning king and 
queen, the claim of Henry could have been the strongest of the three brothers in 
1087.31 William of Malmesbury later attempted a retrospective gloss on Henry's 
kingship by raising the doctrine within his narrative.32 More recently, attempts 
have been made to reconcile the claims of Curthose and Henry to the throne in 
1101 by juxtaposing primogeniture with porphyrogeniture.33 However, there is no 
evidence from any of the sources that porphyrogeniture played any role in the 
actual successions of 1087 and 1100. The later use of the doctrine smacks of 
retrospective propaganda by Henry's clerical admirers, who were well aware of 
the equally uncertain nature of the succession of politics of their own day. 
29 F. Barlow, Edward the Confessor (London, 1970),54. 
30 The process of weighing each claim was evident at all levels of political society, as indicated by 
Orderic's comments on the English not recognising Curthose's claim in 1101. OV, 4,314. For 
comments on the attitudes of the English sheriffs in 1088 and 1101, see, below, Chapter 3. 
31 Compare Lanfranc's comments in a letter to Queen Margaret, written between 1070 and 1089, 
where Margaret's status was noted as 'regali stirpe progenita'. Lanfrane's Letters, no. 50. 
32 GR, I, 709. 
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Henry's exclusion from consideration in 1087 is hardly surprising. Though 
doubts hung over the future of a cross-Channel polity, the indivisible nature of 
England and Normandy meant it could not be partitioned on a three-way basis. 
Likewise, Maine was not a suitable endowment for a young man in his late teens, 
given its strategic importance and the fact that Robert Curthose already had long-
established rights to the county.34 Both Orderic and William ofMalmesbury 
suggest that Henry had been made heir to his mother's lands in Gloucestershire 
and Buckinghamshire, worth roughly £260-£320 per year, in addition to the large 
sum of money that he had been provided with by his father.3s Henry's use of his 
inheritance in 1088 to help fund Curthose's challenge for the throne in return for 
the lordship of the Cotentin, suggest a pragmatic acceptance of the settlement, 
possibly in line with previous ducal successions and the framework of 
accommodation that allowed for the principatus of Normandy to remain intact 
across several successions.36 
William of Malmesbury included in his narrative a comment that Henry's 
ambitions with regard to the kingship were beginning to take shape before 
1087.37 However, there is no evidence to suggest that Henry was either in a 
position to challenge for the throne, or in any way considered a serious contender 
for the throne in 1087. Henry's treatment by his two elder brothers, particularly 
after the Treaty of Rouen in 1091 and their rejection of any claim by Henry to a 
share of their father's lands, suggest that his exclusion from consideration in 
33Hollister, Henry I, 105. 
34 Frank Barlow neatly sums up the arguments. Barlow, Rufus, 49. 
3S OV, 2214; GR, 1,510; Hollister, Henry 1,40-1; Barlow, Rufus, 49. 
36 Garnett, "'Ducal" Succession', 94-5. 
37 GR, 1,542. 
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1087 had set the tone for his treatment throughout much of the early 1090s.38 The 
aims of the treaty will be examined in Chapter Seven, yet for now it should be 
noted that its primary aim was to regulate the mechanisms for future successions 
by recognising Rufus and Curthose the heirs of their father and of each other in 
the absence of a legitimate heir from a marriage, and establish a reciprocal 
political relationship between the two men to take into the effects of Rufus's 
intervention into Normandy between 1089 and 1091. What is noticeable is that 
no one felt the need to account for Henry in the terms of the succession to the 
English throne. Indeed, the very public nature of the agreements further 
marginalised Henry as a possible claimant to the throne.39 Overall, there is no 
reason to think that Henry's bequest from his father in 1087 was not 
commensurate with his status, yet in terms of the wider succession politics he 
was something of a marginal figure while Rufus and Curthose were still alive. 
For much of the 1090s Henry's chief political asset and his greatest problem was 
that royal blood flowed through his veins. 
Henry's experience in 1087 shows quite clearly that eligibility was merely the 
pre-requisite for a claim to the throne to be made. A narrowing of those eligible 
to claim the throne was both desirable for the health and stability of the political 
system as a whole, as well as the starting point for decisions to be made on the 
basis of other criteria.40 No other contender for the throne emerged in 1087, either 
from within the aristocracy or the wider ducal kin, and no one championed the 
38 OV, 4, 250; Barlow, Rufus, 282-3. 
39 Cf. the comments of Hugh the Chantor on the treaties, History o/the Church, 16. 'Qualiter 
inter Jratres conuenit et satis noturn est et nostra nichil interest.' 
40 For example, R. Abels, 'Royal Succession and the Growth of Political Stability in Ninth-
Century Wessex', HSJ, 12 (2002), 83-97; D. N. Dumville, 'The iEtheling: A Study in Anglo-
Saxon Constitutional History', Anglo-Saxon England, 8 (1979), 1-33. 
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cause of Edgar tEtheling.41 This is a potentially significant change ifOrderic is to 
be trusted on the motives of the rebels of 1075. In his account of the revolt, 
Orderic uses earl Roger of Hereford's motives for participating in the revolt to 
suggest that the attitude towards the kingship of some senior Norman magnates 
at this stage appears to have been to treat it as an office that could be assumed or 
discarded.42 Significantly, Rufus's attitude towards his kingship, despite having 
undergone the process of coronation and his education by Lanfranc, initially 
appeared to have echoed this perception. William of Malmesbury thought that 
during the revolt of 1088 Rufus declared that he would gladly resign the crown if 
it were thought to be the right course of action by the advisors appointed by his 
father.43 These comments by Orderic and William of Malmesbury reflect many of 
the arguments that circulated in Germany in the struggle between Pope Gregory 
VII and Henry IV on the nature ofkingship.44 In contrast, by 1101, Henry was 
prepared to argue that once he had been crowned that made a resignation of his 
kingship impossible.4' Therefore, in terms of eligibility, the accessions of both 
Rufus and Henry need to be viewed as part of an ongoing process of refinement 
and development in deciding who could be considered as having a legitimate 
claim to the throne. The terms of the treaties of Rouen and Winchester reflect the 
increasing emphasis within the church on legitimacy and birth.46 Yet, though no 
41 This of course, stands in direct contrast to the events of 1066. Barlow, Godwins, 89-92. 
42 OV, 2, 310-22, esp. 314. 'Unus ex nobis sit rex et duo duces; et sic nobis tribus omnes Anglici 
subicientur honores.' Cf. the comments in C. P. Lewis, 'The Early Earls ofNonnan England', 
ANS, 13 (1991), 221. 
43 GR, 1,546. 'Seorsum enim ducto magnam ingessil inuidiam, dicens Iibenter se imperio 
cessurum si illi et aliis uideatur quos pater tutores reliquerat.' 
44 Robinson, Authority and Resistance, 124-31, particularly his discussion of Manegold of 
Lautenbach's Liber ad Gehehardum. 
4' Wace, lines 10441-3. 
46 Compare Robert of Gloucester's position on the accession of Stephen in 1135, with his 
illegitimacy a barrier to the kingship and Robert expressing a preference for his nephew, Henry. 
Gesta Stephani, ed. K. R. Potter and R. H. C. Davis (Oxford, 1976), 12-14; Crouch, Reign of 
Stephen, 34-5; Hollister, Henry 1,311-2. 
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claim to the throne could be made without satisfying the criteria of eligibility, the 
final choice was clearly governed by other considerations. 
The designation of the previous ruler cannot be under-estimated as a source of 
political legitimacy and a crucial step in turning eligibility into reality.47 Indeed, 
in their respective ways, the examples of both 1087 and 1100 reveal designation 
to be the central factor in any successful and secure accession. In 1087, Rufus 
arrived in England carrying a letter to Archbishop Lanfranc, which despite the 
vagueness of the various accounts that mention the text, reveal that his father had 
designated him as his successor to the English throne.48 The arguments of 
Barbara English, that the Conqueror had 'recommended' Rufus, but fell short of 
designating him are important, but ultimately unconvincing.49 There is nothing in 
the accounts of the letter that Rufus brought with him or in Lanfranc's actions 
following its receipt to suggest that the Conqueror had not designated Rufus as 
his successor, and Lanfranc subsequently acted in accordance with the 
Conqueror's wishes.so Unsurprisingly perhaps, two Canterbury sources, the Acta 
Lanfranci and Eadmer stress the role and suitability of Lanfranc for his task.S! 
47 For a succinct summary of many of the considerations, see, P. Stafford, 'Kings, Kingship and 
Kingdoms', From the Vikings to the Normans, ed. W. Davies (Oxford, 2003), 11-39, especially, 
23-6. C. N. L. Brooke has argued that designation is the most important factor of all when 
considering the succession. C. N. L. Brooke, The Saxon and Norman Kings, 3rd edition (Oxford, 
2001),27-8. 
48 OV, 4, 96. ' ... epistofam de eonstituendo regefecit Lanfranco arehiepiseopo ... .'. The 
translation by Chibnall as 'a letter to secure the recognition of the new king addressed to 
Archbishop Lanfranc', should be compared to the translation by Douglas and Greenaway as, 'a 
letter ... on the appointment ofa successor to the throne.' EHD, 2 (1981), 312. OV, 5,202. 
' .... epistofam regis de coronanda prole Lanfranco archiepiscopo ... t. 
49 English, 'Anglo-Norman Succession', 230-2. Cf. E. Mason, William Il. Rufus the Red King 
(Stroud, 2005), 49, who argues that Rufus's consecration in Westminster abbey was proof that he 
had been designated as his father's heir. See also, Barlow, Rufus, 56. 
so OV, 4, 110. 'Guillelmus Rufus epistolam patris sui Lanfraneo archiepiseopo detulit. qua 
perfecta idem presul eum eodem iuuene Lundoniam properauit, ipsumque adfestiuitatem saneti 
Michaelis archangeli in ueteri basiliea saneti Petri apostoli quae Westmonasterium dicitur 
regem eonsecrauit.' 
S! Eadmer HN, 24. Eadmer described Lanfranc as a 'vir divinae simul et humanae legis 
peritissimus', whose advice the Conqueror always relied upon. 
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William of Malmesbury echoed this when describing Lanfranc as the 'moving 
spirit' in Rufus's coronation and 'the most powerful influence in affairs' .S2 
Though Eadmer portrayed Lanfranc as somewhat reluctant to crown Rufus, his 
views are jaundiced and somewhat unreliable.s3 In contrast, the Acta Lanfranci is 
much more straightforward and the most explicit source, noting that Lanfranc 
chose Rufus to succeed as king as his father had desired.s4 
Unlike the situation in Normandy, where Robert Curthose had been designated as 
his father's successor years before his death, the Conqueror may have left the 
question of the English succession to his death-bed, but equally there is no reason 
to suppose that his designation of Rufus in this way was any less binding than 
Edward the Confessor's designation of Harold in 1066. Indeed, by leaving his 
designation to his death-bed, the Conqueror can be seen to conform to the 
precedent set under the Confessor, both in style and substance; a very English 
way of designating a future successor that takes into account the rulers wishes 
and the will of God.sS Note too, should also be taken of the circumstances 
surrounding Henry I's final days and the succession in England.s6 The author of 
the Brevis Relatio was succinct in discussing both the ducal and royal accessions 
Sl GR, 1,542-4. 
S3 Eadmer HN, 25; Barlow, Rufus, 56. 
54 Acta Lanfranci, 87. ' .. . mortuo rege Willeimo trans mare, fllium eius Willelmum, sicut pater 
constituit, Lanfrancus in regem elegit et ..... sacravat et coronavit.' See also, English, 'Anglo-
Nonnan Succession', 231, n. 40. On the dating of the Acta see, P. Hayward, 'Some reflections on 
the historical value of the so-called Acta Lanfranei, HR, 77, no.196 (2004), 141-60. 
"In general, see, Cowdrey, 'Death-bed Testaments', 720-1. The evidence from both the Vita 
JEwardi and Orderic, appear to suggest a lack of precision and possibly a degree of ambiguity on 
both occasions. The wording of the Vila JEwardi for 1066 reveals that Edward merely 
'commended' Edith and the kingdom of England to the protection of Harold. Barlow, Vita 
JEwardi, 79. Orderic notes that the Conqueror's sins were such that he dare not entrust the 
fasees ... huis regni to anyone but God, but expressed the hope that Rufus would reign if God 
willed it. OV, 4, 92. However, both Orderic and Edith had reasons to want an ambiguous text and 
there is no reason to suspect that both designations did not carry full weight, which is the 
implication of other sources which mention them. For Edith, see E. Mason, The House of 
Godwine (London, 2004), 135. For Oderic, Chibnall, World ofOrderie Vitalis, 186-7; Cowdrey, 
'Death-bed Testaments', 722. 
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of 1087 in the same sentence and using the same tenn, which suggests that he did 
not regard the difference in the circumstances or timing of Curthose's and 
Rufus's respective designations to have affected its impact.s7 
It is, however, William of Malmesbury who provides the strongest evidence of 
the importance of the Conqueror's designation. It appears as though some sort of 
framework was established to oversee the transfer of power, with Roger de 
Montgomery described by Malmesbury as a tutor to Rufus, appointed by the 
Conqueror to advise his son. References to a tutor in the narrative sources usually 
occur in the context of a ducal minority, clearly not applicable to Rufus in 1087. 
However, a quality associated with being a tutor is a degree of 'wisdom' .58 The 
need for mature and sound advice to ensure a smooth restructuring of the cross-
Channel polity is reflected in Orderic's use of biblical paradigms.59 It hardly 
seems credible that any sort of framework would have been established had 
Rufus not be intended as the Conqueror's successor, and his chances of 
becoming king not judged to be good. Yet, Malmesbury also provides direct and 
unambiguous evidence of the importance of designation. As part of his narrative, 
he constructed a rhetorical dialogue between Rufus and Roger de Montgomery 
during the course of the rebellion of 1088. Questioning his kingship reflected 
'6 Crouch, Reign o/Stephen, 30-1; Hollister, Henry 1,473-84. 
51 Brevis Relatio, 35. 'Antequam uerofiniret/ecit heredem de Normannia, Rodbertumfllium 
suum de Anglia autem Willelmum alterumfilium suum.' 
'8 GR, 1,546. William of Jumieges uses the term when commentating on the Conqueror's 
minority. GND, 2, 92. ' Is itaque dux in puerilibus annis patre orbatus, sagaci tutorum 
providentia liberalium morum instituebatur ad incrementa.' William also noted that duke Robert 
entrusted his son to his tutors and guardians. ' ... dux sub tutoribus et actoribus sapientia 
uigentibus illum adusque legitim am etatem subegit ... ' GND, 2, 80.William's guardians are listed 
by Orderic as count Alan III of Brittany, Gilbert of Brio nne and Osbern the steward, OV, 3, 86; 4, 
82. The tutors are mentioned as Turold, Ralph the monk and Master William. Fauroux, nos 220, 
259,262; GND, 2, 92. Orderic also mentions a Thurkill as nutricium to William, OV, 4,82. The 
deliberate use of two separate terms by William of Jumieges, suggests a division in 
responsibilities, with actors fulfilling a more public role in the exercise of power and tutors 
exercising a more pastoral role. 
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badly upon the rebels, Rufus argued, because the 'same man who made me king 
chose you as magnates' .60 
The lack of a clearly designated successor in 1100 almost certainly accounts for 
the hurried nature of Henry's coronation. It may also account for the stronger 
terms in which Robert Curthose's reactions to Henry's accession are recorded, 
and a factor in the far more effective campaign that Robert and his supporters 
waged in 1101.61 Unlike the situation in 1087-8, there is no evidence of debate or 
equivocation among his supporters in England, no accusations of Curthose being 
overcautious.62 Whereas opposition to Rufus grew after his coronation, Henry 
immediately encountered opposition from within the aristocracy to his plans. 
Moreover, the choice in language in some of the narrative sources suggests a 
degree of uncertainty around the circumstances of his accession. The author of 
the Brevis relalio used the verb suscipere to state that Henry had 'dared to 
receive the kingdom of England' , a verb generally used in a context of 
aristocratic succession when there were more than contender for an inheritance 
and the eventual heir may not have been the obvious choice.63 Arguably, the most 
revealing evidence of all is that once the Robert Curthose had landed in England 
he was received as king by his supporters.64 
'9 OV, iv, 122. See above, Chapter 1; Strevett, 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', 172-3. 
60 GR, 1,546. • ... idem enim se regem qui illos duces/ecerit.' 
61 GND, 2, 218-20; Wace, lines, 10322-3. 
62 GND, 2, 204. 
63 Brevis re/atio, 37, ' ... quod regnum Anglie suscipere aususfuisset ... .' Cf., below, Chapter 1 
and the use of succedere and suscipere in the foundation narrative of Shrewsbury Abbey to 
describe the respective accessions of Hugh de Montgomery and Robert de Belleme to the earldom 
of Shrewsbury. The compilers of the text may well have been aware of the difference in the nature 
of Hugh and Robert's elevation; with Hugh designated as the heir to Shrewsbury long before his 
father's death, while Robert's succession was a political decision and therefore subject to the use 
of suscipere. 
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The importance of designation also needs to be seen in the context of it effects on 
the next stage of the succession process, the 'election' of the king by the secular 
and ecclesiastical elite. At this point, the discussion becomes more complex, 
particularly in terms of the interaction between the theoretical concepts of 
legitimacy and the secular aspects of the concept. Also of crucial importance is a 
deeper, underlying problem, namely that on each occasion when the English 
succession was considered, Robert Curthose was already the legitimate ruler of 
Normandy with the full legal and political implications of this role realised in his 
relations with the cross-Channel aristocracy. Orderic's reflections on the 
aristocratic motives in rebelling 1088 probably captures the flavour of the types 
of discussion that took place, mixing an assessment of Curthose as a potential 
English king with the underlying problems faced by the aristocracy, particularly 
the existing bonds of obligation and lordship that may have compelled many in 
the political elite to see Curthose as the natural heir to the Conqueror in England 
and obliged them to support him.6$ For the aristocracy, the decision to partition 
England and Normandy in 1087, and the de/acto continuation of that partition in 
1100, cut across these ties and placed them in an impossible position, something 
Orderic, despite his views on the aristocracy as a whole, was ready to recognise.66 
64 OV, 5, 314. ' ... et ab illustribus et opulentis qui confederati eum prestolabantur susceptus in 
regem bellum parauit.' 
6$ This would also help to account for the involvement of Robert de Belleme. See below, Chapter 
S. 
66 On Orderic's use of biblical paradigms to explore this dilemma see, Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman 
Civil War', 172-3; above, Chapter 1. William of Malmesbury also offers a narrative where 
assessments on the nature of Rufus and Robert as rulers are presented as part of the reasoning 
behind Odo of Bayeux's agitation against his nephew. GR, 1,544. 'Rotberto regnum competere, 
qui sit et remissioris animi et iuueniles stultWas multis iam laboribus decoxerit; hunc delicate 
nutritum, animlJerotia quam uultus ipse demonstret pretumidum, omnia contraJas et ius 
ausurum .. .'. 
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There is no need to re-examine the evidence relating to Curthose having been 
designated as his father's successor in Normandy well before 1087.67 Both Ralph 
Davis and Elisabeth van Houts have discussed the implications of this at some 
length, and especially the possibility that Curthose had exercised power in 
Normandy as duke before 1087.68 Whether Curthose had actually exercised 
power within Normandy before 1087 is not the crucial issue in this context. What 
is crucial is that by designating his successor the Conqueror had created a cross-
Channel dimension to a traditional Norman political framework where, in the 
words of Orderic, once the 'honor' had been granted and homage given by the 
aristocracy for its lands, it could not be taken away, despite the deterioration in 
relations between father and son and Conqueror's own wishes in 1087. 69 The 
strength of these ties is reflected in William of Malmesbury's account for 1087, 
where he noted the pressure that was applied to the Conqueror to ensure that 
Curthose succeeded him as duke in 1087.70 
If, as argued above, succession politics are best regarded, as part and parcel of the 
normal political discourse, then there is an urgent need to view the motives 
behind those members of the aristocracy who refused to let the Conqueror 
'disinherit' Curthose within the longer perspective of the impact on Norman 
politics of the Conquest of England. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to 
suggest that the successful creation of cross-Channel complexes of estates after 
67 In general see, R. H. C. Davis, 'William of Jumieges, Robert Curthose and the Norman 
Succession', EHR, 95 (1980),597-606; Tabuteau, 'Role of Law', 147-52. GND, 1, Introduction, 
34-5; 2, 130, 170; OV, 3, 98, 112. 
68 Davis, 'William of Jumieges', 605-6; GND, 1, Introduction, 34. 
69 See also, Cowdrey, 'Death-bed Testaments', 716-24. OV, 4, 92. 'Ducatum Normanniae 
antequam in epitimio Sen/ac contra Hera/dum certassem Roberto jilio mea concessi, cui quia 
primogenitus est et hominium pene omnium huius patriae baronum iam recepit concessus honor 
nequit abstrahi. ' See also, GND, 2, 202. Robert of Torigni supports Orderic in noting that 
Curthose had been designated heir for a 'long time previously'. 'A/terius enim dudum heres 
designatus fuerat ... ' 
70 GR, 1, 510. 'Normanniam inuitus et coactus Rotbero, Angliam Willelmo, possessiones 
maternas Henrico delegauit. ' 
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1066 introduced the issue of the succession into political discourse long before 
the Conqueror's death. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that fairly rapidly 
after 1066 the Conqueror may have had doubts over the feasibility of one 
individual being both duke of Normandy and king of England. The example of 
the Conqueror's involvement in the inheritance to the lands of William Fitz 
Osbern in 1071 is often taken as evidence of the development of aristocratic 
inheritance practices based upon the distinction between acquisitions and 
patrimonies, and for these to have had an influence on the Conqueror's thoughts 
in relation to 1087. Yet Orderic recorded that the initiative in settling the 
inheritance appeared to have come from the Conqueror himself. 'King William' 
wrote Orderic, divided his inheritance amongst his sons: William the elder 
received Breteuil and Pacy and the remainder of the paternal inheritance in 
Normandy ... But Roger the younger brother ... received the county of Hereford and 
all of his father's estates in England.m There is essentially nothing in William's 
actions to suggest that by effectively dividing the family into Norman and 
English branches William was not using convenient aristocratic customs in order 
to improvise on the developing structures of the cross-Channel polity. Equally, 
given that most of the examples of a division of inheritance along the lines of 
acquisitions and patrimonies occur after 1087, there is nothing to suggest that the 
aristocracy could not improvise and adapt to changing political circumstances. 72 
William's intervention is likely to be a reflection of his own attitudes five years 
after his victory at Hastings, and possibly indicative of some uncertainty over the 
shape the future would take. 
71 OV, 2, 282-4. cr. Le Patourel, 'Nonnan Succession', 234, that there was 'no distinction in the 
Conqueror's mind betweenpropres and acquets'. 
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In political terms, the very process of elevating the Conqueror to the English 
kingship had created tensions throughout the body politic. Without repeating a 
well known narrative of events, the revolt of 1075, the arrest ofOdo ofBayeux in 
1082 or even the aristocratic dismay at Rufus's apparent willingness to 
contemplate the hanging of the rebels besieged in Rochester in 1088, are but 
three examples which suggest the potential and limitations of royal power were 
being consciously worked out after 1066, and resulted in a few aristocratic 
casualties along the way.73 In this context, the continuation of a cross-Channel 
political complex after the Conqueror's death was clearly open to question. 
Nor should one assume that either the Conqueror or those around him had a clear 
conception of how the future should be planned for. Over a twenty-year period, 
and as relations between the Conqueror and his sons' developed, different 
succession arrangements may have been considered. It would have been 
remarkable had the Conqueror not considered the possibility of allowing 
Curthose to succeed to England. In part, this might explain the apparently 
puzzling comments of William of Malmesbury and Robert ofTorigni, both of 
whom, using the language of twelfth century inheritance practices, commented 
that Robert had been deprived of the 'inheritance' ofEngland.74 Suger used 
similar language in his narrative to suggest that Rufus had disinherited Robert." 
Yet this must be contrasted with other terms. William of Malmesbury suggested 
72 For a detailed discussion see, Chapter 8. 
73 For Rochester, see OV, 4, 132; See also, J. L. Nelson, 'The Rites of the Conqueror', Politics 
and Rituals in Early Medieval Europe (London, 1986),400-01. 
74 GR, 1,502. ' .. quare et genitoris benedictione et hereditate jrustratus, Anglia post mortem eius 
caruit, comitatu Normanniae uix retento. '; GND, 2, 202. 'Alterius enim dudum heres designatus 
fuerat ..... '. 
"Suger, Vie de Louis VI Ie Gros, ed. and trans. H. Waquet, 2nd Edition, (Paris, 1964),6. 
'Guilelmus siquidem, rex Anglorum, usul militie aptus,laudisavarusfameque petitor, cum, 
exheredato majore natu Roberto, [ratre suo .... '. On Suger see, L. Grant, 'Suger and the Anglo-
Nonnan World', ANS, 19 (1996), 51-68. 
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that Curthose had 'abdicated', with Rufus coveting the English throne as a 
result.76 Robert of Torigni uses the verb restituere to imply that Curthose was 
urged to "re-conquer by force' the kingdom of England, 'taken away from him by 
his brother.'77 
Whether these comments amount to an actual suggestion that at some stage 
Curthose may have been designated by the Conqueror as his successor in 
England is difficult to gauge. As Professor Holt rightly points out, there is no 
evidence that Robert ever argued that he had been recognised as heir to the 
kingdom.78 William of Malmesbury, though writing to illustrate the inevitability 
of Henry's kingship, expanded his comment on Curthose 'abdicating' his claim 
to the kingship and Rufus's ambition to include a comment that Henry's 
ambitions with regard to the kingship were also beginning to take shape and 
cause Rufus some concern.79 Perhaps the most sensible way to interpret these 
comments, which appear to suggest that Rufus and Henry somehow deprived 
Curthose of his inheritance of the English throne, is to recognise that no claim to 
the throne could be expected to stand on its own merits, irrespective of the 
changing political tides that flowed around it.80 However, for the many among the 
cross-Channel political elite the comments of the chroniclers suggest that even in 
the absence of a formal designation, there was clearly a desire if not an actual 
expectation that Curthose would succeed to England. 
76 GR, 1,542. 'Spe sensim scaturiente iam successioni inhians, maxime post abdicationemfratris 
maioris, cum et tirocinium minoris nonnichil suspiceret.' 
77 GND, 2, 204. 'Cumque suifideles eum exhortarentur ut regnum Anglie sibi afratre prereptum 
uelocius armis sibimet restitueret .... ' 
78 Holt, Colonial England, 149. 
79 GR, 1,542. 
80 In general, see, P. Stafford, Queen Emma, 83-89; A. Williams, 'Some Notes and 
Considerations on Problems Connected with the English Royal Succession, 860-1066', 
Proceedings of the Battle Abbey Conference, 1, (1978), 144-67. 
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In addition to the comments of the chroniclers, evidence of this can be seen in the 
politics of the 1070s and 1080s, and the growing estrangement between the 
wishes and intentions of the Conqueror to exclude Curthose from the English 
throne, and the preference of leading members of the aristocracy for a Curthose 
kingship, based in part on the simple fact that many in the aristocracy had already 
entered into a binding relationship with Curthose by giving prior homage for 
their lands in Normandy. One measure of this is the support given to Curthose in 
his rebellion against his father. Once in open conflict with his father, Curthose 
attracted a coterie of aristocratic youths from some very influential Norman 
families, including Robert de Belleme, Robert de Mowbray, Roger, son of 
Richard de Beinfaite and William de Breteuil, many of whom would retain a 
loyalty to Curthose after 1087,,1 Under the influence of these men, Curthose 
appears to have made two demands on his father. The first was for Curthose to 
have real power and influence within Normandy. According to Orderic, Curthose 
was not prepared to be William's 'hireling'. He was encouraged by his 
supporters to ask for the duchy, which had already been granted to him publicly 
before a great body of magnates who were able to testify to the fact.82 A second 
demand centred on England. Orderic is emphatic that Curthose was advised by 
his followers to, 'rise up boldly' and claim a share of the realm of England.B3 It 
was alleged that his father was denying him the riches of his inheritance!4 In 
response, both the Conqueror and, significantly, Rufus thought it 'shameful' that 
81 OV, 3, 96-100. For Robert de Belleme, see below Chapter 5. For a provocative, but 
questionable interpetation of Robert's rebellion, see W. M. Aird,' Frustrated Masculinity: The 
Relationship between William the Conqueror and his Eldest Son', Masculinity in Medieval 
Europe (London, 1999),39-55. 
82 OV, 3, 98 
83 OV, 3,98. 
84 OV, 3,96. 
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Curthose should aim at the whole inheritance and considered himself equal to his 
father.as William of Malmesbury commented that as a result of the dispute, 
Curthose forfeited both his father's blessing and his inheritance, failing to secure 
England and only just retaining Normandy.a6 
It must be doubted whether Curthose could have attracted the support of such 
notable, if young figures in Norman politics, unless they had the tacit approval of 
their families for their actions.87 The examples of Robert de Mowbray and Robert 
de Belleme, discussed below, reveal that this was merely the start of their public 
association with Robert Curthose, an association that would help to significantly 
define their careers. Yet the episode is redolent with paradoxes. As William of 
Malmesbury makes clear, by engaging in rebellion, Curthose and his supporters 
ensured that the grounds were laid for permanent damage to be inflicted on 
relations with his father and, perhaps more importantly, as a consequence he 
forwent the Conqueror's designation as his successor to the English throne in 
1087. In rebelling against his father and lord, Curthose had flouted the norms and 
conventions governing political conduct.88 Overall, there is a strong argument to 
regard the homage given to Curthose before 1087 as part of the structural 
instability built into the cross-Channel complex after 1066, and which would 
continue to play itself out during the 1090s and early 11 OOs. 
In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that clerical theorists turned their 
attention to potential solutions. George Garnett first drew attention to the 
85 OV. 2.356-8. 
86 0 R.l.502. 
87 cr. M. Strickland, War and Chivalry. The Conduct and Perception o/War in England and 
Normandy, 1066-1217 (Cambridge. 1996).247. n. 92. 
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importance of Lanfranc's own copy of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, brought 
from Bec to Canterbury and now in Trinity College Cambridge, to the whole 
question of succession and political legitimacy. The manuscript contains several 
marginal annotations that have direct relevance to many of the issues. One is 
beside canon 75 from the Fourth Council of Toledo in 633, which laid out the 
mechanisms by which 'the bishops and the head men ofthe people' would decide 
who should succeed to a kingdom.89 The inviolability of the king was reinforced 
by the stress placed upon the effect of anointing by the primate. The canon goes 
on to condemn anyone who disrupts the process through a tyrannical 
presumption, with threats of excommunication.9O Another marginal note appears 
in the manuscript beside a section from the first canon from the Seventh Council 
of Toledo, which states that anyone speaking or conspiring against a king would 
be liable to excommunication.91 
These annotations could have been made at any point from at least 1075 onwards 
when the manuscript was certainly at Canterbury, and possibly from the early 
1060s when the manuscript was compiled, with the palaeographical evidence 
pointing towards a Le Bee origin.92 However, the suitability of these canons to 
88 This is expressed most clearly by Orderic's use of biblical imagery to describe how Curthose 
was flouting God's law and infringing upon the natural order of things. OV, 5, 300-2. 
89 Trinity College MS B. 16.44, 328. • .. . primates totius gentis cum sacerdotibus successorum 
regni concilio communi constituant .... •. Decretals Pseudo-Isidoriannae et Capitula Angilramni, 
ed .• P. Hinschius (Leipzig, 1863),373-4; Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda'. 91-116. On the 
general background, see, R. Collins, 'Julian of Toledo and the Royal Succession in Late Seventh-
Century Spain', Early Medieval Kingship, ed. P. H. Sawyer and 1. N. Wood (Leeds, 1977),30-
49. See also, M. Philpott, 'Lanfranc's Canonical Collection and "the Law of the Church"'. 
Lanfraneo di Pavia e l'Europa del seeoloXI, ed. G.O·Onofrio (Rome, 1993), 131-47. 
90 Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 108-9; Trinity MS B.16. 44, 328 .•... aut praesumptione 
tyrannical regni/astigium usurpaverit, anathema sit in conspectu del patris et angelorum, atque 
ab ecelesia catholica quam perjurlo profanaverit efficiatur extraneus et ab omni coetu 
christianorum alienus ... '. 
91 Trinity MS B.16. 44, 336. 
92 M. Gullick, 'The English Owned Manuscripts of the Collectio Lanfranci (s.xVxii)" The Legacy 
of MR. James. Papers/rom the 1995 Cambridge Symposium, ed. L. Dennison (Oonnington, 
2001), 101. 
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the circumstances of 1087 seems more than coincidental. Indeed, the emphasis 
within the text to the need for widespread consultation and the emphasis that a 
king who is not chosen by the 'people' is not only illegitimate, but also a tyrant, 
parallels the comments of other clerical writers in similar circumstances. William 
ofPoitiers' text suggests that extensive consultations took place between both the 
French and English before the Conqueror agreed to be crowned in 1066.93 In turn, 
the extensive consultations before the Conqueror's own coronation parallels 
Wipo's account of the coronation of the Emperor Conrad II in 1024.94 
The evidence from Lanfranc's surviving letters suggests that this collection of 
canon law texts was used as a source of guidance in settling practical issues.9s 
But this may have been the exception rather than the rule.96 Unlike the fruitful 
corpus of polemical literature to emerge from the debate between the empire and 
papacy, the crucial point in this discussion is not whether these canon law 
collections actually influenced the political discourse in 1087 or 1100, or whether 
they provided a blueprint for the political elite to follow, but that the issues 
which concerned the political community as a whole found exp~ession in these 
texts.97 Given Lanfranc's gloomy prediction on the future after the Conqueror's 
death, it would have been extremely surprising if the issues and problems 
associated with the English succession, and the restructuring of the cross-
Channel polity, had not been thought about and discussed well before 1087, 
93 Gesta Guillelmi, 146-8. 
94 Wiponis Gesta Chuonradi JI ;mperator;s, ed. H. Bresslau, MGH, Scriptores (Hannover and 
Leipzig, 1915), 13-20,26. D. Bates, 'William the Conqueror and his Wider Western World', HSJ 
forthcoming. 
9' Lanfranc's Letters, no. 47. 
96 Lanfranc's Letters, Introduction, 7. 
97 cr. Kantorocwicz, King's Two Bodies, 51.2. 
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especially by the clerical theorists.98 In this, the question ofthe succession can be 
seen to be part of the wider intellectual milieu in which politics and many other 
aspects of secular life were discussed and debated.99 
To a degree, however, these texts are somewhat deceptive, particularly in their 
emphasis on the consultative role of the aristocracy. The part that any formal 
election played in the succession to the English kingship is difficult to 
determine. loo Many of the sources for 1087 stress the fact that Rufus was widely 
accepted as king. lol The Acta Lanfraci notes that Rufus was crowned after he had 
been 'elected'. 102 The evidence for 1100 hints at more dubious' elections'. The 
author of the Brevis Relatio could note that Henry had received the crown with 
the consent of all the French and English.lol In contrast, William of 
Malmesbury's account of 1100 is notable in that Henry's actions had generated 
some 'preliminary disputes' that had to be settled, and the haste with which 
Henry was crowned was out of fear that many magnates would repent of their 
choice. l04 Henry's seizure of the treasury at Winchester had encountered 
opposition from William de Bretueil, who argued that an oath of loyalty that had 
been taken to Curthose and ought to be maintained. lOS Overall, Orderic preferred 
98 Lanfranc 's Letters, no. 1. 'Eo enim uiuente pacem qualemcunque habemus; post mortem uero 
eius nee pacem nee aliquod bonum nos habitores speramus.' 
99 The obvious parallel here is Marcus Bull's discussion of knightly piety and the First Crusade, 
particularly the interplay between religiously inspired ideology and overtly secular values. M. 
Bull, Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade (Oxford, 1993). 
100 Barlow, Godwins, 91. 
101 GR, 1,542; Brevis Relatio, 35; ASC, 1087. 
102 Acta Lanfranci, 87. ' .. . mortuo rege Willelmo trans mare, filium eius Willelmum, sicut pater 
constituit, Lanfrancus in regem elegit et ..... sacravat et coronavit.' 
103 Brevis Relatio, 37. 
104 GR, 1,714. 
lOS OV, 5, 290. cr. Louis VI's accusations against Henry at the Council or Reims in October 1119 
on his treatement of Robert Curthose. OV, 6,256; above, Chapter 1. 
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to brush over the issue, yet he could not deny that Henry was merely the heir who 
was on the spot. 106 
There are several observations that can be made in this context and contribute to 
an understanding of why many would question Rufus's and Henry's kingship 
after their consecration. The use of eligere by contemporaries and references to 
consent suggest, as Christopher Brooke has argued, that this clearly played a 
significant part in their thinking. lo, The evidence from the annotations in 
Lanfranc's canon law collection suggests that wider consultations may have been 
envisaged in the circumstances of 1087. This emphasis on consent and 
consultation is reflected in the wider polemical literature from the dispute 
between Henry IV and the papacy, where the logical extension of regarding 
kingship as an office is to regard its holder as established in power by a pactum 
with his subjects. loa Moreover, the power of kingship made the choice of the right 
man crucial. 109 
Therefore, at first sight, much of the evidence for both 1087 and 1100 suggest 
that these theories of consultation were flouted, with substantial sections of the 
aristocracy excluded from the decision making process, with the result that 
question marks were raised over the legitimacy of both Rufus's and Henry's 
kingship. The two-week delay between Rufus arriving in England in September 
1087 and his coronation by Lanfranc, could, if the injunctions in Pseudo-Isidore 
were followed, have involved the English bishops and the leading magnates in 
106 OV, 5,290. 
107 Brooke, Saxon and Norman Kings, 30. 
loa Robinson, Authority and Resistance, 125. 
109 JE/fric Sermones Catholici, ed. B. Thorpe (London, 1844-6), 1,212. 
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discussions.110 However, just who might be thought to comprise 'the head men of 
the people' in the circumstances of 1087 is open to question. Crucially, the 
Conqueror's half brothers and uncles to Rufus were in Normandy at this point, 
together with Bishop Geoffrey ofCoutances."1 Not only were they senior 
members of the ruling elite, in the case of ado of Bayeux and Robert of Mortain 
they were the senior surviving members of the ducal kin who might have been 
expected to playa significant role in the change of regime following the 
Conqueror's death. William of Malmesbury alludes to this in his comment that 
on release from prison, ado confirmed his nephew in possession of his duchy.112 
In 1101, a similar situation presented itself. Henry had been 'elected' and 
crowned before the news of Rufus's death and Henry's accession reached Hugh, 
earl of Chester, Robert de Belleme and 'many other magnates' all of whom, 
according to Orderic, were in Normandy at this point, most probably awaiting the 
imminent return of Robert Curthose.113 The crucial point connecting the 
successions of 1087 and 1100 is that on both occasions when an English king 
was elected, many members of the senior aristocracy who were most affected by 
the decision were unable to express their views and preferences. 
In these circumstances the concerns expressed by many of the chroniclers were 
perfectly understandable. Robert of Torigini suggests that Curthose's first 
reaction on hearing of his brother's coronation in 1087 was with his usual 
'simplicity', behaving 'almost as a fool'. '''By the angels of God, if I were in 
110 For the chronology of events see, Barlow. Rufus, 55.7. 
111 OV, 4, 104; Barlow, Rufus, 56. 
III GR, 1,544. 'Namque cum iIle. ut dixi, solutus a uinculis Rotbertum nepotem in comitatu 
Normanniae confirmasset ..•.. ' 
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Alexandria, the English would have waited for me and they would never have 
dared to make him king before my arrival. Even my brother William, whom you 
say has dared to aspire to the kingship, would never risk his head without my 
permission."'114 Torigni's portrait of Curt hose's response is clearly a rhetorical 
device, but expresses quite clearly that avenues of consultation were not being 
followed in 1087. In 1101, Torigni noted Curthose's response was merely anger 
at Henry's seizure of the kingdom.lls Chapter seven discusses these responses in 
much more detail and in the context of political ritual, where expressions of 
anger act as a preliminary for a political settlement. Yet in the context of this 
chapter the crucial point is that Curthose, and many of his supporters, clearly felt 
excluded from the king-making process. 
Yet equally, if the use of 'election' is restricted to a formal process of 
acknowledgement and acclamation, then the emphasis in 1087 and 1100 is 
somewhat different, though the sense of exclusion from the king making process 
remains.116 A parallel can be drawn with Harold's coronation in 1066. The 
account in John of Worcester's narrative suggest that Harold had been chosen by 
the magnates who had gathered at Edward's bedside.l17 However, it seems clear 
that Harold's 'election' and acceptance had its base in the careful manoeuvring 
113 OV, 5,298. 'Hugo Ceslrensis comes et Rodbertus Belesmensis ae alii optimates qui erant in 
Normannia ... ' 
J14 GND, 2, 204. 'Cumque suifideles eum exhortarentur ut regnum Anglie sibi afratre prereptum 
veloeius armis sibimet restitueret, simplicitate solita et, ut ita dieam, imprudentie proxima, 
repondisse /ertur: 'Per angelos Dei, si ego essem in Alexandria, expeetarent me Ang/i, nee ante 
adventum meum regem sibi/acere auderent.lpse etiam Willelmus,frater meus, quod eum 
presumpisse diet is, pro eapite suo sine mea permissione minime attentaret. It 
m GND, 2, 218. 
116 cr. Brooke, Saxon and Norman Kings, 30. 
117 John o/Worcester, 2,600. 'Quo tumulato, sub regulus Haroldus, Goduuini ducisfilius, quem 
rex ante suam deeessionem regni successorum elegerat, a totius Anglie primatibus ad regale 
culmen eleetus die eodem ab Aldredo Eboracensi arehiepiscopo in regem est honorifice 
eonsecratus .' 
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by Harold and his supporters once it was clear that Edward was dying.l\8 At the 
very least Harold's accession was unopposed and it could be argued that he could 
be the choice of the witan. ll9 Harold's 'election' is best regarded as a formal 
acceptance his status as Edward's designated successor and the man best placed 
to see off other contenders. Yet even in the staged managed circumstances of 
1066, the sources reveal that Harold had faced opposition from the 
Northumbrians, who refused to accept him as king.120 The earliest and only 
example of what might be arguably called a formal assembly and election is in 
the aftermath ofCnut's death and the contest between Harthacnut and Harold.121 
Yet even here the situation is far from straightforward and as Frank Barlow 
remarked, the meeting at Oxford was a confrontation.122 
In this context, there is a need to make a subtle distinction between election and 
acclamation, and the more general rights of the aristocracy to offer counsel and 
be consulted on issues.123 The observations in the many of the canon law texts 
relating to consultation are clearly not statements of democratic principles, but do 
reflect the need to ensure that the political community accepted the choice of a 
new king, particularly when there may have been multiple claimants for the 
throne. In 1066, Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances presided over a joint ceremony 
III Higham, Death of Anglo-Saxon England, 179~ Mason, The House ofGodwine, 136-7. 
119 Barlow, Godwins, 91. cr. Althoff, Family, Friends and Followers, 145. 'Decision making 
within a small group of confidants was therefore a reality of medieval politics, but these 
consultations were not necessarily happy affairs.' 
120 William of Malmesbury, Vita Wulfstani, ed. R. R. Darlington, Camden Society, Third Series, 
no. 40 (1928), 22·3, cited in M. K. Lawson, The Battle of Hastings 1066 (Stroud, 2003), 34. The 
C and D texts ofthe Anglo-Saxon Chronicle record that at Easter, Harold travelled south from 
York to Westminster, though they give no details of what he was doing in the North. ASC, C, D, 
1066. 
121 ASC, 1035. Williams, 'Some Notes and Considerations on Problems Connected with the 
English Royal Succession', 161-2. 
122 Barlow, Godwins, 30. 
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with Archbishop Ealdred of York, ensuring that when the Conqueror was 
presented to the assembly within Westminster abbey as king, both French and 
English speakers could acclaim the new king.124 In terms of ritual and theology, 
the acclamation of a new ruler also expressed the manifestation of God's divine 
will through the participation of the people.12.5 By designating Rufus as his 
successor and trusting in the judgement of God, it appears as though the 
Conqueror fully understood and subscribed to this view. The danger is to read the 
'elective' aspect of the king-making process in isolation. 
Returning to the narrative of 1087, and using this revised definition of 'election', 
the two-week delay between Rufus arriving in England and his coronation by 
Lanfranc need not be thought of as a period of negotiation as such, with many of 
the great cross-Channel magnates excluded. If any such negotiations did take 
place, there is no reason why the voice of the great cross-channel magnates could 
not have been heard through intermediaries. If anything, once Lanfranc had 
received the Conqueror's letter confirming his designation of Rufus as his 
successor, the two-week delay before his coronation reads as a statement of 
intent, giving the aristocracy an opportunity to travel to be present at Rufus's 
coronation and give homage to him. There is no inherent contradiction between 
the haste shown by Rufus in leaving Normandy before his father had died, and a 
subsequent delay of a few weeks once Lanfranc had agreed to carry out the 
Conqueror's instructions. With the conditions of eligibility and designation met, 
the keys to the treasury secured and the acceptance of Lanfranc and the 
123 J. Hudson, 'Henry I and Counsel', The Medieval State, ed. J. R. Maddicott and D. M. Palliser 
(London, 2000), 109-126. On the limitations of counsel, see, Althoff, Family, Friends and 
Followers, 102-4. 
124 Gesta Guillelm/, 150. 
12.5 See, for example, Nelson, 'Hincmar of Reims', 24. 
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arrangements for the coronation in place, there was an need for the coronation to 
be attended by as many magnates as possible in order for it to have full impact.126 
It seems likely that individual magnates, if not present at Rufus's coronation, 
would have travelled to England to give homage for their lands.127 The Christmas 
court of 1087 would have provided the first formal occasion for a crown wearing 
following Rufus's coronation. In fact, Rufus's actions after his coronation, 
particularly in making extensive donations to churches and the poor for his 
father's soul, suggest that he fully understood the need to act in a recognised 
manner that conformed to contemporary perceptions ofkingship.128 
In contrast, Henry's 'election' by his supporters who were with him at 
Winchester, reveal the other side of the acceptance process. This, together with 
his hurried coronation only three days later, had all the characteristics of a palace 
coup, and was regarded as such by Robert Curthose.129 The crucial difference 
between 1087 and 1100 lay in the absence of any sort of designation by the 
previous ruler, and any sort of wide-spread acclamation for Henry within the 
cross-Channel elite. As both Curthose and Henry had initially been passed over 
for consideration in 1087, it is arguable that the emphasis on consultation and 
election in the canon law texts might have had greater relevance in 1100. 
Nevertheless, the implications of William of Malmesbury's comments on the 
126 This certainly is the implication of the chronology set out by William of Malmesbury. GR, 1, 
542. However, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle suggests that Rufus did not have custody of the 
treasury until after his coronation. ASC, 1087. It seems likely that the Chronicle is referring the 
customary final audit of accounts, rather than a delay in taking possession. Barlow, Rufus, 63. 
Overall, the comments of Frank Barlow appear to capture the balance of considerations, though I 
would emphasise that the hazard might be overstated, Rufus, 57. 'Lanfranc steered the right 
course between an indecorous and private coronation, which could have been challenged as 
unlawful, and unnecessary and hazardous delay.' 
ll7 This certainly was the case for the restoration ofOdo of Bayeux to the earldom of Kent. GR, 1, 
542. 
128 For Rufus's actions after his coronation, see most recently, Mason, Rufus, the Red King, 51. 
129 GND, 2, 220; OV, 5, 300, 306-8. 
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haste for Henry's coronation out of a fear that the aristocracy would change its 
mind, shows that any argument that Henry might have advanced for his 'election' 
to be regarded as valid could be challenged in these circumstances.13o To many in 
the aristocracy, Henry provided to be an unacceptable choice, reflected in their 
mocking of him and in the actions of many individuals, including William of 
Mortain, in making extravagant demands on Henry that could not be met.13I 
Indeed, Henry's near collapse with nervous exhaustion in 1101 reveals the 
precariousness of his position and the very real danger that Curthose's challenge 
for the throne presented.132 Unlike the relatively smooth transfer of power in 
1087, Henry's coronation charter hints at more troubled circumstances, a 
reflection perhaps of the greater degree of uncertainty surrounding his claim to 
the throne. 133 
Henry's haste in arranging his coronation testifies to its importance as the last 
stage in the king making process in transforming a designated and elected 
claimant to the throne into the christus domini, the Lord's Anointed, the divinely 
sanctioned receptacle of legitimate political authority .134 Frank Barlow's 
observation that consecration by the church was not absolutely essential must be 
challenged.13S The coronation publicly and ritually sealed the constitutive 
elements of the king making process, whereby the claimant to the throne had 
been designated, elected and granted possession of throne and kingdom. Most 
importantly of all, the coronation publicly vindicated the victor of a political 
130 GR, 1,714. cr. the arguments orc. Warren Hollister on the validity or Henry's election. 
Hollister, Henry I, 105. 
131 See below, Chapter S. 
132 Eadmer HN, 126. 
133 Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 114. 
134 W. Ullman, The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea o/Kingship (London, 1969),71·2. 
l3S Barlow, Godwins, 91. 
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struggle and provided testament of God's Will. 136 By setting the king above and 
apart from other men, two sources of fundamental authority were fused into the 
person of the monarch, that of feudal lordship and sacral kingship.137 Kingship 
served a traditional role as a force to contain, harness and institutionalise 
aristocratic interests that could tear the polity apart if left unchecked.138 
However, in the circumstances of both 1087 and 1100, the coronation of Rufus 
and Henry I created a further conditional factor in the already complex process of 
succession, namely in the king's ability to command fealty for lands in England. 
Rather than counteract the effects of the homage given to Curthose in a Norman 
context, Orderic's account for aristocratic motives in 1088 reveal that this merely 
complicated matters further for the cross-Channel aristocracy. Nor was this the 
first time that homage given in England had a cross-Channel dimension. As 
Professor Holt has rightly remarked, the oath given at Salisbury in 1086 was 'not 
intended to sustain liege lordship in England but to shatter liege lordship in 
France' .139 
Contemporary sources repeatedly stress that rebellion against the king was a 
violation of sworn fealty and homage.14o In a letter to the Conqueror in 1075, 
Lanfranc described the rebels of that year as 'oath-breakers' :41 In 1101, those 
who had aided Curthose were fined, disinherited or banished after being charged 
136 Nelson, 'Inauguration Rituals', 284. 
137 M. Strickland, 'Against the Lord's anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in 
England and Normandy, 1075-1265', Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy, 
ed. G. Garnett and J. Hudson (Cambridge, 1994),57. 
138 Nelson, 'Inauguration Rituals', 304. 
139 J. C. Holt, '1086', Colonial England, 54. 
140 For example, the comments Orderic attributes to Waltheof. av, 11,314; Leges Henriei Primi, 
10.1, 12.1a, 13.1. 
141 Lan/rane's Letters, no. 34. 
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with violating 'their pledged faith in many ways' .142 Yet, Rufus's treatment 
towards the rebels of 1088 was characterised by its restraint. 143 In between, the 
rebellion of 1095 saw the selective application of extreme judicial penalties and 
Robert de Mowbray imprisoned for life. l44 As Paul Hyams has remarked, no 
loyalty was absolute.14s One reading of the challenges faced by Rufus and Henry 
between 1087 and 1106 would be a gradual hardening of their attitudes towards 
rebellion as political circumstances changed, and as it became clear that giving 
homage for English lands would not substantially alter the effects of earlier 
obligations in Normandy. One possible explanation of this degree of 
differentiation lay in William of Malmesbury's account of the revolt of 1088. 
Apart from Odo of Bayeux and Geoffrey of Coutances, once the rebellion had 
been defeated all the rebels were 'admitted to take the oath of allegiance' .146 In 
effect, the rebels were invited to renew their homage to the king.147 As a 
consequence of this any future rebellion against Rufus, as in 1095, was likely to 
encounter more extreme counter measures and penalties. Though, as will be 
argued in Chapter Four, the rebels of 1095 may have harboured continuing 
doubts over the legitimacy of Rufus's kingship, their actions in rebelling after 
being given the opportunity to renew their homage in 1088 invited the strongest 
possible response. In this context, Gaimar's observation that Robert de Mowbray 
was guilty of the same crime as Waltheof, takes on a slightly different 
perspective if juxtaposed to Orderic's rhetoric on Waltheofs reluctance to be 
142 OV, 12. 
143 Sharp, 'William II and the Rebels', 156. 
144 See below, Chapter 4. 
14' P. Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England (Cornell, 2003), 75. 
146 GR, 1,548. 
147 Barlow, Rufus, 85. The symbolic importance of this act may also explain why the cathedral 
priory of Rochester appeared to have been regarded by many members of the king's entourage, 
particularly his sheriffs, as worthy of limited patronage. See below, Chapter 8. 
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unfaithful to his lord and 'utterly desecrate' his faith.148 This context may also 
explain why the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle consistently refers to the rebels of 1088 
as 'Frenchmen' .149 
Arguably one factor in influencing Rufus's attitude in 1088, apart from the 
intercessions of friends and relatives of the rebels, lay in the fact that their 
behaviour was understandable given their prior homage to Curthose. The advice 
given to Rufus that 'the man who does an injury today may perhaps serve as a 
friend in the future' suggests a recognition for flexibility. The actions of William 
de Breteuil in 1100 in opposing Henry on the grounds that an oath had been 
taken to Curthose, testifies to the power of prior obligations in shaping political 
action, perhaps explaining why the Leges Henrici consistently link together 
rebellion and infidelity. ISO Moreover, it should be noted that in 1088, Lanfranc 
made no effort to excommunicate the rebels unlike in 1075, when he 
excommunicated earl Roger of Hereford and his supporters. lSI In 1101, 
ecclesiastical sanctions are hinted at, but only in so far that Eadmer records that 
Anselm impressed on the king's supporters that any desertion of Henry would 
incur God's curse.t52 Arguably, these facts alone suggest that contemporaries 
regarded the disputes occasioned by the accession of Rufus and Henry as 
qualitatively different to earlier rebellions, and in the context of 1088, elicited a 
suitably complex response. 
148 ov, 11,314. Cf. Lanfrane's Letters, no. 32 and the dangers of Roger of Hereford being 
labelled faithless and perjured. 
149 ASC, E, 1088. 
ISO Leges Henriel Primi, 10.1, 12.1a, 13.1. 
lSI Lanfranc's Letters, 33A. 
m Eadmer HN, 127.8. 
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With this in mind, the salient and most puzzling feature of the instability that 
occurred between the Conqueror's death and Henry's victory at Tinchebray can 
be explored. The degree of consistency in the support given to Rufus, Henry and 
Curthose by many individuals and families, has posed problems for modem 
historians. Significantly, apart from Odo of Bayeux, many of those who were to 
initiate so much instability in 1087 had unblemished records of loyalty to 
Conqueror's regime. In 1088, Curthose could count on the support of his uncles, 
the Conqueror's half brothers Robert of Mortain and Odo of Bayeux. In addition, 
support initially came from Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances and his nephew 
Robert de Mowbray, earl of Northumberland, Roger de Montgomery, earl of 
Shrewsbury and his son Robert de Belleme, Gilbert de Clare, William, son of 
Robert, count ofEu. Also involved was Eustace, count of Boulogne. lS3 
Significantly, all ofthese men were members of the ducal kin or part of the ruling 
elite that had governed Normandy before 1066. In his second challenge, Curthose 
was supported by essentially the same coalition of magnates and families who 
had supported him in 1088. In some instances the intervening years had seen 
several deaths among the major nobility, with sons inheriting their fathers' titles 
and cross-Channel 
estates. Robert de Belleme had succeeded to his father's earldom of Shrewsbury, 
and was joined by his brothers Roger and Amulf, while William of Mortain had 
succeeded to his father's lands and title.1'4 In addition, William II de Ware nne 
followed a different course from his father and joined the ducal party, together 
153 ASC, E lOSS; OV, 4, 12S; John o/Worcester, 3, 4S; Hollister, 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', 79-
SO. 
154 For details, see below, Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
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with Walter II Giffard, earl of Buckingham, Ivo de Grandmesnil, Robert de Lacy, 
lord ofPontefract and Eustace III, count ofBoulogne.155 
In contrast, both Rufus and Henry owed their survival to those members of the 
aristocracy whose interests and lands were predominately based in England. 
Especially prominent were those Normans who had prospered in royal service, 
and in particular, those who had assumed the office of sheriff. 156 Support also 
came from those members of the cross-Channel aristocracy whose Norman lands 
lay on the fringes of the duchy, where ducal power had always been difficult to 
enforce, in particular, Hugh d' A vranches, earl of Chester.1S7 However, William 
de Warenne's involvement in 1088 is also notable, as his lands lay close to the 
heartlands of ducal power.l~8 Nor were the sides static. Henry found supporters 
from those to whom he had developed close personal ties, stretching back to the 
late 1080s, when he attempted to establish himself in western Normandy, 
including Richard de Redvers; or came from families whose lands were 
concentrated mainly in England or lay outside of Normandy, as was the case of 
the Beaumont brothers, Robert count of Meulan and Henry, earl of Warwick. 
Also listed as partisans of Henry in 1101 were Roger Bigod, and Robert fitz 
Hamon. "9 
m OV, S, 308; ASC, E 1101; Hollister, 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', 79-80; Henry I, 132. 
"6 For a full appraisal of the role of the sheriffs in the events of 1088 and 1101, see below 
Chapter 3; Barlow, Rufus, 73. 
m L. Mussel, 'Les fiefs de deux families vicomtales de I'Hiemois au Xie siecle, les Goz et les 
Montgomery', Revue historique de droit fran~ais et etranger, 48 (1970), 431-3; A.Nakamura, 
The Earls of Chester and their Family in Normandy and Englandfrom Early Eleventh Century 
unti/1120, Unpublished University of Glasgow M.Phil thesis, 1997. 
In Hollister, 'The Taming ofa Turbulent Earl: Henry I and William of Ware nne', MMI, 137-44; 
Green, Aristocracy, 31; Loyd, Origins, 111; idem, 'The Origin ofthe Family of Warenne', 
York.shire Archaeological Journal, 31 (1934),97-113. 
1'9 OV, S, 298; GR, 1,716. 
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Previous attempts to explain this support have been unnecessarily complex. C. 
Warren Hollister sought to explain the choices made by the aristocracy through a 
complex argument that focused upon the changed nature of politics under Rufus, 
which allegedly saw the development of a cleavage between the great landed 
magnates and those who made their careers in the service of the king. 160 
Paradoxically, the reality is much more straightforward. The actions of the 
Conqueror and the ambitions of his sons had placed them in conflict with many 
of the most senior members of the cross-Channel aristocracy. The Conqueror's 
decision to have Rufus as his preferred successor in England, his designation of 
him in 1087, and Henry's coup in 1100 effectively marginalised many members 
ofthe senior aristocracy, and provided the environment where many members of 
the ruling elite and their families could question the legitimacy of Rufus's and 
Henry's kingship. As the remaining case studies will demonstrate, these doubts 
found expression through support for a Curthose kingship in 1088 and 1100 and 
in open rebellion in 1095. 
• 
160 'Magnates and "Curiales"', MMI, 97-116. 
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Chapter 3 
The Sheriffs and the Crises of 1088 and 1101 
It was Frank Barlow who first commented on how the loyalty ofthe sheriffs in general, 
and that of the sheriff of Kent in particular, was crucial in suppressing the revolt of 
1088.1 The political importance of royal officials has long been recognised, with its 
strongest articulation expressed through the development of the concept of curiales in 
the 1970s by Professor C. Warren Hollister. His interpretation of the crisis of 1101 as a 
civil war fought out by factions that had formed in Rufus's reign, and based upon the 
seeming division between great landed magnates and royal officials was both 
provocative and also the first real attempt to chart the political importance of royal 
officials in the major political crises of the 1090s and early 1100s.2 
Though Hollister's interpretation of the events of 1101 as a civil war must be rejected, 
and the validity of viewing the aristocracy through the artificial division of curial and 
non-curial questioned, the central problem remains of explaining why, on two 
occasions, royal officials apparently regarded a Curthose kingship as inimical to their 
interests. The majority of discussions have been located within a framework of analysis 
that rightly stresses the diversity of aristocratic interests, ambitions and responsibilities. 
Frank Barlow identified motivation in the need to ensure a continuity of office-holding 
where the foundations could be laid for their families to enjoy enduring local 
prominence. Both Judith Green and Richard Abels have produced important studies that 
I Barlow, Rufus, 72-3, 187-90. 
2 Hollister, 'Magnates and "Curiales''', MMI, 97-115; 76-96. For a critique of Hollister see, N. Strevett, 
'The Anglo-Nonnan Civil War of 1101 Reconsidered', ANS, 26 (2004), 159-75. 
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have explored the careers of many of the most important sheriffs and the various 
benefits to them of office-holding.3 
The Introduction to this thesis charted the changes in the way the aristocracy is now 
viewed, and the implications of this for any reappraisal of the political culture of the 
Anglo-Norman aristocracy. Implicit within this is the challenge to reassess the motives 
and actions of the sheriffs in choosing to support Rufus and Henry in 1088 and 1101. 
The prosopography of the last twenty years have produced studies which has stressed 
the origins of office holders in both 1088 and 1101 as tenants of those closest to the 
centre of power in pre-l 066 Normandy ... In broad terms, the development of extensive 
cross-Channel estates often facilitated their introduction into England as tenants of their 
Norman lords. However, the opportunity for royal service in England acted as a counter-
weight to these ties, and gave these men an independent power base from which they 
were able to construct careers of local importance. Service to the English king was an 
engine of social change and advancement, as indeed had been service to the Norman 
duke, though the scale of the process was radically different by the twelfth century. 
Accumulation of land and estates remained the motor behind social advancement, and 
on a wider scale, the exercise of serious political power and lordship on a local and 
trans-regional basis. Therefore, for many of the sheriffs in 1088 and again in 1101, the 
prospects of a Curthose kingship and a retrenchment of former lords and patrons were 
distinctly unappealing. 
3 J. A. Green, 'The Sheriffs of William the Conqueror', ANS, 5 (1982),129-45; R. Abels, 'Lord Seeking, 
and the Nonnan Settlement of the South-East Midlands', ANS, 19 (1996), 19-50 . 
.. The detailed prosopography on individual sheriffs will be listed in the footnotes that follow as 
appropriate. However, for comments on this approach in general see David Bates' comments on Hugh de 
Port in, 'Kingship, government and political life', 79. 
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There is, however, an urgent need to place this prosopography within a definitive 
narrative framework for the events of 1088 and 1101. The decisive military role played 
by the sheriffs in 1088 and 1101 suggests that the power of acting as the king's 
representative in the localities not only provided a vehicle for personal and family 
advancement, all of which can be interpreted in a traditional manner, but may also 
constitute a further centrifugal force that at times of political crisis inevitably drew the 
sheriffs away from the very people whose connections provided the means for them to 
initially access office and begin their careers. This is thrown into sharp relief when it is 
recognised that many of the issues faced by the most prominent sheriffs in 1088 and 
1101 were hardly new. As early as 1075 the response of sheriffs to the revolt of the earls 
Roger of Hereford, Waltheofand Ralph de Gael, point towards a situation where the 
sheriffs who were in office in 1088 and 1101 may not have had to think too deeply 
about the choices they were asked to make. 
It is somewhat surprising, given the importance of both campaigns, that neither has been 
subjected to close scrutiny by specialist military historians, with the battle of Tinchebray 
generally regarded as the first major engagement of note to follow the battle of 
Hastings.' In strategic terms, Rufus's success in suppressing the rebellion was due to the 
speed with which individuals and groups of rebels could be isolated and defeated, or an 
agreement reached with them before the rebellion as a whole had time to coalesce.6 
Thirteen years later and Henry I was able to gather sufficient forces not only to guard the 
5 Cf. J. Bradbury, 'Battles in England and Nonnandy, 1066-1154', Anglo-Norman Warfare, ed. M. 
Strickland (Woodbridge, 1994), 182-93. The notable exceptions are the studies of Frank Barlow and C. 
Warren Hollister, though both are part of wider discussions. See also, M. J. Maloney, The Mirror of Kings 
and Paladins: William Rufus and the 1088 War of Anglo-Norman Succession, Unpublished University of 
Lancaster M.A. Thesis (1989). 
6 For modern narratives of the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 see, Barlow, Rufus, 74-85; Hollister, Henry 1, 
134-42. The rebellion in the West Country is likely to have been settled by agreement before the siege of 
Rochester. See below, Chapter 4, for a full argument and references. 
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south coast, but also retain the initiative to react quickly to a rapidly changing and 
dangerous situation. Curthose's success in 1101 in avoiding an English fleet sent to 
intercept him and his eventual landing at Portsmouth effectively outmanoeuvred Henry, 
yet he retained sufficient military strength to deter Curthose and his advisers from 
seeking a decisive military engagement and ensured that a negotiated settlement could 
secure him his throne.' In both cases, without the rapid and effective deployment of 
forces that could be counted upon to remain loyal, it is doubtful whether either Rufus or 
Henry could have prevented a Curthose kingship. 
Many aspects of each campaign remain unclear, especially the nature and composition 
of the forces recruited by Rufus and Henry. Contemporary and near-contemporary 
accounts place an emphasis on the willingness of the English to fight for both kings. 
This is a notable thread connecting all the major narrative sources and a prominent 
patriotic note among the accusations of treachery and betrayal.' In the most recent 
discussion, Professor David Crouch has suggested that Rufus appealed to the 'still 
powerful' constituency of 'free' English landowners for support in 1088. 9 Without 
defining his terms or addressing the question of the composition of Henry's army in 
1101, what appears to have led Professor Crouch to conclude that the free English 
landowners rallied to Rufus was the emphasis in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle on Rufus's 
promises to lift many restrictions and financial constraints.10 
7 Wace, lines, 10359-96. See above, Chapter 7. 
• OV, 4, 124,5,314; GR, 1,362,716; ASC, E, 1088; John o/Worcester, 3,48. 
9 Crouch, The Normans, 133. 
10 Crouch, The Normans, 133-4. 
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The obvious point to make in this context is that Rufus's promises, together with 
Henry's coronation charter in 1100, should be read more as general promises of good 
government that inevitably follow a coronation, rather than a specific set of negotiations 
aimed at securing support. The repeated emphasis in the sources on the loyalty of the 
English to Rufus and Henry in itself suggests that those who used the noun either had no 
idea of the composition of each army, or knew the composition perfectly well and wrote 
in terms that would be widely understood. The suspicion has to be that the use of 
English in this way is more likely to be a reflection of a rather loose phraseology on the 
part of the chroniclers. One means of demonstrating this is to draw a parallel between 
the descriptions of the royal forces in the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 and the English 
forces used in the campaign of 1016 against Cnut. The army recruited to face Cnut is 
reported to have come from the 'entire English nation' , as opposed to specific shires, 
with penalties for those who disobeyed the summons.l1 Richard Abels has conclusively 
demonstrated that the logistics of that particular campaign militates against a literal 
reading and would suggest that the use of 'entire English nation' served as a shorthand 
for a summons issued by Edmund throughout all the English shires, aimed at those who 
were trained and eligible for service, in particular members of the IYrd. 12 Moreover, the 
account of the campaigns in the '0' version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle specifically 
uses IYrd as the noun to describe the English army raised by Edmund. 13 
A close reading of the narrative sources for the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 suggests 
that the bulk of the forces deployed by Rufus and Henry was similarly composed of 
II ASC, C, 0, E, 1016. 
12 R. Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England (Los Angeles, 1988), 176-8. 
13 ASC, D, 1016. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 6, MS D, ed. G. P. Cubbin, 
(Cambridge, 1996), 60. 'Da ongan seo Eadmund aPeling to gadrigenne fyrde,Pa seo fyrd gesomned 
was ... '. 
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members ofthelYrd, and in the specific context of this chapter, almost certainly 
organised and led by the local sheriff. Unlike the earlier campaign of Edmund, the term 
used by the 'E' version of the Chronicle to describe the army raised by Rufus in 1088 
was here, thoughlYrd was used to describe the army of 1101.14 The mobilisation and 
deployment of the lYrd was consistent with the other attempts made by Rufus and Henry 
to call upon all the resources at their disposal to meet the challenge of their elder 
brother'" Moreover, the nature of the two campaigns in 1088 and 1101 reveal that those 
men who served in the royal forces were members of a sophisticated military body, 
drawn from the ranks of those who had military training and were eligible for military 
service, and who could be rapidly mobilised and deployed in the areas of greatest threat. 
Twelfth-century Latin historians supplied further information that confirms the role of 
the lYrd in both campaigns. John of Worcester recorded that Rufus initially based 
himself in London where, 'confident in his royal rights' he sent envoys summoning 
those he believed loyal to his side and requisitioning provisions. 16 The response to his 
summons enabled Rufus to field an army that was described as being of a moderate size, 
composed largely of foot soldiers and horsemen, with the latter possibly a reference to 
the members of the Jam ilia regis in the king's company, many of whom were also 
serving sheriffs.17 Later in the campaign, Rufus was able to call upon further men to 
14 ASC, E, 1087 (1088), 1101. The Anglo Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, 7, MS E, 100, 111. 
Under its entry for 1088, the Chronicle records Rufus marching with his army towards Rochester and on 
hearing that Bishop Odo had made for Pevensey, pursued him there. 'Se cyng mid his hereJerde toweard 
HroJeceastre ..... se cyng mid here Jerde refier.'. In 110 I, Henry and his army awaited Curthose at 
Pevenesey. 'Da to midde sumeranJerde se cyng ut to PeJenesre mid eall hisfyrde togeanes his broder ... '. 
Michael Swanton has discussed the use of both terms and noted that by the eleventh century, both terms 
were synonymous and are used on different versions of the Chronicle to describe the same force. The 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, ed. and trans. M. Swanton (London, 2000), Introduction, 33-4. 
15 Liber Eliensis, 218; Eadmer HN, 126; Hollister, Henry I, 137. 
16 John o/Worcester, 3, SO. ' . .iure autem regio, militari, ut impiger,fretus audacia, mittit legatos, vocat 
~uos sib; creditfidos, uadit Lundoniam, belli tractaturus negotia, expeditionis prouisurus necessaria'. 
7 On the links between the royal household and the sheriffs, see Green, 'Sheriffs', 135-6. 
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relieve those troops who had served from the start, together with the craftsman and 
labourers needed to construct two siege castles and maintain the infrastructure necessary 
for a blockade at Rochester. ls Failure to meet the royal summons ran the risk of 
incurring penalties, and in particular, to have been declared a 'Nithing' .19 As Rufus 
rightly judged the main theatre of military operations to be Kent and the south-east, and 
given the timescale between the initial report of the outbreak of hostilities in March and 
their escalation after Easter, a period of four weeks at most, it would appear as though 
John of Worcester's statement regarding London as Rufus's base of operations was 
correct.20 A likely chronology for 1088 would therefore have Rufus initially deploying 
elements of the 10calfYrd from the counties surrounding London and then issuing a 
general summons for further men. 
In 1101, Henry adopted a strategy that bore a remarkable similarity too that of Harold in 
1066. Henry's movements in the summer of 1101 suggest that he could not be sure of 
exactly where or when Robert Curthose would land, but eventually judged that 
Pevensey Bay either offered the most likely spot, or was a convenient staging pOSt.21 
Henry's dispositions were essentially defensive. Yet during this period, Henry and the 
forces he had with him were far from idle. In a memorable passage from the Gesta 
Regum, William of Malmesbury described how Henry personally oversaw the training 
of the English, demonstrating how to withstand cavalry attacks and thus raising the 
II GR, 1,548; av, 4, 126,5,210; Barlow, Rufus, 80-1. 
19 GR, I, 548. ' ... .Anglos suos appellat, iubet ut compatriotas aduocent ad obsidionem uenire, nisi si qui 
uelint sub nomine Nithing, quod nequam sonat, remanere'. The use of nithing would appear to suggest 
that failure to respond to the royal summons would lead to a loss of legal status and the protection of the 
law. See N. Hooper, 'The Housecarls in the Eleventh Century', Anglo-Norman Warfare, 4-5. 
20 De iniusta, 91-2. Bishop William was deprived of his property on 12 March, after rebellions had 
collapsed in Dover, Hastings and London. Easter fell on 16 April. Barlow, Rufus, 74-7. 
21 J. Gillingham, 'William the Bastard at War', Anglo-Norman Warfare, 159; Hollister, Henry 1, 137. 
RRAN, 2, nos. 529,530, which suggest that Henry may have encamped at Wartling in Sussex, 
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combat effectiveness and morale of his army.22 Despite Malmesbury's undoubted 
rhetorical portrayal of Henry as a warrior king, this passage would appear to confirm 
that the royal forces were composed mainly of foot soldiers, and though unused to 
dealing with a cavalry charge were, nonetheless, able to assimilate ad hoc training while 
in the field. 
In his account for the campaign in England of 1101, as well as stressing the loyalty of 
the English, Orderic also hinted at what may have motivated them. He suggested that 
the English supported Henry because they did not recognise the 'rights of the other 
prince' .23 It is probably stretching the evidence to far to suggest that vibrant political 
discussions must have taken place at a local level before any royal summons was 
answered yet the implication of Or de ric's comment does suggest that any discussions 
that did take place mirrored the arguments that were circulating among the upper 
echelons of the nobility concerning the legitimacy of Henry's kingship and the merits of 
Curthose's claim to the English throne.24 Orderic's statement is clear that Henry, and it 
is probably safe to assume that Rufus before him, held a legal and political status, which 
in the eyes of the English did not negate, but certainly outweighed any claims exercised 
by Robert Curthose to the English throne. The evidence from Orderic, though sparse, 
does suggest that the status of Henry as an anointed king had transformed his legal and 
political standing. This is an idea that is articulated to a greater degree in Orderic's 
approximately eleven miles west of Hastings and three miles north ofPevensey Bay. On the possible 
~bolic importan~e ofPevensey, see below, Chapter 7. 
GR, 1,716; HollIster, Henry I, 137. 
23 Ov, 5,314. ' ... omnes quoque Angll alterius principis iura nescientes in sui regisfidelitate perstiterunt, 
f.ro qua certamen salis optauerunt'. 
4 Cf. the comments of Robin Fleming on the Domesday jurors, whose legal knowledge was also distinctly 
political in that they could supply infonnation on the winners and losers in the process ofNonnan 
colonisation, R. Fleming, Domesday Book and the Law (Cambridge, 1998),17·28,37; J. Gillingham, 
'Thegns and Knights in Eleventh Century England: Who then was the Gentleman', TRHS, 6th Ser., 5 
(1995), 129-153, esp. 134-5. 
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account ofWaltheofs response to the approaches of the conspirators of 1075 and 
reflected in William ofPoitiers.2s 
There is a strong suspicion that the anointing of Rufus and Henry must also have had a 
similar effect on their standing with the sheriffs. The decision of the sheriffs to support 
Rufus in 1088 and Henry in 1101 was not unusual or a break in any established pattern 
of political behaviour. It is noticeable that on all previous occasions when dissension 
between the king and members of the political elite had surfaced, royal sheriffs had 
chosen to support the king. Apart from a reference to Eadnoth the Staller having 
organised resistance in the West Country to Harold's sons in 1068, all of the evidence 
that can be interpreted as the sheriff leading the fyrd in military operations between 
1066 and before the revolt of 1088, comes in the context of the rebellion of 1075 and 
the attempt to usurp the English throne and effect a tri-partite division ofpower.26 
In political terms, the actions of the sheriffs in 1075, 1088 and 1101 can be read as a 
growing appreciation and respect for the status and inherent power of English kingship, 
linked perhaps to a cool appreciation of the benefits of office holding. To these 
examples can also be added the arrest of Odo of Bayeux in 1082, which had raised 
similar dilemmas as in 1088 for many individuals, especially Haimo dapifer and Hugh 
2S OV, 2,314; Gesta Guille/mi, 142-6. 
26 Orderic referred to the widespread opposition to the king's servants throughout England. OV, 2, 316. 
John o/Worcester, 3, 24. 'Wlstanus Wigornensis episcopus cum magna militari manu et Aege/uuinus 
Eoueshamnensis. Abbas cum suis asscitis sibi in audiutorium Ursone vicecomite Wigorniae el Waltero 
de Laceo, cum copUs suis, el cetera multiudine plehis.' Archbishop Lanfranc wrote to the Conqueror in 
1075 and noted that a 'countless host of French and English' pursued the rebels, Lanfranc's Letters, 
no.34. Eadnoth the Staller raised a force to oppose the sons of Harold in 1068. Though not specified in the 
text, the balance of probability suggests that Eadnoth relied upon the 10cal.fYrd. 'Eadnothus ..... occurrit 
cum exercitu, et cum eis proe/io commisso, cum multis a/iis occisus est ... ' John o/Worcester, 3, 6. The 
obvious example ofa sherifTfollowing his lord into rebellion in 1075 was that of Ralph de Bernay. Ralph 
had been the sheriff of William fitz Osbern and served his son and successor, Roger, earl of Hereford, A. 
Williams, The English and the Norman Conquest (Woodbridge, 1995) 
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de Port, though on a much reduced scale. If the political crises of the 1070s and 1080s 
are read as a process where the potential and limitations of royal power were being 
consciously explored, with numerous aristocratic casualties along the way, by the time 
of the Treaty of Winchester in 1101, the process had reached a stage where a greater 
respect for sacral kingship appears to be evident among the upper reaches of the 
aristocracy, though not at the expense of the perceived rights and prerogatives of the 
aristocracy. The support given by the sheriffs to the king on numerous occasions during 
this period was clearly advantageous to them. Yet the crucial question is whether the 
sheriffs also chose to support the king against those who challenged his position 
because, and like Earl Waltheofin 1075, they recognised his legitimacy over his 
challengers. 
This question is worth posing, but is ultimately unanswerable. The best that can be done 
is to argue that there is some circumstantial evidence that points in that direction. The 
work of Mark Philpott and George Garnett has done much to reveal the impact of 
Pseudo-Isidorian canon law on the shaping ofthe English state in the late eleventh 
century and the development of abstract political theory, especially the concept of the 
crown. 27 The question is whether the sheriffs were untouched by these developments. 
Quite clearly, one should not doubt that many of the most important sheriffs were 
capable on an intellectual level to follow and possibly participate in complex legal and 
political discussions. Hugh de Port attested a diploma on behalf ofthe Conqueror, which 
detailed an agreement between Gilbert d'Auffay and the abbey of Fe camp in 1085, 
where Hugh was listed as a testis and iudex. 28 The evidence from the De inuistia 
vexacione records that Hugh managed the transition of regime in 1087 and was sent into 
27 See above, Introduction and Chapter 1. 
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Northumbria as one of the new king's emissaries, along with the Bishop of Winchester, 
to investigate accusations that one of William's monks had sold off the bishop's cattle 
and reduced the fortifications of his castle.29 The intervention of Roger Bigod at the trial 
of Bishop William de St Calais at Salisbury in November 1088, may be indicative of his 
relative rehabilitation with the royal court in the aftermath of the rebellion, but the 
nature of his intervention and his advocacy of the right of Bishop William to know the 
charges laid against him also suggests that Roger was intellectually able enough to 
intervene in proceedings that were rooted in sophisticated legal arguments.30 Though 
speculative, these are unlikely to be men who remained untouched by the intellectual 
developments taking place around them. 
The information in the narrative sources about the role of individual sheriffs in 1088 and 
1101 is patchy. A single reference to Roger Bigod as one of Henry's closest advisers is 
the sum total for 1101.31 Fortunately, considerably more sheriffs can be identified in 
relation to 1088. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle identified Roger Bigod and Hugh de 
Grandmesnil within its narrative for the rebellion, yet its terms of reference are 
ambiguous, and it is far from clear that both men actually held office in 1088.32 Any 
uncertainty was removed from the mind of William of Malmesbury, who unequivocally 
identified both men as rebels.33 The De iniusta vexacione Willelmi episcopi primi, 
21 Bates, Regesta, no. 145. 
29 De iniusla, 98. 
30 De in/usta, 83. 
31 OV, 5, 298. 
32 ASC, E, 1088. Hugh's actions, according to the Chronicle 'did not mend matters at all, either in 
Leicestershire or Northampton'. It is difficult to establish whether Hugh was sheriff of Leicestershire at 
this point. Orderic records that Hugh was granted the municipatum of Leicester in 1093. OV, 2, 264. As 
William de Cahagnes was the probable sheriff of Northamptonshire in 1088, the reference to Northampton 
might refer to Hugh's status as a major landholder in Northamptonshire and the greatest lay magnate in 
Leicestershire. DB, I, 224c, 232a- 233a; VCR, Leicestershire, 1,290. Roger Bigod is described as 
throwing himself into Norwich where 'he always did the worst of all throughout all the country'. 
33 GR, 1,546 
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though primarily concerned with the events that took place at the trial of Bishop 
William in November 1088, is the chief source that identifies by name serving or former 
sheriffs within the overall context of the rebellion. 
Among the sheriffs identified within the De iniusta is Ralph Paynel, sheriff of 
Yorkshire, for his refusal to allow Bishop William a safe conduct to Salisbury, and with 
accusations that he invaded and seized the bishop's land during the course of the 
rebellion.34 Urse d' Abetot, sheriff of Worcester shire, received Bishop William for his 
trial and may have had responsibility for his custody during the trial.35 Hugh de Port, 
sheriff of Hampshire, acted as an emissary for the king, together with an unidentified 
Geoffrey de Traileio and the bishop of Winchester, all of whom were sent north to 
investigate accusations that one of William's monks had sold off the bishop's cattle and 
reduced the fortifications of his castles while William was on trial at Salisbury.36 It is 
possible that Hugh de Beauchamp, sheriff of Buckinghamshire and possibly 
Bedfordshire in 1088, testified at the trial that he had personally heard bishop William 
urge Rufus to attack the rebels in March 1088. 37 A man identified solely as sheriff 
Gilbert, possibly Gilbert de Bretteville, sheriff of Berkshire, received an order to deliver 
ships to Bishop William for his exile to Normandy.38 Two men identifiable as sheriffs 
34 De iniusta, 75-6; Eye. 6,2-5. 
3' De iniusta, 81. The shrievalties of Worcester and Gloucester came to be associated with the 
constableship at court. J. A. Green, English Sheriffs to 1154, PRO (London, 1990), 16. 
36 De iniusta, 98. 
37 De iniusta, 83-4; RRAN, 2, no.314 b; DB, 1,213; G. H. Fowler, 'The Beauchamps, barons of 
Bedfordshire', Bedfordshire Ilistorical Record Society, 1 (1913), 1-24. It should be noted that the De 
inuista records the presence ofa Hugo Bellomonte in 1088. Frank Barlow suggested this represented a 
scribal error in the text, with Hugo inserted for Henricus, thus identifying Henry de Beaumont. Barlow, 
Rufus, 75, 77. B.S. Orner suggested an alternative form of scribal error, this time focusing upon the 
toponymic, with Bellomonte a mistake for Bellocampo, De iniusta, 83, n. 45. It should also be noted that 
Stephen of Whitby's account of the founding ofSt Mary's abbey, York, lists Henry de Beaumont as 
accompanying Rufus on his journey north in the early part of 1088. BL MS Add 38816 33r. 
31 De iniusta, 98, 94. The only known Gilbert to have held office under William Rufus was Gilbert de 
Bretteville, sheriff of Berkshire, between 1090 and 1094, RRAN, 1, no. 359. Aiulf, sheriff of Dorset is 
recorded as having farmed the royal revenues in Berkshire in 1086. DB, 1,63. 
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before 1086 also appear in the text, Ivo Taillebois and Emeis de Burun, former sheriffs 
of Lincolnshire and Yorkshire respectively.39 Both men appear to have had a crucial role 
to play in taking custody of Bishop William's castle and arranging a safe conduct for the 
bishop's men. Finally, Roger Bigod's conduct at the start of the rebellion does not 
appear to have excluded him from the proceedings at Salisbury, where he intervened to 
argue for Bishop William's right to know the charges made against him.40 
Roger Bigod may be one of the few examples outside of Robert of Mortain's Sussex 
rapes where the ties to former lords and patrons may have retained a significant 
influence on his political behaviour. Roger occurs as sheriff of Suffolk and Norfolk in 
1086, and could have been replaced as sheriff by either Godric dapifer, or Humphrey the 
Chamberlain by 1087.41 It may well be that Roger was replaced as a matter of course, 
having possibly alternated office with Robert Malet previously. Roger was certainly no 
different from any other sheriff in using his office to acquire property and men, 
activities that brought him into conflict with other royal officials.4z Likewise, he still 
retained links to many of the great cross-Channel magnates, especially Odo of Bayeux, 
holding nearly twenty manors in Suffolk and may have started his career in England 
under the patronage ofOdo.43 Roger also retained strong cross-Channel links, appearing 
on several Norman acta before 1087.44 Overall, it is not entirely clear what motivated 
Roger in 1088 and the scale of disturbance in East Anglia at that time is difficult to 
quantify, though Roger's tenant, Robert de Curzun, seized the manor of Southwold from 
39 De Iniusla, 95; DB, 1,376; RRAN, 1, no.406. For Erneis, Bates, Regesta, nos 273,277. 
40 De Inlusta, 83. 
41 For Roger see, DB, 2,179,282, 292b, 393; VCH, Suffolk, 1,389. For Humphrey see, RRAN, 1, nos 
448,449. For Godric see RRAN, 1, nos 291,392. 
41 DB, 1, 173a, 174b, 177a. 
43 Roger was the brother of Hugh Bigot, who was a tenant of Odo at Savenaye and Loges. van Houts, 
'Wace as Historian', 125; Loyd, Origins, 15; H. Navel, 'L'enquete de 1133 sur les fiefs de l'eveche de 
Bayeux' BSAN, (1935), 18. 
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Bury St Edmunds.45 Roger's actions in 1088 suggest that he may have initially misread 
the strength of the rebellion and subsequently came to terms with Rufus fairly quickly. 
Although never trusted by Rufus to hold office, Roger does figure prominently in the 
acta from Rufus's reign and eventually regained office under Henry.46 
Into this framework can be inserted much of the well known prosopography on many of 
the sheriffs who are likely to have played a prominent role in both campaigns, especially 
Haimo dapifer, sheriff of Kent and Hugh de Port, sheriff of Hampshire.47 These men 
enjoyed careers that saw them maintain a continuity of office-holding, only matched by 
a continuous search for alternative sources of patronage and reward. The careers of 
some of the lesser-known sheriffs also fit the framework. A prime example comes from 
the largely unexamined career of Aiulf, sheriff of Dorset in 1088.48 His career reveals a 
man who rose to local, and possible national prominence on the back of consistent royal 
service. Aiulf s career can be shown to have successfully encompassed the reigns of 
both Rufus and Henry, and therefore the upheaval of both 1088 and 1101.49 
44 Bates, Regesta, nos 30, 50, 175,264,267,266. 
45 Memorials ofBurySt Edmunds, ed. T. Arnold, RS (London, 1890), 1,79. 
46~N, l,nos290.291,295,296,306,319,320,361,371,397,400,426,427,431,449,450,454,456, 
458, 466. ~N, 2, nos 290a, 348a, 414a, 459a. For office under Henry see, ~N, 2, no.S09. Wareham 
has suggested that Roger was reappointed sheriff in 1092, citing RRAN, 1, nos. 373 and 461 as evidence. 
Wareham, 'Bigod Family', ANS 17 (1995), 226. ~N, 1, no.373 is a writ from Rufus to Herbert, bishop 
of Thetford, Roger, Humphrey the Chamberlain and William Albini, notifying them that Abbot Aldwin of 
Ramsey was to have his rights at Ringstead and Brancaster, as his predecessors had had them in the time 
of William I. Roger is more likely to be addressed, not in the capacity as sheriff, but on account of the 
land he held at Ringstead, over which Ramsey Abbey claimed jurisdiction. DB, 1, 173b. Moreover, as a 
former sheriff of Norfolk, it is likely that Roger would have knowledge of the rights enjoyed by Ramsey 
under the Conqueror. 
47 Individual sheriffs can be traced through their entries in Keats-Rohan, Domesday People, as well as the 
comments in Barlow, Rufus, 187-91; Green, 'Sheriffs', 129-45; Abels, 'Lord Seeking', 19-50. For Haimo, 
see also the introduction to the Domesday Monachorum of Christ Church, Canterbury, ed. D. C. Douglas, 
Royal Historical Society (London, 1944). 
48 DB, 1,83; Bates, Regesta, no.207. 
49 In Dorset, Aiulfappears as sheriff under Henry. RRAN, 2, nos 544,573,754,896, 1018. In Somerset, 
Aiulf may have alternated office with William Capra, ~N, 2, nos 386a. Aiulf appears to be the only 
sheriff for the first years of Henry's reign. RRAN, 2, nos 622, 735, 763, 896. It would appear that Aiulf 
was dead by the time of his grant to Sbaftesbury abbey in 1121, RRAN, 2, no.1347. However, Aiulfs debt 
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As sheriff of Dorset in 1088, one would have expected Aiulf to be in the forefront of 
efforts to contain the rebellion in the south-west, a region where many of the most 
prominent rebels held land. Though there is no direct evidence for Aiulrs actions in 
1088, a prominent role is surely suggested by the fact that he was addressed as sheriff in 
a writ addressed to the barons of Wiltshire and Somerset between 1089 and 1091, thus 
raising the possibility that he added Somerset and Wiltshire to his portfolio of offices, 
possibly replacing the incumbent office holders in the aftermath of 1088.s0 Aiulrs 
probable promotion was almost certainly part of a wider re-organisation of royal 
government in the south-west, which saw the appointment of Bishop John to the diocese 
of Bath and Wells together with the reorganisation of his see, and the promotion of 
another prominent royal supporter, Robert fitz Hamon, son of Haimo dapifer, to the 
newly created lordship of Glamorgan. 
Aiulrs background and experience was of a kind that would have made him the natural 
choice as the new sheriff of Somerset and Wiltshire after 1088. His brother, Humphrey 
for money taken from the fann of Dorset was entered in the 1130 Pipe Roll with no indication that he had 
died. Pipe Roll 0/31 Henry I, ed. J. Hunter (London, 1929), 14. 
so RRAN, I, nos. 326,457. William de Mohun had occupied the office of sheriff in Somerset from the 
1070s at the earliest and was the sheriff in 1086, Bates, Regesta, no. 289; DB, I, 86b; Green, English 
Sheriffs, 73. William died after 1090 when his son succeeded him, Sanders, Baronies, 114. His removal 
from office may have been due to his failure to prevent the sacking in Bath in 1088. However, William 
may have been related to Alvred de Moyon, whose sister and niece were nuns at Sainte-Trinite, Caen. Les 
actes de Guillaume Ie Conquerant et de la Reine Mathilde pour les abbayes Caennaises, ed. L. Musset, 
Memoires de la Societe des Antiquaires de Normandie, 37 (Caen, 1967), no. 8. A further William de 
Moyon was listed as a tenant of the bishop of Bayeux in 1154. Antiquus cartularius Ecclesiae Baiocensis 
(Livre Noir), ed. V. Bourienne, 2 vols. Societe de I'Histoire de Normandie (Rouen and Paris, 1902-3), I, 
32-33; van Houts, 'Wace as Historian', 57. In Wiltshire, an individual known simply as Walter served as 
sheriff at the start of Rufus's reign. RRAN, I, no. 290; 2, no. 290a; The Chronicle o/Battle Abbey, 96. 
Possible identities include Walter Huse or Walter, son of Edward of Salisbury. For Walter Huse see, 
RRAN, 2, no.673. For Walter, son of Edward of Salisbury, RRAN, 2, no. 220. Neither Walter served in 
office under Rufus and had to wait until Henry I to resume their careers, suggesting that their removal 
from office was on the grounds ofa failure to prevent Robert de Mowbray campaigning in West Wiltshire 
in 1088. Aiulf is also included in the witnesses to the charter confirming Bishop John with the abbey of 
Bath, though he is styled simply as Aiulfus vicecomes. RRAN, I, no. 315; Wells Cathedral Archives, 
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the Chamberlain, had successfully carved out a career for himself in the ducal and royal 
households;51 he is listed as a chamberlain in the foundation charter for the abbey of La 
Trinite, Caen, and may have been chamberlain to Queen Mathilda; evidence from 
Domesday suggests that he profited directly from his connections to her, holding the 
manor of Combe in Surrey and two manors in Gloucestershire as gifts from the queen.52 
After Mathilda's death, Humphrey appears to have sought out alternative sources of 
patronage, possibly acting as dapifer to Guy, count of Ponthieu, in the early 1080s.53 
Humphrey's next appearance in England is after the death of the Conqueror as a 
possible sheriff of Norfolk under the new regime of William Rufus.54 
It is impossible to date when Aiulf began his career; the first references to him serving 
as a sheriff are contained within Domesday, though he may have been in office in 
Dorset from the early 1080s.55 Like his brother, Aiulfappears to been a chamberlain to 
the royal household, since the returns for his lands in the Domesday Book are listed 
under the two titles of camerarius and vicecomes.56 An entry in the Dorset Geld Rolls 
records that the hundred of Albretseberge had been granted remission from geld as Aiulf 
was able to testify that Queen Mathilda granted a remission for the soul of her son 
Richard, perhaps indicating that Aiulf was initially camerarius to Mathilda, and may 
Charter 3. My thanks are due to the cathedral archivist, Mrs Francis Neal, for allowing me to examine the 
original charter. 
'I For the identification of Humphrey as Aiulrs brother see, DB, I, 52a; VCH Somerset, 1,416. 
51 Actes Caennaises, no. 2. An extended confirmation charter for La Trinite reveals that Humphrey held 
land at Denouvilte, with his son Roger. Bates, Regesta, no. 59. The information contained within this 
charter and the fact that Humphrey's career appears to pre-date 1066, suggests that Humphrey was the 
elder of the two brothers. DB, I, 36b, 170. 
'3 Bates, Regesta, no.341. 
,. RRAN, I, nos 448, 449. 
" Aiulf is listed as the sheriff of Dorset in a record of gifts given by Robert, count of Mortain, compiled 
between 1087 and 1094, but recording gifts originally granted around 1082. Bates, Regesta, no. 207. 
56 DB, 1, 82b, 63, 73,83. 
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have followed his brother into that position before her death.57 Whether Aiulf served on 
as chamberlain to the royal household after Mathilda's death is unclear, but never-
theless, he continued to retain the title. A charter of Henry I was drawn up between 1107 
and 1120 and addressed jointly to Roger, Bishop of Salisbury, and Aiulfthe 
Chamberlain, where both men were notified that Henry had confirmed the grant of 
Lodres to the abbey of Montebourg.58 
The significance of Aiulf s career is complicated by the fact that different opinions, 
largely based on onomastic grounds, have been developed over Aiulfs ethnic origins. 
Judith Green noted the possibility that Aiulfmay have been of English descent.59 Brian 
Golding identified Aiulfas an English survivor, following the editors of the Phillimore 
edition of the Domesday Book who identified Aiulfus as a Latinised version of the Old 
English /Eoelwulf.6O Cecily Clark explored the Domesday evidence in detail and 
suggested that Aiulfthe sheriff could have been a Norman pre-Conquest incomer, 
married and domiciled in England, ready to trade his local knowledge to incoming 
Normans after 1066.6\ 
Despite the efforts of Cecily Clark, the Domesday entries for Aiulf remain problematic. 
Apart from the references to Aiulf camerarius and vicecomes, further references to an 
" VCH. Dorset, 3, 128. 'Aiulfus dicit reginam perdonme pro anima Ricardifilii sui.' Cf. VCH Dorset, 3, 
47, where Eadgifu, an Englishwoman holding land at farm in Edmondsham from Humphrey, had been 
freed of geld by Mathilda in memory of her son. See also, Williams, The English and the Norman 
Conquest, 79-80. Of course, ifthere was a written record of the gift, Aiulf may have been able to testify in 
his capacity as sheriff. 
,. CDF, no. 876. 
59 Green, English Government, 155. See also, n.74. 
60 B. Golding, Conquest and Colonisation (London, 2000), 105, 183; DB, Dorset, 8, n.l; Olof von 
Feilitzen, Pre-Conquest Personal Names of the Domesday Book (Uppsala, 1937), 191; W. G. Searle, 
Onomasticon Anglo-Saxonicum (Cambridge, 1897),64. von Feilitzen suggested that Aiulfwas also a 
derivation of the Old Norse EileifrlEiUfr or the Old Danish Elef, Elif. See also, C. Clark, 'Starting from 
Youlthorpe (East Riding of Yorkshire) An Onomastic Circular Tour', Journal of the English Place Name 
Society, 16 (1983-4), 25-37. 
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individual or individuals named Aiulf occur. In Cornwall, an Aiulfheld Tremail 
tempore regis Edwardi from St Petroc, along with Carworgie.62 In Devon, an Aiulf is 
listed holding Lidmere from Judhael of Totnes, land that this Aiulfhad held tempore 
regis Edwardi, as well as a further entry for an Aiulfwho held his land in 1086 as a 
tenant-in-chief.63 In Somerset, the same or a different Aiulfheld Exford tempore regis 
Edwardi, but which was held in 1086 by Roger de Courseulles.64 In Wiltshire, a man 
described as Edmund, son of Aiulf, held land in 1086 that his father had held tempore 
regis Edwardi.6' 
Beyond Domesday, the only reference to an Aiulf in an English source is in the Liber 
Vitae of New Minster and Hyde Abbey. 66 The entry for Aiulf is one of a number of later 
additions to the list, in a hand identified by Professor Simon Keynes as belonging to 
scribes working in the late eleventh or early twelfth century. In contrast, Norman acta 
identify three men with the name Aiulf, all in acta associated with the ducal abbeys in 
Caen.67 The conclusion to draw from this evidence is that an individual or a number of 
individuals named Aiulfhad held land in the West Country before 1066 and continued 
to do so afterwards, though not without variations in their fortunes. Whether these 
individuals were of English descent, or Norman settlers domiciled in England before the 
Conquest, is impossible to tell.68 As Cecily Clark recognised, it is unwise to rely upon a 
61 Clark, 'An Onomastic Circular Tour', 30. 
62 DB, I, 121a, 123d. 
63 DB, 1,I09a, 116b. 
64 DB, 1, 94a. 
6' DB, 1,74. 
66 The Liber Vitae of the New Minster and Hyde Abbey Winchester, ed. Simon Keynes (Copenhagen, 
1996), ro. 2Sv, 96. See also, S. Keynes, 'The Liber Vitae of the New Minster, Winchester', The Durham 
Liber Vitae and its Context, ed. D. Rollason, A. J. Piper, M. Harvey and L. Rollason (Woodbridge, 2004), 
149-64. 
67 Actes Caennaises, no. I; Bates, Regesta, nos 46, 49. 
61 For wider discussions of pre-Conquest Norman settlement in England see, C. P. Lewis, 'The French in 
England before the Norman Conquest' ANS, 17 (1994), 131-2. 
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single etymology for all the names recorded as Aiulfus, Alofus, ./Elulfus and Eiulfus 
within Domesday.69 
There can be little doubt, however, that the Aiulfwho is listed in the three counties of 
Berkshire, Wiltshire and Dorset as vicecomes and camerarius was different from the 
Aiulf or Aiulfs recorded for pre-Conquest Somerset, Wiltshire, Devon and Comwall.'o 
The appearance of an Aiulf and his brother Humphrey in charters associated with the 
Caen abbeys may well indicate that his Norman origins lay in association with this great 
centre of Norman ducal power. Aiulfthe sheriff was therefore someone who had 
profited from the Conquest. All the land he held in 1086 had been held previously by 
English land holders and there is no evidence of continuity in terms of the same man 
holding land in Berkshire, Wiltshire and Dorset before 1086 and holding office after 
1086. As well as the possible additions of Somerset and Wiltshire to his portfolio of 
offices after 1088, Aiulf appears to have been drawn close to royal power. Aiulf occurs 
in the company of many of the most important sheriffs, including Urse d' Abetot, Haimo 
dapifer and Hugh de Port, in the witness list to a charter dated to January 1091, 
confirmed while Rufus waited to cross to Normandy.'· The reward for his loyalty in 
1088 and 1101 was expressed through the continued enjoyment of office, which almost 
certainly enabled him to consilidate his position as figure of local importance. In 1086, 
Aiulfheld one hide ofland at Farnham in Dorset, jointly with the wife of Hugh fitz 
Grip, the previous sheriff. It appears that at some point between 1086 and 1121 Aiulf 
gained permanent control of the land, as he was able to grant it to Shaftesbury Abbey for 
69 Clark, 'An Onomastic Circular Tour', 30. 
70 The Aiulf recorded as a tenant-in-chief in Devon, is, on the balance of evidence, likely to be Aiulf the 
sheriff. DB, 1, 116b. 
71 RRAN, 1, no. 315; Wells Cathedral Archives, no. 3. My thanks are due to the Cathedral archivists for 
allowing me to see the original. 
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the sake of his daughter who had become a nun at the abbey, together with one and a 
half hides he had held at Blandford.72 
Like Aiulrs, Urse d' Abetot's career is likely to have been facilitated by his eldest 
brother, Robert the Dispenser, who made a career based upon service in the royal 
household and was a sufficiently respected figure to have come to the attention of 
Orderic.73 Hugh de Port's origins are well attested and it is probable that Hugh was the 
first Norman sheriff of Kent under the influence of Odo of Bayeux.74 Durand de Pitres 
followed his brother, Roger, as sheriff of Gloucester, and may have been initially settled 
in England as a follower of William fitz Osbern.7s It is possible that Durand may have 
alternated office with his brother before 1086.76 Haimo dapifer's earliest recorded 
appearance in England is in 1069, on a diploma of the Conqueror, which granted the 
church of Deerhurst in Gloucestershire to the abbey of Saint Denis. Haimo attests with 
the title of dapi[er, which would seem to indicate that his initial career in England was 
as a member of the Conqueror's household, and would indicate a remarkable revival in 
the fortunes of the family from the low point of opposing Duke William at Val-es Dunes 
in 1047." Peter de Valognes, sheriff of Hertfordshire, is perhaps somewhat unusual as 
one of the few sheriffs to originate from western Normandy. In Peter's case, his 
marriage to Albreda, a sister ofEudo, vicomte of the Cotentin, was indicative of his 
status and standing with the ruling elite.78 
72 DB, 1,78, 82d; RRAN, 2, no. 1347. 
73 OV, 4,172. 
74 Livre Noir, nos 1,5. The family owed five knights fee to the bishopric of Bayeux. Loyd, Origins, 79. 
75 Dates, Regesta, no 4; DB, 1, 169a; D. Walker, 'The "Honour" of the Earls of Hereford in the Tweflth 
Century', Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological SOCiety, 69 (1960), 174-211, 
178; Green, 'Sheriffs', 136. 
76 Green, Aristocracy, 61. Bates, Regsta, no.135. 
77 Bates, Regsta, no. 254. 
7. Keats-Rohan, Domesday People, 322; Monasticon, 3, 345-7. Eudo held office in Normandy from the 
early 1060s, possibly in conjunction with Nigel, and was certainly a familiar enough figure to appear as a 
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Ralph Payne1's career also owed much to his father's connections with the ducal family 
and ruling Norman elite.79 The first reference to his father, William Paynel, occurs as a 
party to an agreement with the abbot of Mont Saint-Michel concerning the terms of 
military service William had to perform for the abbey.so The evidence of this text points 
towards William being of sufficient status and importance for lands to be given to him 
on his marriage by the Conqueror!1 William further appeared on a ducal charter in 
favour of the church of Bayeux in 1074, a charter for the abbey of Grestain in 1082, 
where he witnessed a settlement of a dispute between Robert of Mortain and Ralph 
Cardon, along with other Mortain tenants, and confirmations by the Conqueror of grants 
by William de la Ferte-Mace to the abbey of Saint Julien of Tours, and by Roger de 
Montgomery to the abbey of Saint-Etienne, Caen.82 William is listed as a 'man' of 
Robert de Belleme in the grant to Saint Etienne and attests the act with other 
MontgomerylBelleme tenants.81 
Ralph Paynel appears to have retained strong cross-Channel links. He must have crossed 
to Normandy fairly rapidly after the conclusion of hostilities in 1088, as he attests a 
witness on Nonnan acta under the Conqueror. Bates, Regesta, nos 26, 48, 49, 57, 59, 61, 88, 175, 198, 
200.201,206,252,266,267; Bates, Normandy, 157; Leopold Delisle, Histoire du Chateau et des Sires 
de Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte (Valognes, 1867),22-24. 
79 My thanks are due to Maxime Guilmin of the University ofCaen, for allowing me to see the results of 
his research on the Paynel family. 
80 CDF, no. 716; See also, E. Z. Tabuteau, TransJers oJProperty in Eleventh Century Norman Law 
(Chapel Hill, 1988),57-58. 
81 Bates, Normandy, 259. The existence of a charter of Hugh, William's son, refers to his mother's 
maritagium. The lands granted by the Conqueror to William on his marriage may have been around 
Fontenay-Ie-Pesnel, as a charter of Hugh Paynel gave to Saint- Etienne a gift of two thirds of the tithe at 
Fontenay, with the consent of his mother Lesceline, 'de cuis maridagio ipsa decima est'. Cartulaire Saint 
Etienne, fo. 49v-50r. 
12 Bates, Regesta, nos 27, 46, 49, 158,279. 
13 Bates, Regesta, nos 27, 279. Relations between the two families appear to have been enduring. An 
Adam Paynel occurs as a member of the entourage of William Talvas III, son of Robert de Belleme. 
Recueil des actes des comtes de Ponthieu (1026-1279) ed. C.Brunel (Paris, 1930), 778. 
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grant of Robert Curthose to Mont Saint-Michel, in 1088.84 Links to the Counts of 
Mortain also survived the collapse ofCurthose's challenge to Henry in 1101.85 
However, the degree of independence Ralph enjoyed counter balanced these ties. 
Though the Paynel family had strong ties to the counts of Mortain and held land in 
Devon, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, 
counties with a strong Mortain presence, the majority of Ralph's lands came from the 
estates ofMerlesvein, sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1066.86 It was ultimately the rewards of 
royal service that determined his political behaviour, even ifhe remained to a notable 
degree a cross-Channel magnate. 
Other examples show that the cross-Channel elite continued to provide a valuable 
conduit for those aspiring to office during the early part of Rufus's reign. William de 
Cahagnes, sheriff of Northamptonshire, may well represent one of Rufus's earliest 
appointments as sheriff. William is first mentioned as sheriff in two writs addressed to 
Ramsey abbey that date from the first weeks of his reign.87 He was a substantial tenant 
of Robert of Mortain in Northamptonshire and Sussex, and had almost certainly 
followed Robert to England as one of his Norman tenants.88 It is possible that William 
may also have been a tenant of Odo of Bayeux and deliberately sought out Robert of 
Mortain as an alternative source of patronage after Odo's arrest in 1082.89 
84 RRAN, 1, no. 299; CDF, 717 . 
., For an analysis of Ralph's patronage ofMortain institutions, see below, Chapter 8. 
86 DB, 1, 168b, 225c, 325d, 326a, 362d, 363a, 462b, 463b, 464; EYC, 6, 2. The obvious date for Ralph to 
have assumed these lands would be after the Danish invasion scare and revolt of 1069.ASC, 1069; OV, 2, 
222,226; Dalton, Conquest, Anarchy and Lordship, 69. 
87 RRAN, 1, nos. 228b, 383; D. Bates, 'Two Ramsey Abbey Writs', HR, 63 (1990),337. 
88 B. Golding, 'Robert of Mortain', ANS, 13 (1990), 137; I. Soulsby, The Fiefs of the Counts ofMortain, 
1066-] 106, Unpublished University of Wales M.A. Thesis (1974), 143-145. For Normandy see, Magni 
Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae, ed. T. Stapleton, 2 vols, Society of Antiquaries of London (London, 1840-
44),2,251, where a Ralph de Chagnes held a knight's fee from the Count of Mortain; Red Book of the 
Exchequer, 2, 640. 
89 Golding, 'Robert of Mortain', 137; DB, I, 201b. 
109 
Another early appointment may have been that of Hugh de Beauchamp as sheriff of 
Bedfordshire, and later in Rufus's reign, sheriff of Buckinghamshire.90 Hugh appears on 
a writ addressed to himself and Peter de Valognes as sheriff of Hertfordshire confirming 
the abbey of St Albans in its lands, churches and tithes, and ordering that the abbey was 
to enjoy its property and privileges, as they had been on the day that William became 
king.91 Hugh does not appear in any of the Conqueror's acta, while the abbey ofSt 
Albans might have had good reason to seek out a writ from the new king to protect its 
rights and privileges, as it maintained a claim to land in Bedfordshire that Hugh himself 
held in 1086.92 
Hugh almost certainly replaced Ralph Taillebois as sheriff in Bedfordshire. The writ 
addressed to Hugh may have supplemented an earlier writ addressed to Peter de 
Valognes and Ralph Taillebois. This writ had confirmed a grant to St Albans sake and 
soke, toll and team and all its customs. The abbey was to enjoy its privileges, as they 
had been when Stigand had held them, on the day that King Edward was 'alive and 
dead' .93 The language used in this writ is an echo ofthe language and concepts 
expressed in the Domesday inquest, and suggests that the writ itself was drawn up while 
the survey was in process, with the scribes at St Alban's influenced by the forms of the 
Domesday inquest. Ralph was certainly dead by the time the Domesday returns for 
Bedfordshire were being compiled as his widow, Ascelina, is listed as accounting for his 
90 For Buckinghamshire see, RRAN, 1, no. 370. Cf. Westminster Abbey Charters, no. 51 alternative date of 
1091 x 1095. RRAN, 2, no.390. 
91 Matthew Paris, Chroniea Majora, RS (London, 1882),34, no.17; RRAN, 2, no. 314b. • Volo ut sciatis 
quod ego eoneedo et eoneedendo praeeipio ut eeclesia Saneti Albani habeatfirmiterques teneat et sine 
ealumnia terras, eeclesias, deeimas, et omnia quae habebat ilIo die quando rex eflectus sum.' 
92 DB, 1, 213a. 
93 Bates, Regesta, no. 249. ' .. . Stigandus habuit iIIo die quo rex JEwardus mortuus est'. 
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lands in the Domesday Book.94 At this stage, Ralph's younger brother, Ivo, accounted 
for the royal lands in Bedfordshire.9s 
The most likely hypothesis is that Ralph died while the survey was in progress and his 
brother Ivo represented a natural choice as temporary custodian of the royal lands in 
Bedfordshire, with Hugh de Beauchamp appointed as sheriff in the early months of 
Rufus's reign. Given the geographical proximity of their respective holdings in 
Normandy, both families are likely to have been well known to each other, as well as the 
ruling elite.96 Ralph had links to the ducal abbey of Saint-Etienne, where he occurs in a 
record of purchases by the abbey, exchanging eight acres ofland 'in front' ofthe abbey 
for land at Villers.97 Ivo Taillebois occurs as a royal steward in a writ issued in the first 
months of Rufus's reign.98 The links between the families were strengthened by Hugh's 
marriage to Ralph Taillebois's daughter.99 
Once in office, these men continued to use it for their own advantage in precisely the 
same way as their established colleagues did. The lands inherited in Bedfordshire by 
Hugh de Beauchamp from Ralph Taillebois, reveal that Ralph had been active in using 
his office to attract large numbers of sokemen, a policy Hugh was content to continue. 
In Hertfordshire, Peter de Valognes was using his office in much the same way as a 
means to acquire land and tenants. 100 In some form or another, all the sheriffs were using 
94 Liber Eliensis, 196; DB, 1,213. 
95 DB, 1, 209b. 
96 Loyd, Origins, 20-1; Green, English Sheriffs, 133. 
97 Bates, Regesra, 53. ' .. Rodulfo Taillebosc octo iugera terrae que ipse habebat ante monasterium et ad 
mensuram tantumdem dedit sibi in territorio Villariensi .... '. 
98 J. Annitage Robinson, Gilbert Crispin, Abbot a/Westminster: a study a/the abbey under Norman rule 
(Cambridge, 1911), 136, no.9. 
99 Abels, 'Lord Seeking', 136; Keats-Rohan, Domesday People, 260 
100 Abels, 'Lord Seeking', 138. 
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their office as a means to accumulate land. lol In case of William de Cahagnes, holding 
office was important as a means of consolidating his family's position in 
Northamptonshire, where William appears to have held office continuously until the 
early years of Henry Is reign. l02 The amount of land William held in chief in 
Northamptonshire was minimal, just £1 compared with a total of £29 held from Robert 
ofMortain. l03 By the twelfth century, however, five of the manors held by William from 
Robert of Mortain in 1086, were subsequently held in chief by the Cahagnes family, 
almost certainly coming to William in the wake of William of Mortain's permanent loss 
of his English estates after 1104.104 The patterns of monastic patronage by William 
further suggest a loosening of ties to the counts of Mortain, as William patronised none 
of the Mortain foundations. lOS 
The mechanics behind the promotion of both Hugh de Beauchamp and William de 
Cahagnes suggest a continuity of personnel and procedure, across not only a change of 
regime, but also between ducal government before 1066 and royal government after 
1066. The evidence explored in the previous chapter suggested that the Conqueror was 
well aware of the need to create a stable framework to oversee the smooth transition of 
101 For example, the activities of Haimo dapifer may be traced through the archives of St Augustine's. 
Haimo appears to have actively engaged in the illegal appropriation of church lands. A writ from the 
Conqueror ordered Archbishop Lanfranc, Geoffrey of Coutances, Robert, count of Eu, and Hugh de 
Montfort to reseise abbot Scotland, with the manor Fordwich, which was currently held by Haimo. The 
writ was part ofa wider examination into sheriffs' abuses, and explicitly castigated the previous abbot 
lEthelsige for allowing land to be alienated through carelessness, fear or greed. Bates, Regesta, nos 83, 
129. According to the chronicle ofSt Augustine's, )Ethelsige attempted to win the backing from the 
Nonnans by granting them land 'against the will of his brethren.' William Thorne's Chronicle o/St 
Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury, ed. A. H. Davis (Oxford, 1934),49·50. A further writ notified Lanfranc, 
together with counts Robert and Roger that William I had restored eight prebends in Newington to the 
abbey as a result of an inquiry through the shire court. Though Haimo was not named in the Conqueror's 
writ, a further writ of William Rufus ordered Haimo to restore to St Augustine's the rights held in 
Newington, as they had been proved in the shire court in the time of the William I. Bates, Regesta, no.88; 
RRAN, 1, no. 464. 
102 RRAN, 1, no. 476; 2, nos. 694,732,770. 
103 Soulsby, Fiefs o/the counts o/Mortain, 145; Green, 'Sheriffs', 141. 
104 VCB, Northamptonshire, 1,357.92; OV, 6, 286. 
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power in England; one that would bind those elements of the aristocracy who might 
have had serious objections to Rufus's elevation firmly into the governmental and 
decision making process. The promotions of Hugh de Beauchamp and William de 
Cahagnes suggest that in the early months of Rufus's reign the transition was managed 
smoothly and with the minimum of disruption, with Rufus recruiting his sheriffs from 
among the same pool of talent as his father. 
The first conclusion to draw from a discussion on the role of the sheriffs in 1088 and 
1101 is quite simply that without the support of these men, organising and leading the 
fyrd, both Rufus and Henry would have lost the English throne to Robert Curthose. 
Beyond this general observation, the details for the campaigns of 1088 and 1101 have 
much contribute to any understanding on the continuity and resilience of the Old 
English administrative structures and the continuity in the role of the sheriffs 
themselves. A second conclusion is that, in attempting to understand why, on two 
occasions over a thirteen-year period, the men who occupied the office of sheriff 
regarded a Curthose kingship as potentially damaging to their interests is, paradoxically, 
less easy. On one level, the discussions of Frank Barlow, Judith Green and Richard 
Abels provide a ready explanation; the need to ensure continuity of office and the 
benefits of office-holding, particularly the opportunities to acquire land and the means 
for individuals and families to gain local prominence and create their own networks of 
patronage and power. The benefits were, however, symptomatic of the structural 
instability that permeated so many aspects of the relationship between England and 
Normandy following 1066. At moments of crisis and tension within the cross-Channel 
political elite, despite past and present links to the major landholders on both sides of 
105 B. Golding, 'The Religious Patronage of Robert and William of Mortain', Belief and Culture in the 
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the Channel, the predominant concern of the sheriffs to protect their English interests 
and to retain administrative office, would have been a further centrifugal factor in 
preventing any continuation of a single cross-Channel polity under Robert Curthose. 
What is less apparent is the extent to which sheriffs chose to support Rufus and Henry 
because they had little difficulty in accepting their legitimacy as kings. What evidence 
there is can be marshalled to suggest that the sheriffs were part of a wider aristocratic 
world that operated in an environment where complex legal and political issues were 
discussed and had a profound impact on the conduct of contemporary politics. In a 
specifically English context, John Gillingham has presented a compelling case for the 
success of the 'county community' in finding a voice in national politics and shaping 
political discourse. 106 There must, at least, be a prima facie case for suggesting that the 
complex arguments that swirled around the upper echelons of the cross-Channel 
aristocracy impinged on the consciousness of the sheriffs. The implications of Order ie's 
remark, that the English 'did not recognise the rights of the other prince', suggest that 
the issue of Henry's kingship, and by implication that of Rufus's before him, together 
with Curthose's claim to the throne, were debated by all levels of society, including the 
sheriffs. 
Middle Ages, ed. R.Gameson and H. Leyser (Oxford, 2000), 228. 
106 Gillingham, 'Thegns and Knights in Eleventh Century England', 134·5. 
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Chapter 4 
Robert de Mowbray and the Revolt of 1095 
Contemporary and near-contemporary accounts of the rebellion of 1095 have two 
defining characteristics; the prominence they assign to Robert de Mowbray in 
formulating the revolt and the absence of any sort of evidence to suggest that it was a 
repeat of 1088. What makes this rebellion especially noteworthy is that Robert de 
Mowbray had, by 1095, enjoyed a career that was remarkable even by the standards of 
the eleventh century. He could claim to be one of the greatest Anglo-Norman magnates, 
with interests that stretched from the Scottish border to the Cotentin. Understandably 
therefore, both near contemporaries and modem historians have struggled to make sense 
of Robert's career before 1095 and his part in the revolt. 
For those near-contemporary writers who chose to interpret political instability through 
the prism of aristocratic failings and the destabilising effect these could have on the 
body politic, both the career of Robert de Mowbray and the revolt of 1095 provided a 
ready example. The most influential of these accounts came from the pen of Or de ric. I 
Physically powerful, austere, melancholic, contemptuous of authority and full of vanity, 
Orderic's description of Robert provides a near caricature of his views on the turbulent 
nature of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy as a whole and the need for an effective secular 
restraint. Orderic was clear that the rebellion of 1095 arose from Robert's greed and the 
desire to 'extend his territories on all sides'.2 There is no reason to doubt Orderic's 
claim, yet modem discussions have wrestled with the problem of reconciling Robert's 
I OV, 4, 278-86. Significantly, Orderic qualifies his description with the observation that Robert was more 
'given to thought than speech'. On Orderic's view of the aristocracy in general see, K. Thompson, 
'Orderic Vitalis and Robert of Belleme' ,JMH, 20 (1994), 133-41. 
2 OV, 4,278. 'Robertus autem utflnes suos undique dilataret ... t. 
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career before 1095 and his prominence in the revolt with a general paucity of evidence 
for the causes of the revolt.3 Somewhat surprisingly, given his wealth and the strategic 
position of his lands on both sides of the Channel, by the mid 1090s Robert has been 
seen by many historians as a marginal figure in political terms, perceived as estranged 
from Rufus, with a series of grievances and unfulfilled ambitions.4 Questions have also 
been raised about Robert's status and authority within Northumbria itself, with a history 
of conflict with Bishop William de St Calais and the monks of Durham cited as 
evidence ofinsecurity and thus necessitating royal intervention within Northumbria, 
interpreted as proof of instability and even of hostile royal attitudes towards Robert.s 
The causes of the revolt have even been sought beyond the borders of the Anglo-
Norman world, with the death of the Scots king Malcolm III in 1093 at Robert's hands 
seen as giving Rufus the opportunity to intervene directly in the Scottish succession, 
with the result that as the threat to the north of England from Scotland lessened, so the 
need for a powerful earl in Northumbria receded, thus paradoxically undermining 
Robert's position, yet also providing the conditions necessary for revolt.6 
The cumulative effect of these discussions has been for the rebellion of 1095 to be 
regarded as a revolt of the disappointed, the politically marginalised and the overly 
ambitious. It may be doubted, however, that this represents the whole picture, or even a 
substantial part of it. A close reading of all the narrative accounts from the early twelfth 
century suggests that those writers who concerned themselves with the revolt 
recognised that it went beyond the boundary of regional politics. The surprise to emerge 
from these sources is that of a man often described by modem historians as an 
3 In general, Crouch, The Normans, 147·9; Barlow, Rufus, 346·8; W. E. Kapelle, The Norman Conquest 
of the North (London, 1979), 154·5. 
4 Barlow, Rufus, 346; Hollister, 'Magnates and "Curiales"', MMI, 97-115; Crouch, The Normans, 148. 
5 W. M. Aird, 'Robert de Mowbray', DNB, 39, 585·8. 
6 Kapelle, Norman Conquest of the North, 154·5. 
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unattractive and seemingly a marginal figure in political terms, yet nonetheless able to 
attract many members of the Anglo-Norman political elite into a wider conspiracy that 
in its more extreme manifestations aimed at regicide. 
There is, therefore, an urgent need to re-examine the established evidence for Robert de 
Mowbray'S career before 1095 and reassess the origins of the revolt. The contemplation 
of regicide by the conspirators raises the possibility that the revolt was a manifestation 
of wider instability within royal and aristocratic relationships that was a legacy of the 
political upheaval of 1088 and, therefore, part of the wider problem of divided lordship 
and a disputed English succession.7 The absence of any evidence to suggest that the 
rebels of 1095 were revisiting the ground of 1088, and sought to replace Rufus on the 
English throne with his elder brother, should not necessarily be taken as proof that 
Robert de Mowbray and his fellow conspirators did not question the legitimacy of 
Rufus's kingship; John of Worcester noted that the aim of the conspirators was to 
replace Rufus with his cousin, Stephen of Aumale. 8 If anything, the revolt of 1095 
points towards the issue of the legitimacy of Rufus's kingship continuing to be far from 
settled for many within the cross-Channel aristocracy. Despite the failure of the revolt 
of 1088 and attempts by the aristocracy to provide a permanent solution to the wider 
problem of divided lordship through the Treaty of Rouen in 1091, questions and doubts 
over Rufus's politicallegitimacy could be revived at moments of crisis and political 
tension. 
7 Cf. Barlow, Rufus, 317, especially his observation that Robert de Mowbray'S killing of Malcolm III in 
1093 was an act of lese majeste. 
8 John of Worcester, 3, 76. 
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The actual events of 1095 have been well rehearsed and need not be repeated in any 
detail,9 Though the ground had evidently been laid for a widespread uprising, ultimately 
only Robert de Mowbray was prepared to oppose Rufus militarily, who in turn executed 
a characteristically well-planned campaign, quickly overcoming resistance at Newcastle 
and Morpeth and laying siege to Robert at his castle of Bamburgh. The conspiracy is 
notable for the significant degree of violence that was planned and aimed specifically at 
the king. At some point during this period, Orderic suggests while the king was 
approaching Northumbria, a plot to commit regicide was revealed by Gilbert fitz 
Richard, lord of Tonbridge, with the effect of convincing most of the conspirators that 
their best course of action was to seek reconciliation with Rufus. IO Orderic is the chief 
authority for both the revolts of 1088 and 1095. As such, his accounts provide a useful 
barometer of a change in attitudes towards Rufus on the part of sections of the 
aristocracy. Orderic is explicit in stating that the rebels besieged in Rochester in 1088, 
though numerous and well supplied with money and arms, were nonetheless reluctant to 
engage the king in open battle in his own kingdom. II By 1095 such restraints on conduct 
were largely absent. Despite their ultimate rejection of regicide, many members of the 
aristocracy had, nonetheless, been prepared to join a conspiracy against Rufus where 
regicide had been discussed openly and an oath sworn to achieve his death.12 In 
response, Rufus was prepared to resort to a degree of violence not seen in 1088, 
threatening to maim Robert in order to pressurise his wife and nephew to surrender 
Bamburgh castle to the besieging royal forces. 13 
9 In general see, Barlow, Rufus, 346-59; Crouch, The Normans, 148-9. 
10 OV, 4,280-2. 
11 OV, 4, 126-8. In general see, Strickland, 'Against the Lord's anointed' 56-79. 12 ' OV, 4, 280. 
\3 John of Worcester, 3, 78. 
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The aftermath of the revolt was equally characterised by the selective application of 
judicial violence.14 Though spared his life, Robert de Mowbray remained in captivity 
until his death, a period of between twenty or thirty years, possibly entering St Albans 
as a monk shortly before his death. I' Besides Robert de Mowbray, the most prominent 
rebels in 1095 were William, count ofEu, and Gilbert fitz Richard. Gilbert's reward for 
revealing the plan to ambush and kill Rufus was largely to escape royal retribution. 
William of Eu was less fortunate. Charged with treason and defeated in a judicial duel, 
he was blinded and castrated, dying of his injuries shortly afterwards.16 Others 
implicated in the revolt included members of the powerful Montgomery family, with 
Hugh de Montgomery, earl of Shrewsbury, privately reproached by Rufus and received 
back into royal favour on the payment of three thousand pounds.17 His younger brother 
Philip suffered imprisonment.ls Roger de Lacy saw his lands confiscated and was also 
exiled, his lordship of Weobley passing to his younger brother, who had remained loyal 
to the king. 19 Odo of Champagne, lord of Holderness, also suffered confiscation and 
imprisonment.2o Ernulf de Hesdin successfully defended himself in a judicial duel, but 
judged it prudent to depart on crusade and died at Antioch.21 
The actions of Gilbert fitz Richard on route to Northumbria set the tone for much of the 
subsequent investigations into the rebellion. Behind the list of those involved in the 
conspiracy, there are hints of a complex web of court intrigue and family politics, which 
appear to have exploded into life in the aftermath of the failure of the revolt. William of 
14 For a comparison with the reconciliation process following the revolt of 1088 see, R. Sharpe, '1088. 
William Rufus and the Rebels', ANS, 26 (2004), 139·57. 
U Matthaei Parisiensis, monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica Majora, ed. H. R. Luard, 6 vols, RS (London, 
1872-3) 6,372; Gaimar, L 'Estoire, lines, 6175; OV, 4, 282. 
16 OV, 4, 284; GR, 1,564. 
17 OV, 4, 284. 
II John o/Worcester, 3, 82. 
19 OV, 4, 284. 
20 John o/Worcester, 3,82. 
21 Liber Hyda, 301-2. 
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Eu had earned the enmity of his brother-in-law, Hugh d' Avranches, earl of Chester, on 
account of his flagrant infidelities and neglect of his wife, Hugh's sister.22 William's 
sentence was carried out at the instigation of his brother-in-law. Indicative of the degree 
of pressure Rufus exercised on the rebels, Morel, Robert de Mowbray's nephew and 
sheriff, broke ranks from his family and fellow conspirators and only saved himself by 
turning informer, but died in exile, a broken and reviled figure according to Orderic.23 
Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, some writers noted how many of those 
implicated in the conspiracy appeared to have been innocent, or at the very least were 
guilty only of association with known conspirators. One such individual was William of 
Eu's cousin and steward, William d' Audrieu, who was accused of treason and 
subsequently hanged. 24 William ofMalmesbury's account of the revolt has the 
execution of William d' Audrieu at its centre, and though careful not to pass judgement 
directly, William leaves little doubt that he regarded many of Rufus's actions as 
unjust.2S Ernulf de Hesdin's disgust at the nature of what was taking place was such, that 
although his innocence had been proved through a judicial duel, he decided to leave 
England completely.26 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicler laconically noted that some 
conspirators were taken to London 'and there destroyed' .27 Overall, the aftermath of the 
revolt appears to have had a quality that impressed itself into the consciousness of many 
of those who wrote about it at nearly a generation removed. Significantly, the nearest 
22 OV, 4, 284. 
23 OV, 4, 284. 
24 ASC, E, 1096; GR, 1,564. 
2$ GR, 1,564. Indicating that he felt that Rufus might have gone too far in punishing William, 
Malmesbury began his next passage in the Gesta Regum. 'Veruntamen sunt quaedem de rege preclarae 
magnanimitatis exempla. quae posteris non inuidebo.' Significantly, William of Malmesbury may have 
had access to good sources of information in relation to William d' Audrieu, as his monastery was close to 
two manors held by William in Wiltshire, Littleton Pannell and Compton Basset. DB, 1,71 c-d; Barlow. 
Rufus, 358. 
26 Liber Hyda, 301-2. 
27 ASC, E, 1096. 
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parallel for such political violence had occurred some twenty years earlier, in the 
aftermath of the revolt of 1075. 
Previous discussions of the nature of Rufus's response to the revolt have suggested the 
king was concerned mainly with personal retribution, or using the aftermath ofthe 
revolt as an opportunity to terrorise the aristocracy into submission.28 This argument is 
somewhat undermined by the fact that the punishments appear to have been carefully 
thought out, selective and the result of close consultation between Rufus and his 
advisers.29 Those who suffered most appear to have been the ones closest to the centre 
of the rebellion and most implacably opposed to Rufus. Unlike the rebels of 1075, the 
conspirators of 1095 had conspired to kill Rufus, with Robert de Mowbray and William 
of Eu both specifically named in this context.3D 
Nor was 1095 the first occasion when both these men had opposed the king. Robert and 
William, together with Robert's uncle, Geoffrey of Coutances, had participated in the 
rebellion of 1088 where their activities in Somerset, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire had 
seriously endangered royal control ofthe region. Robert had campaigned through 
Wiltshire and sacked the royal city of Bath, while William was credited with the 
destruction of Berkeley in Gloucestershire.31 Their combined activities came to an end 
only after Robert attacked and failed to take another royal city, Gloucester, which 
effectively signalled the end of the rebellion in the West Country.32 As Orderic listed 
Robert among the royalist forces at the siege of Rochester, it would appear as though 
28 Crouch, The Normans, 149-50; Hollister, 'Magnates and "Curiales"', MMI, 104. 
29 OV, 4, 284. 
30 For William ofEu see,John o/Worcester, 3,76. 
31 John o/Worcester, 3, 52; GR, 1,544. 
32 John o/Worcester, 3, 52. 
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Rufus moved quickly to isolate Robert and his uncle from the rebel cause and reached a 
settlement with them before the rebellion had been concluded in the southeast.33 
The link to the revolt of 1088 carries significant implications for any understanding of 
the conspiracy of 1095. The involvement of Robert and his uncle in the rebellion of 
1088 needs to be located within the general framework of aristocratic attitudes towards 
succession explored in Chapter Two, and represented a manifestation of the deep unease 
that the partition of England and Normandy and the means by which Rufus had secured 
the English throne had generated within substantial sections of the senior aristocracy. 
Consideration of Robert's career before 1088 suggests a strong attachment to Robert 
Curthose that shaped his thinking in 1088. Robert's reluctance to see the claims of 
Robert Curthose to the English throne bypassed was also shaped by a pragmatic 
appreciation of the future difficulties that would be engendered by a separation of 
England and Normandy. Yet in the context of the rebellion of 1095, support for 
Curthose's claim to the throne in 1088 may have been of more importance in that it 
created an atmosphere in which doubts over Rufus's legitimacy could fester and be 
revived in the right set of circumstances. 
Robert appears to have been in Normandy between the Conqueror's death and the 
outbreak of hostilities in England after Easter 1088, as he was listed as one of the 
despoilers of La Trinite 'in the year after the king's death', and did not cross to 
Normandy again until after the conclusion of Bishop William's trial at Salisbury in 
November 1088.34 At this stage Robert was both a significant figure in his own right, 
33 ov, 4, 128. Cf. the comments of Barlow, Rufus, 92, n.186. 
34 Charters and Custumals of the Abbey of Holy Trinity Caen, ed. J. Walmsley, 2 vols, British Academy, 
Records of Social and Economic History, New Series 22 (1994), 2, 126: 'Robertus de Molbrai!xviii 
libras quoque anno post mortem Regis.' Barlow, Rufus, 89. 
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but also the heir to a career of great potential. As the son of Roger de Mowbray and 
descended from a family related to Nigel, the vicomte of the Cotentin, Robert was also 
the heir to the lands of his uncle, and thus a potentially enormous cross-Channel 
complex of estates.3' In political terms, Robert's inheritance was no less significant. 
Robert's father had attended the council of Lillebonne in 1066 and was described by 
Orderic as one of the illustrious laymen who were busy making Normandy great.36 
Robert's early and close association with Robert Curthose suggests that he was 
earmarked to follow his father into the Norman political elite. 
Despite this political importance, the Mowbray lands in Normandy appear to have been 
modest and centred largely on Montbrai itself. Several neighbouring villages were 
included in the later Mowbray fee including Beaumesnil, Belson, Etouvy, Coulonces, 
Margueray, and possibly Landelles, Saint-Vigor and Pontfarcy.37 Orderic recorded a 
confirmation by Robert of the gift of the church of Etouvy to Saint-Evroult by Richard 
de Coulances, where Robert is described as the 'chieflord' .38 Although no statement on 
the wealth of the family can be arrived at before the death of Bishop Geoffrey in 1093, 
the patronage of his uncle was crucial in lifting Robert into the very highest levels of 
wealth and power. Credited with over two hundred and eighty manors by Orderic, 
Geoffrey is recorded in Domesday as holding two hundred and sixty five manors in 
Berkshire, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Hampshire, Huntingdonshire, Northamptonshire 
and Lincolnshire.39 
3'OV, 4, 278; John Le Patourel, 'Geoffrey of Montbray, Bishop ofCoutances, 1049-1093', EHR, 59 
(1944), 129-61. 
360v, 2,140. 
37 D. Greenway, Charters o/the Honour o/Mowbray 1107-1191 (Oxford, 1972), Introduction, 18-19. 
31 OV, 3,230. 
39 OV, 4,278. This figure obviously excludes Northumbria. The estimated revenue of all these estates was 
£750 per annum, W. J. Corbett, Cambridge Medieval History, v (Cambridge, 1926),510-11. For a 
complete list of Domesday references to Geoffrey's holdings see, Domesday People, 228-229; COEL, 
person no, 837 
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As the heir to a great cross-Channel complex of estates, Robert's support for Curthose 
in 1088 was therefore entirely predictable. Orderic listed him, along with Robert de 
Belleme, Roger, son of Richard de Bienfaite and William de Breteuil, as among those 
men who supported Curthose in his rebellion against his father in 1077 and implied that 
Robert then accompanied Curthose on his exile from Normandy.40 As was discussed in 
Chapter Two, all of Curt hose's supporters at this stage are identifiable as direct heirs to 
some potentially enormous cross-Channel complexes. Orderic is emphatic that Curthose 
was advised by these men to 'rise up boldly' and claim a share of the realm of 
England.4! Yet the actions of these individuals must also be seen as a representation of 
the views of the senior aristocracy in terms of its preference for the Conqueror's 
successor. In this context, Robert's actions in 1088 would represent the logical outcome 
of a strand of thought first developed in the 1070s, which saw Curthose as having the 
preferred and strongest claim to the English throne, and whose kingship would continue 
the cross-Channel polity created after 1066, and thus present few practical difficulties. 
Robert's identification with Curthose and his involvement in the difficulties of the 
1070s do not appear to have hindered his career. A charter confirmed at Bonneville-sur-
Touques and dated 14 July 1080 lists both Robert Curthose and Robert de Mowbray 
among the witnesses, almost certainly before both men crossed the Channel en route to 
Scotland.41 Robert also appears in the company of some high status witnesses for two 
confirmation charters drawn up for the ducal abbey of Saint Etienne between 1080 and 
400 V, 3, 100-2. Orderic also lists Joel fitzAlfred, William de Moulins-Ia-Marche and William de 
Rupierre, and many others of 'noble birth and knightly prowess'. 
4! OV, 3, 98. 
42 Bates, Regesta, no.175 (II), 
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1083.43 It may also be significant that during the same period the last recorded act of 
Robert's father, Roger de Mowbray, occurs in the confirmation pancarte drawn up for 
the abbey of La Trinite between 1080 and 1082, where Roger gave to the abbey his land 
at Grainville-sur-Odon, on behalf of his daughter who had become a nun there.44 
Therefore, by the time of the outbreak ofthe revolt of 1088, the evidence points towards 
Robert having been a significant figure in Norman politics for at least a decade. 
Robert's relationship with Curthose after 1088 does not appear to have suffered from 
any agreement he had reached with Rufus in the aftermath of the revolt, which almost 
certainly centred upon the recognition of Rufus's claim to the throne.4S To a degree, 
however, the dynamics of that relationship meant that Robert and his uncle were less 
successful in reaching an accord with Henry in his new position as count of the Cotentin 
in the late 1080s.46 Orderic could recount how in 1090 Henry had support from Hugh 
d' Avranches and Richard de Reviers and, 'the other barons of the Cotentin except 
Robert de Mowbray' .47 Nearly all the local contemporary accounts also create the 
impression that Bishop Geoffrey was in his diocese and actively resisting Henry's 
attempts to enforce his rule within the Cotentin.48 Orderic's account is significant in that 
it provides the latest date by which Robert's father had died and Robert had inherited 
his father's Norman estates. Therefore, given the history of the relationships between 
Robert and Bishop Geoffrey with the Conqueror's three sons, and the strategic 
importance of both men on both sides of the Channel, it is possible that they may have 
been involved in the joint campaign of Curthose and Rufus to remove Henry from the 
43 Bates, Regesta, nos 50, 53. 
44 Bates, Regesta, no. 59. 
45 See also, Sharpe, 'lOSS-William II and the Rebels', 139-57. 
46 OV, 4, 148; GND, 2, 206-8. 
470 V, 4, 220. ' .. aliasque munitiones possidebat. et Hugonem com item et Ricardum de Radueriis aliosque 
Constantiniensis preter Robertum de Molbraio secum habebat. ' 
48 Gallia Christiana in Provincias Ecclesiaticas Distributa, ed. P. Piolin, 16 vols. (paris, 1715-65),9, 
Instrumenta, Cols. 217-24. 
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Cotentin in 1091. More importantly, they may also have been involved in the 
negotiations surrounding the treaty of Rouen in 1091. Geoffrey ofCoutances was 
included among the witnesses to a charter drawn up at Dover in January 1091, while 
Rufus waited to cross to Normandy.49 Geoffrey's presence may be significant in that 
most of the hard negotiations preceding the treaty of Rouen had been completed by this 
stage and Rufus was crossing to Normandy in order to ratify the agreement. so 
By equal measure, both Robert and his uncle appear to have been regarded as too 
powerful to let the revolt of 1088 undermine any future relationship with Rufus. Signs 
of reconciliation were immediate. At the trial of William de St Calais in 1088, Geoffrey 
of Coutances had been sufficiently reconciled to Rufus to bring his experience to bear in 
the proceedings against Bishop William.sl Geoffrey's steward, William de Merlay, also 
claimed damages against Bishop William on behalf of his lord for the alleged seizure of 
two hundred of Geoffrey's cattle by William's men during the revolt.s2 Bishop 
William's request at the end of his trial to travel into exile in the company of Robert de 
Mowbray suggests that Robert was regarded as enjoying favourable status with 
Curthose, and thus might have afforded William some protection and status in the face 
ofa possible hostile reception. S3 Robert's motives in crossing to Normandy at this stage 
can be guessed at with some confidence, and were almost certainly to ensure that his 
relationship with Robert Curthose remained intact following 1088, as well as to 
facilitate relations with Henry as the new count of Cotentin. 
49 RRAN, 1, no. 315. 
so See below, Chapter Seven. 
SI De iniustia, 84-5. 
S2 De iniustia, 93-4. 
53 De inuistia, 95-6. The text of the De iniustia reads Roger instead of Robert. For an explanation see, 
Barlow, Rufus, 89, n.171. 
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Therefore, in seeking to understand the breakdown in relations with Rufus it is crucial 
to recognise that, far from being a marginal figure, Robert de Mowbray was, by 1095, at 
the very centre of the Anglo-Norman political elite. By 1093 at the latest, and following 
the deaths of his father and uncle, Robert had immense landed interests in the very 
heartlands of English royal power, and in a politically sensitive region of the duchy. 
Laying aside the prejudicial views of Orderic, there is no evidence in Robert's career 
before 1095 to suggest a degree of recklessness or a lack of political finesse. His support 
for Curthose in the 1070s, as with so many other leading members of the next 
generation of Norman leaders, appears to have been calculated, but did not damage his 
reputation and standing with the ruling elite to any extent that would necessitate his 
exclusion from power and promotion. What evidence there is suggests that Robert had 
successfully negotiated the troubled period following the death of the Conqueror. His 
participation in the revolt of 1088 had been successfully mitigated and Robert had 
fulfilled his potential and inherited a cross-Channel complex of estates that elevated his 
status to be one of the leading members of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. 
The date and circumstances of Robert's appointment in Northumbria have been seen as 
a possible source of dispute with Rufus. Dates ranging from 1085 through to 1094 have 
been suggested for Robert's appointment, with Rufus's reluctance to recognise Robert 
as earl suggested as a source of dispute in 1087 and precipitating Robert's participation 
in the revolt of 1088.54 Robert's predecessor, Aubrey de Couey, resigned his office at 
some point between 31 May 1081 and the death of the bishop Robert of Sees in 1082.55 
Symeon of Durham implies that Robert directly succeeded earl Aubrey.56 Set against 
54 Barlow, Rufus. 167; Green, Aristocracy, 112; Aird, DNB, 'Robert de Mowbray', 586. 
5S Bates, Regesta, 231. 
56 Symeon, Opera, 2, 199. 'lnde rex dedit ilium honorem Albrico. Qua in rebus difJicilibus parum valente. 
patriam que reversa, idem Rodberto de Mulbreio dedit comitatum Northymbrensem ... • 
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this, however, Stephen of Whitby's account of the foundation of St Mary's, Yark, in 
1088 contains a reference to Geoffrey ofCoutances exercising authority in Northumbria 
at that date.s7 Given the difficulties and dangers of administering the north, it is unlikely 
that the Conqueror would have wanted to repeat past mistakes. That he would have 
appointed someone soon after Aubrey de Couey's resignation appears likely. As well as 
preventing destabilisation in the region, the separation of Robert de Mowbray and 
Robert Curthose may have been judged a politically prudent move after the political 
upheaval of Curt hose's first rebellion against his father.s8 Stephen of Whitby's account 
suggests that it is likely that Robert's initial foothold in Northumbria may have been in 
partnership with his uncle Geoffrey. Although the absence of Domesday evidence 
makes it difficult to link Geoffrey with the administration of North umbria before 1088, 
there are several reasons to think that Geoffrey had resources in Northumbria that may 
have provided Robert with the power base needed to establish his authority. It has 
already been noted that charges were brought against William de 8t Calais at his trial 
relating to the seizure of Geoffrey's cattle by William's men. As William had retreated 
to Durham at the outbreak of the revolt in 1088, it is likely that any seizure took place 
within the Durham area, with William de Merlay possibly acting as Geoffrey's steward 
in the north. On the death of his uncle, William de Merlay is likely to have served 
Robert in a similar capacity; Gaimar recorded William de Merlay being besieged at 
Morpeth in 1095.s9 
S7 BL, MS Add. 38816, fol. 33r7v. ' .... Gosfridus Constantiensis episcopus qui eo quoque tempore 
Northahimbrorum consulatum regebat ... '. The specific reference to Geoffrey exercising authority within 
Northumbria at that particular time could imply that it was a temporary situation, rather than the normal 
state of affairs. 
sa Orderic displays a degree of contradiction when discussing this episode, both blaming Curthose's 
companions for leading him astray with evil counsel, yet at the same time creating a speech for the 
Conqueror where he complained that Curthose had lured away the Conqueror's young knights. OV, 4, 
100-2, 110-12. 
S9 Gaimar, L 'Estoire, lines, 6144-8. 
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Other connections point towards the importance of familial links to the establishment of 
Robert's power in Northumbria. The family connection between Morel, Robert de 
Mowbray and Geoffrey of Coutances was well known.60 A further relative, an unnamed 
brother of Robert, had custody of Newcastle at the start of the rebellion.61 William de 
Merlay gave the monks of Durham land at Morwick, Warkworth and a fishery in the 
Tyne.62 The gift was given for the souls of William, his wife Meinalda and their sons 
Rannulf, Goffrid and Morel, and was confirmed by William's son Rannulf in 1129 and 
later by his grandson, Roger.63 Given that William de Meday named one of his sons 
Morel, this too would point towards a strong connection with Robert's family on 
William's part. Ultimately, though patchy and conjectural, the evidence does seem to 
point towards a situation where Robert de Mowbray had been established in 
Northumbria relatively soon after the resignation of Earl Aubrey, and may have looked 
to his wider family and uncle for support. 
In this context, Bishop Geoffrey was the obvious candidate to administer Northumbria 
in any absence, as was perhaps the case between September 1087 and Easter 1088, and 
thus reflected in Stephen of Whitby's account. Whether de Mowbray's absence at such 
a critical juncture and his ties to Curthose caused Rufus to hesitate in confirming him in 
his earldom is a matter of speculation. Crucially, however, no source mentions this in 
connection with the revolt of 1088, or as a long-term cause of any discord between the 
two men. The balance of evidence for Robert de Mowbray'S involvement in the revolt 
of 1088 suggests that it was the claim of Robert Curthose to the English throne that 
motivated his and his uncle's involvement, rather than any reluctance on the part of 
60 ASC, E, 1095. 
61 John o/Worcester, 3, 76. 
62W 
. Dugdale, The baronage o/England, 2 vols. (London, 1675-6), 1,570. 
63 W. Percy Hedley, Northumbrian Families (Newcastle, 1968), 196; Sanders, Baronies, 65. 
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Rufus to recognise Robert's status. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Robert's 
likely presence in Normandy in September 1087 meant that he was excluded from the 
selection process in choosing a new English king. 
Royal intervention within Northumbria in the relationship between Robert de Mowbray 
and Bishop William de St Calais has been cited as evidence of insecurity and royal 
hostility towards Robert, and therefore grounds for rebellion.64 Robert certainly 
displayed an opportunistic attitude towards ecclesiastics and there is little doubt that his 
relationship with the bishop and monks of Durham was poor, reflected in Robert's 
seizure of the priory of Tynemouth.65 Symeon of Durham suggests that Robert's actions 
were a result of his hatred for Bishop William, implying that relations between the two 
men had already deteriorated before the seizure.66 A local context for Robert's actions 
may have been a dispute with Bishop William over the ownership of twelve vills at 
Aycliffe in Northumbria.67 A notification ofa concord made by Rufus between William 
and Robert, shows Robert surrendering his claims to Aycliffe in consideration of a 
payment of one hundred pounds.68 The origins of the dispute are unclear, but may be 
indicative of competition between the two men for followers in an area that had limited 
Norman settlement into the 1090s.69 Apart from Morel and William de Merlay, only one 
further man of any significance can be identified in Northumbria before 1095, Hubert de 
la Val, at Callerton.7o Symeon records the names of two of Robert de Mowbray's men, 
64 Kapelle, Norman Conquest of the North, 154. 
65 For a detailed discussion see below, Chapter 8. 
:~ Symeon, Opera, 2, 12~. • ... propter ini~icitras quae inter episcopum et ipsum agitabatur .. ' 
Symeon of Durham, LIbel/us de ExordlO atque Procursu islivs, hoc est Dunhelmensis Ecclesie, ed. and 
trans. D. Rollason (Oxford, 2000), 236-8, 238, n. 31 where the properties in question are listed. 
68RRAN, 1, no. 349. Questions over the authenticity ofthis writ remain. For comments concerning the 
background to it see, H. S. Offler, Durham Episcopal Charters, 1071-1152, Surtees Society, vol 197 
(1968),3; D. Bates, 'The Forged Charters of William the Conqueror and Bishop William ofSt Calais', 
Anglo-Norman Durham, 122. 
69 See M. Strickland, 'Securing the North: Invasion and the Strategy of Defence in Twelfth Century 
~nglo-Scottish warfare' , Anglo-Norman Warfare (Woodbridge, 1994), 210. 
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Gumer and Robert Taca, in relation to the forcible removal of Tuchil from St aswin's 
church in 1090.71 
In the context of Northum brian regional politics the witness list attached to a charter of 
Edgar, Malcolm Ill's son and claimant to the Scottish throne in 1095 may be 
significant.72 The suggestion that the Normans listed in the witness list were either part 
of Rufus's army or more importantly, already settled in the north-east, possibly as part 
of the bishop's patrimony, could be significant as another source oftension.73 Certain 
families listed in Edgar's charter rose to prominence in the early twelfth century 
including the Humet, Amundeville, Audrey and Valognes families.74 It has even been 
suggested that Edgar had seized Lothian as part of the campaign of 1095 and was met 
by Bishop William at Norham where the original charter was drawn Up.7S 
Other families whose settlement in Northumbria can be dated more generally to the 
1090s include the Umfravilles, established at Prudhoe, and the Balliols, established at 
Bywell.76 There are, however, grounds for thinking that Guy de Balliol was attracted to 
Northumbria under royal patronage. Guy's lands were made up from various sources 
including land from the royal demesne, the former lands of Hugh fitz Baldric, a casualty 
of the 1088 revolt, and also, eventually, from Robert de Mowbray'S lands." Various 
dates have been advanced for the establishment of Guy de Balliol, ranging from 1093 to 
after 1095.78 No conclusive evidence for either period exists and it is unlikely, given 
71 Symeon, Opera, 2, 261. 
72 Early Scottish Charters Prior to A.D.1153, ed. A. C. Lawrie (Glasgow, 1905), no. 15. 
73 W. M. Aird, St. Cuthbert and the Normans (Woodbridge, 1998),201. 
74 A. M. Duncan, 'Yes, The Earliest Scottish Charters', Scottish Historical Review, 78 (1999), 32-3. 
7S Duncan, 'Yes, The Earliest Scottish Charters', 33. 
76 L. Keen, 'The Umfravilles, The castle of Prudhoe and the Barony of Prudhoe, Northumberland', ANS, 
5 (1982),165-184. 
77 P. Dalton, Conquest, Anarchy and Lordship. Yorkshire 1066-1154 (Cambridge, 1994),83 
78 J. C. Hodgson, A History of North umbria (Newcastle, 1893-1940) 6,19; Dalton, Conquest, 83. 
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their composition, that Guy de Balliol received all of his lands at the same time. James 
Spearman, writing in the early eighteenth century, quoted an earlier, unnamed writer 
who claimed that Guy had been given Bywell in the seventh year of Rufus's reign 
together with the forests of Teesdale and Marwood on account of his 'good and faithful 
services' .79 Eventually, Rufus also gave to Guy Aubrey de Courcy's Yorkshire fee.so 
Where these strands come together is in Robert of Torigni's account of the rebellion in 
1095, which started with Robert de Mowbray attacking unnamed fortresses on the 
border of his earldom, a possible reference to Bywell and Prudhoe.sl Orderic believed 
that one the motivating factors for the rebellion was the desire of Robert de Mowbray to 
extend his territories 'on all sides' .82 Given the strategic importance of both Bywell and 
Prudhoe in controlling the upper Tyne valley and the route to Bamburgh and if 
Spearman's original unnamed source is to be believed, the presence ofthese men and 
the evident ties between Balliol and Rufus may have been a provocation for Robert de 
Mowbray. 
Torigni's statement suggests that a wider context for concern might have been the 
policy initiated by Rufus in the early 1090s that saw the advancement of men with 
strong ties to Rufus into northern lordships. Robert I de Stuteville was a beneficiary of 
Hugh fitz Baldric's fall after 1088, being granted land around Thirsk, augmented by 
demesne land from the North Riding and eventually elements of the Mortain fee. s3 In 
Cumbria, Ivo Taillebois was advanced into the Upper Eden valley by 1094, and 
79J. Speannan, An Enquiry into the Ancient and Present State of the County Palatine of Durham (1729), 
51; Hedley, Northumbrian Families, 203. 
so EYC, 1,438. 
81 GND, 2, 214. 
82 OV, 4, 278. 
83Greenway, Charters of the Honour of Mowbray, Introduction, 20. 
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following his death in 1094 the lordship of Burton passed to Robert I de Stuteville.84 
The lordship of Kirkby Malzeard in the eastern Pennines passed into possession of 
Erneis de Burun and later to Robert de Stuteville.as The men who were initially 
advanced into the north in the 1090s were not possessed of large estates elsewhere in 
England and were clearly of moderate social status. Ivo Taillebois and Erneis de Burun 
had proved themselves loyal in the rebellion of 1088 and were important to royal 
administration. All owed their status and lordships to Rufus. Yet to follow the line of 
reasoning suggested by Orderic, and to argue that these men in any way posed a threat 
to the interests of Robert is largely unconvincing. At worst, Robert may have viewed the 
advancement of these men as evidence of creeping royal interests in the north, but 
hardly the grounds for rebellion on the scale envisaged in 1095. 
Ultimately, the evidence that points to a strained relationship between Rufus and Robert 
de Mowbray is equivocal and occurs in a context where Rufus had to seemingly 
intervene to prevent relations between the two major powers in Northumbria seriously 
compromising each other. The evidence for supposed royal hostility needs to be placed 
in its proper context. A writ addressed to Geoffrey Bainard, sheriff of Yorkshire, 
between 1089 and 1091, notified him that the monks of Durham had been granted the 
monastery of Bellingham with a grant of all customs pertaining to this and other lands 
of St Cuthbert between the Tyne and Tees. 86 The specific demarcation between the 
Tyne and Tees might point towards a situation where Robert was confined to beyond 
the Tyne and was specifically excluded from administering the lands of Bishop William 
de St Calais during his exile. Likewise, the two loyalists of 1088, Ivo Taillebois and 
84Greenway, Charters o/the Honour 0/ Mowbray, Introduction, 22. 
8'Greenway, Charters o/the Honour o/Mowbray, Introduction, 22. 
86 T. A. M Bishop & P.Chaplais, Facsimiles o/English Royal Writs loA.D.I 100 (Oxford, 1957), plate 7 
(a); RRAN, 1, no. 344. The land between the Tees and the Tyne had been granted to the Church of 
Lindisfame and formed the core of the Patrimony ofSt Cuthbert. W. M. Aird, 'St Cuthbert, the Scots and 
the Normans', ANS, 16 (1993), 3. 
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Emeis de Burun, were given possession of Durham castle during Bishop William's 
exile. 87 However, given Rufus's determination to secure the castle during William's 
trial, it would have been remarkable had Rufus entrusted it to Robert in the immediate 
aftermath of 1088, especially if Robert had permission to travel to Normandy at that 
point, and the absence of Robert and Bishop William would have probably left Norman 
power in Northumbria in the hands of Bishop Geoffrey, another rebel from 1088. 
Rufus was clearly prepared to act to uphold royal interests and prevent instability within 
a strategically important earldom, yet there is nothing in these actions that points 
towards a wider deterioration in his relations with Robert. The diplomatic evidence can 
be misleading and needs to be treated with care. The monks of Durham appear to have 
been particularly well organised administratively and had a tradition of seeking writs to 
preserve their liberties.88 In terms of the advancement of men into the north who owed 
their status to Rufus, there is no evidence that this advancement contributed to the 
revolt. The earliest possible date for Guy de Balliol's advancement into Northumbria is 
1093, by which point relations between Rufus and Robert de Mowbray were already 
beginning to break down. Therefore, assuming that Robert of Torigni and Orderic were 
indeed referring in 1095 to attacks by Robert on lands and castles controlled by men 
loyal to Rufus, all the available evidence suggests that these men were advanced into 
the north after relations between Rufus and Robert began to deteriorate. They were 
symptomatic of a breakdown in relations, not the cause. 
Overall, there is nothing to suggest that the damning caricatures of Robert presented in 
the sources, and especially by Orderic, were anything more than the selective 
87 De inuistia, 95. 
88 E. Mason, 'William Rufus and the Benedictine Order', ANS, 21 (1998), 17; RRAN, 1, nos. 366,367, 
368, 396, 426;2, 338a. 
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application of rhetoric and prejudice. His conduct in 1088 and loyalty to Robert 
Curthose was perfectly understandable and presented no obstacle to the development of 
an effective working relationship with Rufus. Though relations between Robert and 
Bishop William de 8t Calais and the monks of Durham were poor, this in itself does not 
suggest a motive for rebellion on the scale envisaged in 1095. Nor does it explain why 
so many members of the elite were attracted to the rebellion. 
Ultimately, and as in 1088, the origins of Robert's hostility to Rufus lay in questions 
over the legitimacy of his kingship. The narrative sources convey the impression of a 
sudden outbreak of discontent and violence. Yet quite clearly the ground had been laid 
for an extensive rebellion that must have taken time to organise and any framework of 
analysis must consider the issues that would attract a geographically diverse group of 
Anglo-Norman magnates into a conspiracy where regicide was openly discussed and 
promoted. 
One connecting thread uniting a rather diverse group of conspirators is that most of 
them were former opponents of Rufus. William ofEu was, after Robert de Mowbray, 
the most prominent of the rebels. A major landholder in the West Country, it is certain 
that any agreement reached between Rufus, Robert and Geoffrey of Coutances in 1088 
is likely to have included William.89 Like Robert, William was also the heir to a 
potentially significant cross-Channel complex of estates. Prior to the Conqueror's death 
it appears as though William administered the family's lands in England, with his father 
concentrating on Normandy.90 The death of William's father, Robert, count ofEu, at 
89 Domesday People, 477. William was listed as a tenant-in-chiefin nine counties in 1086. (Insert) 
90 Bates, Regesta, no. 158. 
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some point between 1089 and 1093 saw him inherit these lands.91 At the same time 
Rufus was able to convince William to align more openly with him. John of Worcester 
dates this to 1093, noting that he 'abandoned' Curthose for Rufus, with promises of 
honours and on account of his greed for gold.92 No evidence of any such grants or gifts 
exists and William's personal conduct during this period had created enemies from 
within his own extended family, who would prove instrumental in his downfall.93 Given 
this set of circumstances, William may have been open to suggestions of revolt. 
The extent of Hugh de Montgomery's involvement in the revolt is unclear. Although 
privately reproached by Rufus and returned to royal favour with a £3,000 fine, Symeon 
records that it was his younger brother Philip who was actually involved in the revolt.94 
By 1095, Philip was the only Montgomery brother not to have any substantial land 
holdings and this may well have made the revolt of 1095 an attractive prospect. There is 
a strong suggestion within the sources that Philip was acting alone and the Mont-
gomerys reflected the Lacy family in dividing over its involvement in the conspiracy. In 
the aftermath of the revolt, Rufus granted Arnulf, the youngest Montgomery brother, the 
lands of Odo of Champagne in Holderness and Lincolnshire, almost certainly as a 
reward for remaining loya1.9' Given that the Welsh stormed Montgomery castle during 
the course of the rebellion and it was a royal army that intervened to retake it, it seems 
unlikely that Hugh would have had much to gain from any involvement in the 
conspiracy. It is noticeable that the fine levied on Hugh matches the same figure offered 
by his elder brother, Robert de Belleme, for the earldom of Shrewsbury in 1098, and 
91 For a list of Robert's lands see, Domesday People, 373. 
92 John o/Worcester, 3, 68. 
93 OV, 4, 284. 
94 OV, 4, 285; Symeon, Opera, 1, 171-94; John o/Worcester, 3, 82. 
9' Barlow, Ru/us, 358. 
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this may have been the relief set in 1094 toO.96 It is unlikely that Hugh would have paid 
the debt by 1095 and the complicity of his younger brother in the revolt would hardly 
have passed unnoticed by Rufus, who probably took the opportunity to remind Hugh of 
his indebtedness. A combination of his younger brother's involvement in the 
conspiracy, and the support given by his family to Curthose in 1088, may have made 
Hugh an obvious, but unfounded, target of suspicion in 1095. 
Odo of Champagne, lord of Holderness and the father of Stephen of Aumale, emerged 
as a prominent figure in the aftermath of 1088 when he escorted William de St Calais to 
his trial, with Alan of Brittany and Roger ofPoitou.97 In the wake of Bishop William's 
exile, some of his estates in Yorkshire were divided between Odo and Alan of Brittany. 
Odo was also named as one of those present at the foundation ofSt Mary's, York, in 
1088, and gave the abbey the manor of Hornsea.98 Odo's main landed interests lay in 
northern England, with the Norman lands of his wife, passing first to his stepdaughter 
from his wife's first marriage, and only then to his son, Stephen of Aumale.99 There is 
no evidence to suggest that Odo held any grievances against Rufus, or had ambitions in 
the north that were not met. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the involvement of 
William ofEu and Odo in the revolt of 1095 was a reaction to the events in Normandy, 
and in particular the tendency for the counties of Eu and Aumale to serve as a staging 
post for Rufus's forces within Normandy. 
A more significant step in understanding Odo's involvement, and the origins of the 
revolt as a whole, is to appreciate his family ties to Rufus through his marriage to 
96 OV, 5, 225. 
97 Symeon, Opera, 1, 176. 
98 Eye, 1, no. 354. 
99 Barbara English, The Lords of Holderness 1086-1260: A Study in Feudal Society (Oxford, 1979), 11. 
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Adelaide, a half-sister of the Conqueror and aunt to Rufus. John of Worcester was 
explicit in stating that the aim of the rebels was to replace Rufus as king with his cousin, 
Stephen of Aumale. loo Stephen's actual involvement appears slight, and if David Crouch 
is right to suggest that Odo may have been instrumental in nominating his son as a 
replacement for Rufus, it may signal that by 1095 Odo was receptive to individuals such 
as Robert de Mowbray who might have suggested to him that the legitimacy of Rufus's 
rule was open to question. IOI Overall, the only obvious link. between Robert de 
Mowbray, William ofEu, Gilbert fitz Richard and the Montgomery family, is that they 
had opposed Rufus in 1088.102 
The chronology of the revolt suggests a gradual unravelling of a long-planned 
conspiracy. Robert de Mowbray's plundering of four Norwegian canards in late 1094 or 
early 1095 was the signal for a wider revolt to begin, rather than the cause of the revolt 
itself.103 After the merchants had complained to Rufus, Robert refused a summons to the 
king's court. I04 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle dates Rufus's summons to after Easter 
1095, though without giving any reason for the summons. The possibility that the 
conspiracy was in trouble before it had begun is suggested by the refusal of Rufus to 
grant Robert a safe conduct or deliver hostages to him. 105 It is possible that Robert's 
strike against the unnamed royal fortresses bordering his earldom represented a planned 
second stage in the revolt. I06 John of Worcester's account points towards a situation 
where the details of the revolt and the plot to replace Rufus as king were known before 
100 John of Worcester, 3, 76. 
101 Crouch, The Normans, 148; Barlow, Rufus, 348. 
102 Barlow, Rufus, 348. 
103 ov, 4, 280; Barlow, Rufus, 347; cr. Green, Aristocracy, 112-3. 
104 ov, 4, 280; Barlow, Rufus, 347, suggests that Robert must have refused to come to court on at least 
three occasions to make him legally contumacious. 
lOS ASC, E, 1095. 
106 GND, 2, 214. 
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Rufus began his march north.107 The conspiracy to commit regicide was revealed to 
Rufus as he approached Northumbria. l08 
The chronology outlined above and the amount of time necessary to formulate the 
conspiracy against Rufus, suggests that the breakdown in relations between Rufus and 
Robert de Mowbray must have started by 1094 at the latest if not earlier. The most 
significant event that might have precipitated such a breakdown was the death of the 
Scots king, Malcolm III, at the hands of Robert's men in November 1093. There can be 
no doubt that the death of Malcolm and his eldest son registered as a major political 
event throughout the Celtic and Anglo-Norman worlds.109 Though Rufus had been 
brusque in his treatment of Malcolm in 1093, news of Malcolm's death was both 
unexpected and unwelcome from Rufus's point of view. 110 The Scots raised Malcolm's 
brother Donald to the throne, while Rufus took the opportunity to attempt to interfere in 
the Scottish succession by supporting the claim of Malcolm's surviving eldest son, 
Duncan. The haste and ill-prepared nature of Duncan's expedition suggest that Rufus 
was completely taken aback by events.111 Duncan's reign was short-lived, being 
powerless to prevent the return of his uncle, and was subsequently killed in 1094 after 
promising not to call upon any further assistance from outside of Scotland. 112 Rufus, for 
his part, was clearly not in a position to have helped Duncan in 1094, as he crossed the 
Channel on 19 March and spent the rest of 1094 in Normandy. 113 
107 John o/Worcester, 3, 76. 
108 OV, 4, 280. 
109 John of Worcester dated Malcolm's death to St Brice's Day, 13 November, while Durham observed 12 
November. A. A. M. Duncan, The Kingship o/the Scots 842-1292 (Edinburgh, 2002), 47. 
II00V, 4, 271; Gaimar, L 'Estoire, lines, 6124-8. 
111ASC, E, 1094. 
III Kapelle, Norman Conquest o/the North, 154; G.W.S Barrow, 'Companions ofthe Atheling', ANS, 2S 
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The Durham Historia Regum Anglorum saw Malcolm's death as divine punishment for 
his attacks upon Northumbria. Sources from the Celtic and Anglo-Norman worlds leave 
little doubt that Malcolm's death was the initiative of Robert de Mowbray alone.114 It is 
unlikely that Robert would have been caught unaware by Malcolm's raid. It was 
politically prudent for him to have ties to the Scottish court, and though the strength of 
these ties is uncertain, Morel is described by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicler as being a 
'gossip' or god-relative to Malcolm.ll5 Later writers were ambivalent about Robert's 
motives in killing Malcolm. Gaimar could not decide 'whether it was right or wrong' .116 
Orderic telescoped the events of 1091 with those of 1093 to suggest that Malcolm was 
killed while returning home under a truce. Continuing with this theme, Orderic 
suggested that when news of Malcolm's 'murder' reached Rufus, he felt a 'deep shame' 
that a Norman should have committed such a deed. 117 
What prompted Robert to kill Malcolm can only be subject to speculation, and it would 
be dangerous to see Malcolm's death as a precursor to the revolt. The continuing claim 
of the Scots kings to Northumbria, fostered enthusiastically by the monks ofSt 
Cuthbert, must have been a source of irritation and destabilisation within Northumbria. 
Malcolm's presence at the foundation of Durham cathedral while on his way to meet 
Rufus in 1093 was a direct challenge to Robert, who is not mentioned in any of the 
sources as being present at the foundation. liS The wider context for the breakdown in 
relations between Rufus and Malcolm may have centred upon Rufus's desire to enforce 
114 Early Sources o/Scottish History, 500-1286, ed. A. O. Anderson, 2 vols, (Edinburgh, 1922),50,51; 
ASC, E, 1093; GND, 2, 212. 
m ASC, E, 1093. 
116 Gaimar, L 'Estoire, lines 6109-10. 
117 OV, 4, 270. 
I1S For a discussion and full set of references, see below, Chapter 8. 
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a stricter interpretation of his lordship over Malcolm."9 Recently, Professor Duncan has 
plausibly suggested that Rufus's refusal to honour the 1091 agreement between himself 
and Malcolm lay at the heart of the dispute, not least because Robert Curthose and 
Edgar lEthe ling may have brokered it. '20 A further factor in relations between the two 
kings may have been a possible marriage alliance between Rufus and Malcolm's 
daughter. 121 
It is possible that Orderic may have been aware of the diplomatic difficulties Rufus's 
actions engendered. His analysis of the events of 1093 drew upon the Second Book of 
Samuel and the slaying of Abner by Joab.122 In the Old Testament account, Joab had 
killed Abner while returning from a meeting with David in which David's lordship over 
a united Israel was at issue. Joab appears to have been kept away from the meeting as 
Abner had killed his younger brother Asahel. On learning of the meeting, Joab overtook 
Abner and killed him. Joab's actions are described as a blood revenge and David is 
careful to avoid any blame for Abner's death, even going so far as to call down a curse 
on Joab's house. As Orderic remarks, the 'crime of a fomer age was repeated in our own 
time' .123 The inference from Orderic's use of the Old Testament would be that 
Malcolm's death was the fault of Robert de Mowbray alone, and may have had its 
origins in some unrecorded dispute. The crucial point that Orderic may have been trying 
to draw upon is that just as David was restrained in acting against Joab because ofthe 
nature of Abner's death as a blood feud, so Rufus may have been restricted in his 
reaction to Malcolm's death. For his part, Robert de Mowbray may have felt that 
119 For a full discussion of all the issues that have relevance and a detailed appraisal of recent literature 
see, D. Broun, 'The Church and the origins of Scottish independence in the twelfth century', Records of 
the Scottish Church History Society. 31,2001 (2003), 10-11, n.25. 
120 Duncan, Kingship of the Scots, 47-9. 
121 Barlow, Rufus, 310-17. 
122 OV, 4, 270; 2 Samuel, 3, 22-7. 
123 OV, 4, 270. 
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Rufus's actions in 1093 had created the atmosphere where any incursion into 
Northumbria by Malcolm could be met with legitimate and lethal force. 
If so, it appears that Robert had seriously misjudged Rufus's mood. Whatever Robert's 
motives, there is no doubt the effect the killing had. In terms of Robert's wider 
reputation there is a palpable sense in the sources, even those less hostile to Robert than 
Orderic, of Robert going beyond the pale. William of Malmesbury was most the 
explicit. Malcolm, according to William, was done to death 'more by fraud than force' , 
a criticism perhaps of Rufus as much as Robert.124 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle 
understandably focused on the reactions of Malcolm's wife, but noted that she felt her 
husband and son had been betrayed.12S Henry of Huntingdon thought that Robert had 
became 'puffed up with pride' at having killed Malcolm and refused to attend Rufus's 
court for this reason.126 Robert may have felt a sense of grievance at the reaction to 
Malcolm's death and particularly at having to come to court to justify his actions before 
Rufus. 127 From Rufus's point of view, and despite the setback to any plans he may have 
had to enforce his over lordship, to renegotiate the agreement of 1091 or even to marry 
Malcolm's daughter, one cannot underestimate how the deliberate act of regicide by one 
of his most powerful magnates would have affected Rufus. The memory of 1088 must 
have been fresh in Rufus's mind and he may well have regarded Robert's actions as lese 
majeste.128 Rather than provide the circumstances in which Robert could seemingly plot 
a rebellion against Rufus without any apparent concern as to the reaction from the 
Scots, the killing of Malcolm III and Robert's treatment by Rufus marks the point at 
124 GR, 1, 554. 
12SASC, E, 1093. 
126 HA, 420. 'Cum autem Robertus consul Nordhymbre in superbiam elatus, quia regem Seotorum 
strauerat, curiam Regis adire repudiaret ... '. 
127 Gaimar, L 'Estoire, lines, 6127-8. 
128 The point was first made by Frank Barlow see, Rufus, 317. 
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which relations between the two men began to deteriorate and Robert started to question 
Rufus's legitimacy once more.129 
Some of the sources certainly reflect these concerns. Gaimar is the most obvious. 
Though writing in the late 1130s, it seems likely that the audience he wrote for would 
have well understood what had been at issue in the 1090s and its bearing on 
contemporary political concerns.130 Gaimar drew a comparison between the events of 
1095 and those of 1075, and in particular, drew parallels between the aims of the 
conspirators in 1095 and those in 1075, remarking that they were guilty of the treason 
'for which Waltheofwas put to death'.l3l Significantly, Gaimar places this scene after a 
discourse on the ideal relations between a king and his aristocracy. In Gaimar's 
reconstruction of Rufus's court, Hugh d' Avranches had taken exception to being asked 
to serve as a 'noble porter' to the king. 132 Through an exercise of good humour and 
generosity, an ugly scene was avoided and Hugh willingly volunteered to serve the king 
and was rewarded with high authority in Wales. The points that Gaimar appears to have 
been making were the folly of challenging the king and the duty incumbent upon the 
senior aristocracy to support a king, who in tum labours under the great weight of 
mantle, sceptre and crown. In Gaimar's text, the actions and generosity of Rufus was 
what was expected and would be talked about forever, while those who challenged the 
authority and legitimacy of a king were described as being of 'Nero's lineage', 'rising 
today and falling tomorrow' . 
129 cr. KapeUe, Norman Conquest of the North, 154. 
130 Gillingham, 'Kingship, Chivalry and Love', The English in the Twelfth Century, 233-58. 
131 Gaimar. L 'Estoire.lines, 6138. 
132 Gaimar, L 'Estoire, lines, 6011-46. 
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It must also be remembered that the period between 1093 and 1095 saw Rufus in a great 
deal of trouble with the wider cross-Channel aristocracy. In particular, the guarantors of 
the Treaty of Rouen had found Rufus guilty of breaking its terms, accusations that 
Rufus angrily rejected. \33 Retreating to Eu, Rufus began to recruit mercenaries and once 
more resorted to violence in Normandy. The importance and impact of Rufus's actions 
cannot be under-estimated. The framework of separate legal and political co-existence 
envisaged within the treaty was threatened by Rufus's contravention of its terms and 
ultimate rejection.134 In his diplomatic conduct with his elder brother and fellow king, 
Rufus may have inadvertently revived questions about his own suitability to the throne. 
Added to this mix was the trouble Rufus found himself in with his new archbishop. The 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded that the conspiracy against Rufus in 1095 included 
many clerics, though this might be more a reflection of royal prejudices than fact. 13S 
Though no evidence connects the conspiracy against Rufus with the dispute with 
Anselm, it may have added further doubts to those who questioned Rufus's suitability 
for the throne. Rufus's treatment of Anselm at a difficult period for his regime certainly 
contrasted with Henry's efforts in 1100 to soothe any ruffled archiepiscopal feathers 
over his quick coronation.136 
Even William of Malmesbury, whose account of 1095 centred upon the execution of 
William d' Audrieu, and has a chronology for the revolt that is different to other sources, 
hints at the underlying causes of the revolt. William suggested that the quarrel between 
Rufus and Robert began after 'high words had passed' between them, stating that 
Robert then left the king's court in order to prepare for rebellion. Rufus then chased 
133 John a/Worcester, 3, 68-70; Barlow, Rufus, 331.332. 
134 For a more detailed discussion of the treaty, see below Chapter 7. 
m ASC, E, 1095. 
136 Hollister, Henry I, 117-26. 
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after Robert and placed him in captivity. At this point William ofEu was accused of 
treason.137 As every source other than William suggests that Robert would not come to 
court, it is tempting to think that the 'high words' that passed between Robert and Rufus 
may have connected to the Rufus's difficulties before 1095, with Robert criticising 
Rufus's conduct and his kingship. 
Despite his prejudicial views, it appears that even Orderic had to acknowledge the wider 
issues and could not wholly reduce the revolt to the actions and ambitions of one 
individual. Towards the end of his account, Orderic noted the widespread nature of the 
conspiracy and that Rufus had to be somewhat restrained in dealing with those who may 
have been on the margins of the conspiracy rather than at the centre for 'fear of goading 
them into another unlawful insurrection against the state' .138 Orderic's use of res publica 
in the context of the revolt of 1095 appears to be deliberate and, as such, places it finnly 
within the wider discourse of succession and political legitimacy that had been part of 
the politics of the eleventh century. Robert Curthose may not have been involved in the 
rebellion of 1095, but the rebellion certainly had its origins in many of the issues that 
had been highlighted in 1088. Only this framework adequately explains why a man such 
as Robert de Mowbray, who had enjoyed a career of quite remarkable achievements, 
and who had no easily identifiable grievance against Rufus, should have been prepared 
to risk his life and liberty in fonnulating a conspiracy that could attract widespread 
support and have regicide at its centre. 
\37 GR, 1,564. 
138 ov, ~, ~8~. 'Porro haec sublililer rex comperiit, et consultu sapientum huiusmodi uiris pepereit, nee 
eos ad IU~/elum palam prouocauit, ne furor in peius augmentaretur, iterumque in generate facinus contra 
rem publleam lacesserentur .... '. 
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Chapter 5 
Robert de Belleme and the Crisis of 1100-1102 
In Orderic's search for examples of the dangers posed to the wider polity by unchecked 
aristocratic ambition, Robert de Belleme offered an even better example than Robert de 
Mowbray. Orderic's choice of language to describe Robert paralleled directly that used 
to describe Robert de Mowbray. Where de Mowbray was described as being puffed up 
with empty vanity and anxious to extend his territories, so Robert de Belleme was 
swollen with overwhelming pride, challenging his peers, guilty of criminal and cruel 
deeds and not allowing any man to be his equal.1 
If laymen in the twelfth century found Orderic's views on the aristocracy 
unsympathetic, modem historians, with few notable exceptions, have readily followed 
Orderic's footsteps when discussing Robert de Belleme.2 Discussions of his career and 
the Montgomery family have made it among the best known of Anglo-Norman 
aristocratic families, accurately reflecting their power, wealth and status.3 Within this 
historiography, their involvement in the crisis of 1101 and the conflict with Henry the 
following year is seen as the defining point in their fortunes. 4 Over forty years ago, J. F. 
1 OV, 5, 224-8, 232-4. 
1 On the reception of Orderic's views in the twelfth century, see the comments of John Gillingham, 
'Gaimar, the Prose 'Brut' and the Making of English History', The English in the Twelfth Century, 113-
122. 
3 The major commentaries on the Montgomerys and the lordship of Belleme can be found in: G. H. 
White, 'The First House of Belleme' , TRHS, 4th Ser., 22 (1940), 67-90; J. Boussard, 'La seigneurie de 
Belleme aux Xe et XIe siecles', Melanges ... Louis Halphen (Paris, 1951),43-54; Mason, 'Roger de 
Montgomery and his sons', 1-28; K. Thompson, 'Family and Influence to the South of Normandy in the 
Eleventh Century: The Lordship of Belleme', JMH, 9 (1985), 215-26; G. Louise, La Seigneurie de 
Bel/eme, Xe -Xlle Siecles, 2 vols (Le Pays Bas-Normand, 1990). For Robert in particular see, K. 
Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', ANS, 13 (1990),263-86; idem, 'Robert de Belleme', 
DNB, 5, 3-6; C. W. Hollister, 'The Campaign of 1102 against Robert of Belleme', Studies in Medieval 
History Presented to R Allen Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, C. J. Holdsworth and J. L. Nelson (Woodbridge, 
1989), 193-202; M. Chibnall, 'Robert of Belleme and the Castle of Tickhill' , Droit Prive et Institutions 
Regionales. Etudes historiques ofJertes a Jean Yver (Paris, 1976), 151-6. 
4 The main narrative for the events of 1100 can be found in Freeman, William Rufus, 2, 392-415; David, 
Robert Curthose, 137; Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', MMI, 76-96; Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman Civil 
War Reconsidered', 159-175. 
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A. Mason chose to end his account of the family with the conflict of 1102, commenting 
that by that point 'the Montgomeries had reached the topmost level of the west-
European aristocracy; they could only maintain themselves ... by risking complete 
destruction in an attempt to procure a king who would maintain the flow of patronage as 
Robert was already doing in Normandy'.s 
The emphasis on the need to secure the flow of patronage has been influential in 
shaping views of Robert de Belleme. C. Warren Hollister went from regarding Robert 
as 'one of the best known and least liked of Anglo-Norman magnates', to seeing the 
whole family as constituting a 'dangerously potent and refractory force in Anglo-
Norman and French politics'.6 Kathleen Thompson has done much to redress the 
prejudicial views held of Robert.7 In particular, extensive and exhaustive use of much 
unpublished material allowed a greater degree of sensitivity in her analysis, yet her 
discussion of Robert's political career remains firmly located within a traditional 
framework, and in particular, the need to preserve a cross-Channel complex of estates 
that apparently explained Robert de Belleme's 'apparently lawless' behaviour! For 
Thompson, though an able administrator and professional in his approach to soldiering, 
Robert's eventual downfall was almost entirely due to a lack of foresight and political 
astuteness in negotiating the problems he faced because of the conflicting ambitions and 
rivalries of the Conqueror's sons.9 
Robert's supposed lack of political foresight is somewhat surprising, given his status as 
one of the leading members of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy. He was, following the 
S Mason, 'Roger de Montgomery', 26-7. 
6 Hollister, 'The Campaign of 1102',193; Henry 1,156. 
7 Thompson, 'Orderic Vitalis and Robert de Belleme', 133-41. 
8 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 263. Cf. Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 192-3: 'The 
succession of Robert de Belleme to the English lands of his younger brother Hugh in 1098 meant, among 
other things, that the inheritance of his father, Roger de Montgomery, had been reunited after the partition 
of four years earlier.' 
9 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 286; 'Robert de Belleme', 6. 
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death of Ear! Hugh of Chester in July 1101, its most senior member in terms of 
experience, although perhaps somewhat eclipsed by William of Mortain in terms of 
social status. By this point, Robert had amassed a significant cross-Channel complex of 
estates, and had emulated his father's place in the Anglo-Norman polity. More 
significantly, both Orderic and Wace assigned him a prominence in their narratives for 
1101 that reflected his status; Wace identified Robert as one of the baronial negotiators 
at Alton, along with William ofMortain and Robert fitz Hamon. lo Tellingly, there 
appeared to have been no doubt in Henry's mind as to his most dangerous opponent. 
From the early summer of 1101 onwards, Henry put in motion the process of compiling 
the charges used against Robert in the following year.l1 
The traditional emphasis on Robert's support for Curthose in 1101 being based solely 
upon a flawed assessment of the relative merits of Henry and Curthose as sources of 
future patronage ignores, or more accurately misinterprets, the evidence that points to a 
long-standing and profound relationship between Robert de Belleme and Robert 
Curthose; a relationship which appears to have deeply influenced Robert's conduct. 12 
Events at both the start and end of Robert's career signalled a deep attachment to Robert 
Curthose, whether in joining Curthose in rebellion against his father or resisting 
Henry's attempts to gain custody of his nephew and Curthose's son, William Clito.13 
Understanding the nature of this relationship remains one of the crucial keys to 
understanding Robert's actions between 1100 and 1102 and his career as a whole. 
On one level, the actions of Robert and his family, as with Robert de Mowbray in 1095, 
actually suggest a cavalier disregard for the preservation of their cross-Channel estates. 
10 OV, S, 314; Wace, lines 10397-40. Both Symeon of Durham and John of Worcester locate Robert's 
rebuilding of Bridgnorth castle within the context of the events of 1101. Symeon, Opera, 2, 234; John of 
Worcester, 3, 100. 
11 OV, 6, 20. 
12 Cf. Mason, 'Roger de Montgomery', 27; Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 286. 
13 OV, 6, 178-82; Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 278. 
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The activities of Robert and his fellow magnates during this period provided 
ammunition for their enemies and rivals within the wider polity and the grounds for 
Orderic to justify, in John Gillingham's judgement, Henry's 'often dishonourable 
actions' after 1101.14 The apparent inconsistencies in Robert's conduct led Kathleen 
Thompson to suggest that there were four distinct phases to Robert's career; stability 
under the Conqueror, disorder under Robert Curthose until 1096, comparative stability 
under William Rufus between 1096 and 1100 and finally the years after 11 00.1S Dealing 
with many of the same issues, Judith Green has remarked that Robert de Belleme was 
both a natural ally to Curthose and dangerously powerful. I6 
The qualification to this statement may be that he was a natural ally when the question 
of the English succession was discussed, yet dangerously powerful when looking after 
his family's interests in Normandy. The two need not be mutually exclusive. The most 
recent analysis of Robert's career noted that he always attempted to maintain a loyalty 
to Curthose.17 The crucial question of what 'loyalty' precisely meant within the wider 
context of the disputed English succession or the narrower context of regional, northern 
French politics has not received any significant exploration. There is a tension within 
the existing historiography between Robert's consistent support for Curthose's claim to 
the English throne and his actions within Normandy and the surrounding regions; the 
latter often perceived as detrimental to the interests of Robert Curthose. 
In simple terms, the current discussions of Robert's conduct and career ignore the 
evidence that suggests Robert's actions between 1100 and 1102 were part of the 
unfolding discourse on succession and legitimacy and took a specific form in the shape 
of discussions centred upon the legitimacy of Henry's kingship after 1100. Rather than 
14 J. Gillingham, 'The Introduction of Chivalry into England', English in the Twelfth Century, 212-3. 
15 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 266. 
16 Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', ANS, 22 (2000), 109. 
17 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 266. 
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a lack of political judgement, Robert's conduct, indeed his whole career, suggests a high 
degree of political awareness, which led him to support Robert Curthose's challenge for 
the English throne, and inevitably brought him into conflict with Henry. 
Chapter Seven lays out in greater depth the argument to suggest that rather than a lack 
of political astuteness, Robert, together with his fellow negotiators at Alton, displayed a 
great deal of political acumen as architects of the peace settlement of 1101. The role 
assigned to Robert in the negotiations of 1101 points to a deep appreciation on his part 
not only of the political and legal problems presented by Henry's accession, but also the 
sheer scale of disturbance in the political process that his actions had engendered. In 
response, Robert and his colleagues acted within the mainstream of contemporary 
political thought. They sought to resuscitate the Treaty of Rouen as the means to restore 
and evolve further a framework of political separation for England and Normandy that 
would finally settle the issue of the English succession, and remove the conflicting 
claims exercised by the Conqueror's sons on the loyalties of a trans-regional 
aristocracy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to place Robert's actions between 1100 and 1102 in 
context. The abilities displayed by Robert in the events of 1101 presented a major 
obstacle to Henry's ambitions to reconstitute his father's cross-Channel dominions, 
hinted at as early as March 1101 in the terms of the treaty negotiated with count Robert 
of Flanders. IS Preference for Curthose as a single cross-Channel ruler in 1088 did not 
prevent Robert constructing and exploiting a good working relationship with William 
Rufus, the fruits of which were seen in Robert's succession to his father's earldom ten 
years later. The failure to achieve a similar modus operandi with Henry is notable. In 
18 For the terms of the treaty, E.M.C. van Houts, 'The Anglo-Flemish Treaty of 1101', ANS, 21 (1999), 
169-74. Henry's attitude towards Normandy also created significant problems for William ofMortain, 
and will be explored in the following chapter. 
150 
short, Henry's campaign against Robert de Belleme in 1102 was a rejection ofthe 
political framework that emphasised co-existence. Robert de Belleme's isolation in 
1102 owed less to a lack of political astuteness, or an alleged reputation for sadism and 
brutality, than to the reluctance of the cross-Channel aristocracy as a whole to uphold 
the Treaty of Winchester and come into conflict with Henry in the process. 19 
The identification by Orderic and Wace of Robert de Belleme as one of the leading 
baronial negotiators in 1101 is of great significance. Irrespective of the intellectual 
abilities of the negotiators, which the evidence, explored in Chapter Seven, suggests 
was formidable, in practical terms only men of sufficient stature and standing could 
have had the prestige and power necessary to negotiate with both Henry and Curthose, 
and impose a settlement upon them. By the time of Rufus's death, Robert de Belleme 
had clearly reached such a position.20 In addition to his inheritance ofthe Montgomery-
Belleme lands straddling the southern Norman March, in 1098 Robert had paid a relief 
of £3,000 to Rufus for his father's English earldom. His marriage to Agnes, daughter 
and heir of Guy, count of Ponthieu brought Robert further lands on the northeastern 
frontier ofNormandy.21 In practical terms, the effect of the accumulation ofthese lands 
was to give Robert a political profile beyond the borders of England and Normandy, 
expressed in part through the patronage of abbeys as geographically diverse as 
Shrewsbury, Saint-Martin de Sees, Saint-Vincent du Mans and La Sauve Majeure.22 A 
further aspect of this political profile is that Robert, his father Roger, and his brother 
Roger all made marriage alliances beyond the borders of Normandy, while Arnulf de 
Montgomery attempted to go one step further by marrying the daughter of the Irish king 
19 Cf. Hollister, Henry I, 156-7. 
20 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 276. 
21 Though the date of Robert's marriage to Agnes is unclear, by 1100 Robert had succeeded his father-in-
law as count ofPonthieu. Recueil des actes des corntes de Ponthieu, ed. C. BruneI (paris, 1930), nos 7, 
II, 12. 
22 Shrewsbury Cartulary, no. 35, Grand Cartulaire de La Sauve Majeure, no. 1354; Livre Blanc, fos.79, 
93v; Cartulaire de L 'Abbaye de Saint-Vincent du Mans, ed. R. Charles and Ie vicomte Menjot d'Elbenne 
(Le Mans, 1913), no. 630. 
151 
Murchertach.23 Significantly, following his expUlsion from England, Robert's activities 
within northern France focused upon Maine as much as Normandy.24 Robert's stature 
was significant enough for both the pope and Louis VI to comment upon his arrest by 
Henry, and for the incident to have possibly influenced Suger's construction of the 
deathbed scene of Louis VI. 25 
Robert's stature as a magnate of cross-Channel importance, and his interests beyond the 
Anglo-Norman world, is a reminder to view the events taking place in England in the 
year between Rufus's death and the Treaty of Winchester, and the individuals most 
intimately involved, within a wider European context. The wider issues ofthe potential 
deposition of a consecrated king, the nature of political legitimacy and the transmission 
of the throne were ones that had a resonance throughout much of Western Europe, and 
would continue to do so for much of the twelfth century.26 Both Robert Curthose and 
Henry were aware of the need to act in a way that would hold meaning for a wider 
audience. Robert complained to Pope Paschal II that his brother had seized the throne 
by force, while in turn, Henry looked beyond Normandy for practical support and 
negotiated a treaty with Robert II, count of Flanders, in March 1101, in the presence of 
his chief advisers, including Robert, count of Meulan.27 Robert of Meulan may even 
have been active in the French court on behalf of Henry after his coronation?8 It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that the two most significant advisers and negotiators during the 
23 OV, 6, 30. Arnulfwas also listed as a friend of Archbishop Anselm, along with many other members of 
the aristocratic elite, R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge, 1990), 188; 
Vaughn, Anselm, 63-6, 75, 123-5,333. 
24 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 277 
25 OV, 6, 256; For the council of Reims, see below, Introduction. Suger, Vie de Louis VI Ie Gros, 124, 
274; Gillingham, 'Introduction of Chivalry', The English in the Twelflh Century, 212-13. 
26 J. Martindale, 'Succession and Politics in the Romance-speaking World, c.l 000-1140', Status, 
Authority and Regional Power. Aquitaine and France, 9'h to 12th Centuries, (Aldershot, 1997), 19-21. 
27 Anselm; Opera, 4, 110-11; van Houts, 'The Anglo-Flemish Treaty of 1101', 169-74; RRAN, 2, 531. 
28 S.Vaughn, Anselm of Bec and Robert of Meulan. The Innocence of the Dove and the Wisdom of the 
Serpent (London, 1987),225-6. 
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crisis of 1101, Robert de Belleme and Robert of Meulan, were important figures beyond 
the confines of the Anglo-Norman world.29 
Robert's support for Curthose in 1101 was part of an established pattern of behaviour. 
Before 1087, Robert had close ties to Curthose and his participation in Curthose's 
rebellion against his father was a carefully crafted expression of political dissent and 
represented the Montgomery family view on the preferred choice of successor for the 
English throne after the Conqueror's death. As with Robert de Mowbray, Robert's 
participation in Curthose's rebellion did not result in his exclusion from the ruling 
political elite.30 This context explains why Orderic chose to include Robert in his great 
rhetorical scene to explain aristocratic motives in the rebellion against Rufus in 1088, 
along with Robert of Mortain and Odo of Bayeux.31 
Very little has been made of why Robert should have been involved in the rebellion 
against Rufus in 1088, other than beyond the obvious attractions ofking-making.32 Why 
Orderic would have included Robert de Belleme in the same dialogue as the most senior 
members of the ducal kin is something of a puzzle, unless a strong relationship between 
Curthose and Robert de Belleme already existed and his views, together with those of 
his family, on the future of the English succession were not already well known. 
Orderic's discussion on aristocratic motives chose to concentrate on the legal and 
political implications of division, and more broadly, the grounds for the selection of an 
English king. The emphasis placed by Orderic was on the legal and political ties that 
existed between Curthose and the aristocracy, though expressed in the language of 
twelfth century aristocratic inheritance customs. The crucial point, considering 
29 For Robert of Meulan see, OV, 5,298,310,314-16. It is noticeable that Orderic's descriptions of 
Robert usually contain references not only to his loyalty, but also to his sagacity. 
30 Bates, Regesta, nos. 29, 46, 49,53,54,64,175,207,248,280,283,281,282; CDF, no. 658. 
31 OV, 4, 122. 
32 Thompson, 'Robert de BeUeme Reconsidered', 269. 
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Orderic's views on the nature of the aristocratic ambition, is that Robert de Belleme, 
Odo of Bayeux and Robert of Mortain are presented as discussing their motives for 
rebellion in terms that go beyond those of a diminution in wealth and power that a split 
in the Anglo-Norman polity would entail.33 
William of Malmesbury is even more explicit. Using a similar rhetorical method to 
Orderic, he constructed a dialogue set during the revolt of 1088 between Rufus and 
Robert's father, Roger de Montgomery, where Rufus complained that it was a puzzle to 
him why the aristocracy were so ungovernable, adding that if money and lands were 
what they sought, then they should take them. In Malmesbury's dialogue, Rufus only 
persuaded Roger de Montgomery to desert Curthose when he changed tack and turned 
the argument towards the mechanism by which he was chosen as king and Roger 
elevated to power; namely the judgement of the Conqueror. 34 Robert's participation in 
the revolt of 1088 was, therefore, perfectly consistent with the tenor of his relationship 
with Curthose before that point. His own view, together with that of his family and 
many other Anglo-Norman magnates on the English succession, found expression in 
Orderic's and William of Malmesbury's rhetoric. 
Robert's actions in Normandy during 1087 provide a prime example of the way in 
which local and regional concerns interacted with wider cross-Channel ones. Robert 
heard of the Conqueror's death while at Brionne, upon which he promptly turned his 
horse around and galloped to Alen90n, where he immediately expelled the ducal 
garrison.3s The traditional interpretation of this episode is to see it as a reassertion of 
33 For full references, see below, Chapter 2. 
34 GR, 1,546. 'Non se intelligere quid ita efJrenes sint; si uelint pecunias, accipiuant pro libito; si 
augmentum patrimoniorum, eodem modo prorsus quae uelint habeant. Tantum uideant ne iuditium 
genitoris periclitetur, quod si de se putauerin! aspernandum, de se ipsis caueant exemplum; idem enim se 
regem qui illos duces leeerit'. 
35 0 V, 4, 114-16. Even the very circumstances of Robert de Belleme's actions in 1087 are significant. 
There is no discussion in the secondary literature of the possible reasons for Robert wishing to see the 
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local power and a move away from support and co-operation with Curthose.36 It is 
important to stress, however, that Robert was not alone in his actions, nor in the wider 
context of regime change, were his actions and concern to regain control of familial 
property in any way unusual.37 William de Breteuil, Ralph de Tosny and William of 
Evreux all similarly expelled ducal garrisons in 1087.38 Perhaps as a response, it is 
noticeable that two of the clauses of the inquest into ducal rights in 1091, not only 
forbade the building of castles and strongholds without permission, but also reasserted 
the ducal right to garrison non-ducal castles and take hostages as a guarantee of good 
conduct.39 William of Evreux continued to make claims for the restitution of family 
property, in one case, refusing to give his consent for the marriage of his niece to Count 
Fulk of Anjou, unless there was a restoration of disputed property to him and his 
nephew, William de Breteui1.40 
The crucial point is that Curthose had enjoyed good relationships with all of these men 
and generally continued to do so. William of Evreux, William de Breteuil and Ralph de 
Tosny commanded the ducal forces on expedition into Maine in 1088, attracting 
commendations from Orderic for their martial qualities.41 Perhaps even more 
significantly, William de Breteuil was the first magnate to oppose Henry in 1100, 
forcefully arguing that he ought to observe the oath he had taken to Curthose and wait 
Conqueror on 'important matters' as Orderic termed them. Whether the initiative for Robert seeking an 
interview came from the Conqueror or Robert is impossible to determine, as is the nature of these 
important matters. As a close supporter of Curt hose since the 1070s, and given that Robert's father, Roger 
de Montgomery, was a tutor to Rufus and clearly part of some transitional political structure, Robert's 
urgency in trying to reach the Conqueror was highly likely to have been connected to the issue of 
succession. For Roger de Montgomery's role as tutor to Rufus see, Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War 
Reconsidered', 173, n.96. 
36 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 269. 
37 For the strategic importance of Alenc;on and the history of Belleme control, see Thompson, 'Family 
Influence', 215-26. On the Conqueror's policy in general, J. Yver, 'Les chateaux-forts en Normandie 
jusqu' au milieu du XIIe siecle. Contribution a l'etude du pouvoir ducal', BSAN, 53 (1957),42-63; Bates, 
Normandy Before 1066, 165-6. 
38 ov, 3, 112-4. 
39 Haskins, NI, 283, nos. 3, 4. 
40 ov, 4, 184, n. 2. 
41 ov, 4, 154. 
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for his return before the issue of the succession was discussed.42 Only the threat of 
physical violence against William allowed Henry access to the treasury. 
In the interplay of local and cross-Channel interests many of the difficulties in the 
relationship between Curthose and Robert in the immediate aftermath of 1088 stemmed 
from the need for the Montgomery family as a whole to renegotiate their relationship 
with Rufus. In doing so, they thus exposed their position to rivals within the Norman 
polity. In the aftermath of the failure of the revolt of 1088, Robert left England only 
after the intercession of powerful 'friends' who engineered a rapprochement with 
Rufus.43 The unsettled nature of Norman politics allowed 'mischief makers' , and in 
particular, Bishop Odo of Bayeux, to suggest that the reconciliation negotiated between 
Robert and Rufus had included provisions for a confederation between Henry and 
Robert aimed at Curthose.44 The subsequent events are well known; the arrest of Henry 
and Robert, Curthose's campaign into Maine, the siege of the Montgomery-Belleme 
castle at Saint-Ceneri, the restoration of the castle to Robert Giroie and the 
reconciliation arranged by Roger de Montgomery.45 Orderic thought that Curthose 
should have gone further and banished Earl Roger and his 'seed' from Normandy.46 Yet, 
almost immediately on his release, Robert resumed his position as one of Curt hose's 
chief counsellors, whose views on the proposed marriage between Count Fulk and the 
niece of William of Evreux evidently carried some weight.47 
The granting of Saint-Ceneri to Robert Giroie suggests that ducal trust in Robert may 
have waned, though Robert's overall relationship with Curthose and the importance to 
42 OV. 5. 290. 
41 OV. 4. 148. 'Deinde peractis pro quibus ierat ;n autumno reg; ualefec;t et cum Roberto Belemensi qui 
iam per amicos potentes cum rege pacificatus erat in Normanniam remeare disposuit.· 
« OV. 4, 148. 
4S OV, 4, 156-60; Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 270; Green, 'Robert Curthose 
Reassessed', 108-9. 
46 OV, 4, 152. 
47 OV, 4, 186. 
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both men of Norman influence in Maine provided a strong motivation to make their 
relationship work. In 1090, Robert was conspicuous among the ducal supporters in 
suppressing the rebellion against Curthose at Rouen.48 In return, Curthose gave Robert 
his support against local neighbours and rivals for control of the Hiemois, and in 
particular, the Grandmesnils and Courcy families, who in turn vigorously protested their 
loyalty to Curthose.49 Perhaps as a result, Curthose's support was ultimately more 
symbolic and he refused to press the siege of Courcy too closely.50 The danger for all 
sides was the exploitation of local rivalries by Rufus, which appears to have been the 
case with Richard de Courcy, whom Orderic listed as a supporter of Rufus.51 
Robert's inheritance of his father's English earldom in 1098 can also be located in this 
interplay between the local and trans-regional concerns. His actions in pursuing his 
father and younger brother's English estates appear opportunistic.52 The customs of 
aristocratic inheritance gave Rufus and Robert scope in negotiating for the earldom of 
Shrewsbury. From Rufus's point of view, allowing Robert to succeed to his brother's 
earldom was an effective exploitation of Robert's ambitions on order to help secure his 
own French interests. As the heir to the county ofPonthieu, Robert could probably be 
counted On to provide a secure communications route to the continent, especially in the 
event of Robert Curthose re-establishing control in Normandy on his return from the 
crusade and relations between the two brothers deteriorating once more. A friendly 
Count ofPonthieu would also secure Rufus's domination of northeast Normandy 
around Aumale and Eu, and would allow him to exercise pressure on the next layer of 
Anglo-Norman magnates in northeast Normandy, especially the Warennes. 
48 OV, 4,226. 
49 OV, 4,230-6. 
50 OV, 4,232. 
51 OV, 5, 26. 
52 For a discussion of the sources that support this interpretation see above, Chapter 1. 
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From Robert's point of view, closer ties to Rufus centred upon the determination to 
restore Norman power in Maine. Robert had first commanded Rufus's knights in his 
Vexin campaign of 1097-8 where, according to Orderic, he surpassed all others in his 
devotion and duty.53 The construction ofa castle at Danguel by Helias, which covered 
the Sarthe valley and directly blocked the route south from Belleme, posed a threat to 
Robert's interests. The extent to which both men worked in close harmony is obvious. 
Once the war in Maine had been concluded, Rufus paid for the fortifications of his 
castles and he appointed Robert castellan of BaIlon and provided three hundred 
knights.54 This is also reflected in Orderic's hostile prose, and in particular, his 
suggestion that Rufus was easily deceived by Robert, whom Orderic believed had a 
clear expansionist policy within Maine.55 
The crucial point to emerge from this evidence is that Robert's elevation to cross-
Channel 'super magnate' status did not alter his priorities. Both Robert and Rufus saw 
the consolidation of Norman power in Maine as the priority; each was locked into a 
symbiotic relationship with the other, where the fortunes of one were linked to the 
fortunes of the other. On resumption of hostilities with Helias in July 1099, Robert was 
besieged at BaIlon and immediately sought assistance from Rufus, who did not hesitate 
in supporting Robert.56 By contrast, though Orderic suggested that Robert was 
particularly brutal in his treatment of the Welsh, the Brut y Tywysogyon reveals that 
Robert had no impact in comparison to his father and brother, and suggests that 
expansion into Wales from his English lands were of secondary concern, in comparison 
to securing his interests in northern France." 
53 OV, 5,214. 
54 OV, 4, 232, 234. 
55 OV, 5,232; Barlow, Rufus, 382. 
56 OV, 5, 254-6. 
57 Brut y 7}'lrysogyon or the Chronicle of the Princes, Peniarth, MS 20 Version, trans. T. Jones (Cardiff, 
1952),22. 
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Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that in 1101 Robert's primary motive in 
supporting Curthose was to preserve and protect his newly acquired English lands, or 
that these acquisitions brought him into conflict with Henry.s8 His successful acquisition 
of the earldom of Shrewsbury represented the cross-Channel fruits of a successful 
regional relationship, but his interests in northern France remained his overwhelming 
priority. It is notable that during the period immediately before Curthose landed in 
England in 1101, Robert's activities centred upon Normandy as he received the 
bishopric of Sees, Argentan and the forest of Gouffern from Curthose, areas crucial to 
Robert's long term aim of acquiring control of the vicomte ofthe Hiemois, Argentan 
and Exmes.s9 The accession of Henry in August 1100 may have left Robert with the 
uncomfortable option of having to deal with a man with whom he may have clashed at 
an earlier point and who had been in possession of Domfront, a former Belleme family 
holding, since 1092.60 Yet no record of any dispute between the two men exists before 
July 1101 and Robert gave Henry homage and received his English estates from him, 
probably at a council summoned to London shortly after Henry's coronation.61 
The grounds for Robert's opposition to Henry in 1101 centred upon a long-held belief 
in the claim of Robert Curthose to the English throne and Robert's exclusion from the 
whole process of selecting a king. In simple terms, the evidence suggests that when 
Robert became aware of Curt hose's intention to challenge for the throne he supported 
his claim because he believed that it was right. The circumstances of Henry's 
succession contravened the framework laid out in Pseudo-Isidore, and for the second 
time in thirteen years the rights and prerogatives ofthe senior aristocracy to be involved 
in the decision-making process had been contravened. However, once it became clear 
S8 Cf. Thompson, 'Robert de Belh!me Reconsidered', 276. 
59 OV, 5, 308; Louise, La Seigneurie, 2, 392. 
60 OV, 4, 256-8. 
61 OV, 5, 298; Hugh the Chanter, The History o/the Church o/York 1066-1127, ed. and trans. C. 
Johnstone, revised by M. Brett, C. N. L. Brooke and M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 1990), 10. 
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that an overwhelming momentum in favour of a Curthose kingship had failed to 
develop, Robert and his fellow negotiators aimed for a negotiated settlement. The only 
discernible difference that Robert's expanded interests may have made to his attitude in 
1101 lay in the contemplation of the complete political separation of England and 
Normandy, building on the framework laid out in 1091 with the Treaty of Rouen, and 
the need for co-existence as a permanent solution to the problem of divided lordship.62 
Robert's expulsion from England in 1102 was Henry's rejection of the idea of co-
existence.63 In doing so, Henry rejected a political solution that had apparently found 
acceptance in the world at large.64 Robert de Belleme witnessed a charter of Henry's at 
Windsor on 3 September but left England before Robert Curthose, and was in 
Normandy by 5 November.6s Nor was Robert alone in feeling it safe to leave England. 
When Curthose left England, William de Warenne also accompanied him, witnessing a 
charter of Robert Curthose at Caen in 1102.66 Other Curthose supporters also appear to 
have shared the same sense of security, most notably Rannulf Flambard, who began to 
administer the diocese of Lisieux from January 1102.67 
Once Robert de Belleme and Robert Curthose were out of England, Henry moved 
swiftly. Charges against Robert Malet, Iva of Grandmesnil and Robert de Lacy were 
pressed.68 William de Warenne approached Curthose in 'great distress' over his 
forfeiture in early 1102.69 It seems as though Robert returned to England shortly before 
62 This, of course, goes against the heart ofLe Patourel's thesis. See, Norman Empire, 195. 'All men who 
at any time had interests in England and Normandy would be concerned for the political union of the two 
countries. ' 
63 For the narrative of Henry's campaign see, C.W. Hollister, Henry I, 156-63. 
64 See above, Chapter 1, for a discussion of the importance of double confirmations. 
65 RRAN, 2, no.544, 548; Recueil des actes des comtes de Ponlhieu, no.l5 
66 OV, 6, 320; RRAN, 2. nos 544, 548, 621. 
67 Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', 95; OV, 5, 322. 
68 OV, 6,12. 
690V,6,12. 
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Easter and Henry made his move against him. 70 The author of the Brut thought that one 
of the charges laid against Robert was his rebuilding of Bridgnorth without royal 
permission, and that his brother, Arnulf, was also summoned to answer charges.71 
Though Henry had been assiduous in building a case against Robert and his brothers, 
his actions initially drew opposition from among the political elite who, according to 
Orderic, feared that they 'would be trampled on like slave girls' if Henry were to 
succeed in disinheriting Robert.72 
Henry also appealed to Robert Curthose to move against Robert, under the terms of the 
Treaty ofWinchester.73 Curthose began to besiege Vignats, yet as in England, his 
actions were unacceptable to many in his entourage, who created a diversion that forced 
the ducal army to retreat and allowed Robert's men to defend the fortresses of Chateau-
Gontier, Fourches and Argentan.74 Curthose may also have attempted to confiscate 
Robert's lands.7s Once Henry had subdued Robert and his brothers he expelled them 
from England. Though Orderic indulged himself with his rhetoric, suggesting that 
Henry could now begin to rule freely after driving Robert out of England, William of 
Malmesbury thought that enough room had been left for manoeuvre between Henry and 
Robert.76 The implication is that Henry rejected the notion. 
As far the issue of Henry's kingship was concerned, Robert's expulsion in 1102 brought 
to an end the crisis in political relationships created by Rufus's death, though quite 
clearly Henry's ambitions with regard to Normandy still had to be played out. Any 
70 ASC, E, 1102 
71 Brut, 22-3. 
72 OV, 6, 26. 'S; rex magnificum com item uiolenter subegerit. nimiaque pertinacia ut conatur eum 
exhaereditauerit omnes nos ut imbelles ancil/as amodo conculcabit. ' 
73 OV, 6, 24. 
74 OV, 6,24. 
" OV, 6,46. Orderic describes the reconciliation between Robert and Curthose, where Robert was 
ffanted his father's lordship. 
6 OV, 6, 30: GR, 1,718. 'Rotbertus cumfratribus Ernulfo .... et Rogerio Pictauensi ... Angliam perpetuo 
abiurauit. sed uigorem sacramenti temperauit adiectio. nisi regi placito quandoque satisJecisset 
obsequio.' 
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appraisal of Robert de Belleme's career during this period needs to have at its heart the 
recognition of his intellect and political skills. Robert's opposition to Henry's kingship 
in 1101 stemmed not from the promise of further patronage from Curthose, or even 
from the need to preserve his newly created cross-Channel complex of estates, but from 
a profound questioning of the legitimacy of Henry's kingship. Yet, unlike Robert de 
Mowbray, Robert's doubts did not form themselves into the contemplation of regicide, 
but found expression in support for Robert Curthose's claim to the English throne; 
support Robert de Belleme had consistently espoused since the earliest association of 
the two men. Robert's conduct in the negotiations at Alton belies the notion that he 
lacked political astuteness or ability. Together with his fellow negotiators, he recognised 
that times had changed. As well as a pragmatic appraisal of the lack of support for 
Curthose, attitudes towards the concept of kingship had clearly evolved from the days 
of the rebellion of 1075, where those involved regarded it as an office to be assumed or 
discarded. The question was one of striking the right balance between respect for sacral 
kingship and respect for the rights and preferences of the senior aristocracy. 
The attitude ofthe aristocracy had also changed from 1088. For a man of renowned 
martial qualities, Robert recognised that violence in the circumstances of 1101 offered a 
limited means to effect long lasting political change. The experience of 1088 and the 
bitter aftermath of Curthose's failure represented a grievous threat to Robert's interests 
within northern France and as a result bred caution. His conduct in the early 1090s and 
the degree of local violence, which so disgusted Orderic, is in part explained by the 
need to restore and defend his position within Normandy. The importance of Robert's 
local interests lay behind his elevation to the status of cross-of Channel magnate after 
1098 and was the expression of a political relationship with Rufus that suited the needs 
of both men in a local, northern French context. 
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Robert's support for Curthose's claim to the English throne led him to a position where 
the emphasis of negotiations at Alton and the terms of the eventual settlement stressed 
co-existence and permanent separation of England and Normandy as the solution to 
divided lordship. In this, the negotiators at Alton had the framework of the Treaty of 
Rouen in 1091 to guide them. The evidence points to Robert being one of the architects 
of the agreement, and having the skills, experience and power necessary to broker an 
agreement. Arguably, if Robert did display a lack of foresight during this period, then it 
is surely in thinking that Henry would abide by the terms of the agreement. However, if 
Symeon of Durham and John of Worcester are correct in locating Robert's rebuilding of 
Bridgenorth castle in the context of the events of 1101, then Robert may have also have 
accurately judged Henry, but clearly holding Henry to the treaty could not be achieved 
by Robert or the Montgomerys alone." 
"Symeon, Opera, 2, 234; John of Worcester, 3, 100. 
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Chapter 6 
William of Mortain 1100-06 
In comparison to Robert de Mowbray and Robert de Belleme, and to paraphrase Marc 
Bloch, William ofMortain is the one member of the Anglo-Norman political elite for 
whom our direct evidence of his character and conduct is so inadequate that we are 
likely to despair of scenting human flesh.· Unlike the career of his father, or those of his 
uncles and cousins, William's prominence at the apex of the cross-Channel political 
elite was short-lived, with a public career that lasted barely more than a decade, and 
with over half of this period spent in conflict with Henry I. After his capture at the battle 
of Tinchebray in 1106, he spent the remaining years of his life as Henry's prisoner. 
Despite this brevity, William's relationship with Henry has attracted considerable 
attention. Nearly all expressed ambivalence towards him. Unlike Robert de Mowbray 
and Robert de Belleme, they generally admired William's character and personality, yet 
this did not prevent them from criticising his political judgement. The first and most 
influential study came from the pen of William of Malmesbury. No admirer of either 
father or son, William suggested that the origins of William of Mortain's conflict with 
Henry lay in his jealousy of Henry since boyhood. 2 Malmesbury presented William as a 
man who could not control his ambitions. His seemingly ill-judged claim to his paternal 
uncle, Odo of Bayeux's, former earldom of Kent released such 'bitterness and obstinacy 
that with hideous arrogance he vowed that he would not wear a cloak, until he was 
I M. Bloch, The Historian's Craft (Manchester, 1954),22. 
2 GR, 1,720. 
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allowed to inherit what he asserted passed to him from his uncle' .3 By contrast, Henry is 
portrayed by Malmesbury as the very model of regal self-control, who succeeded in 
postponing the issue until, and following the judgement of the royal court, he refused 
William's request and went a step further and demanded the return ofland that William 
was alleged to have 'wrongfully' held. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle added that having 
lost the verdict of the court, William left England for Normandy, after which Henry 
confiscated his English lands.4 
On a personal level, William of Malmesbury was prepared to concede that William of 
Mortain possessed a lively mind and youthful energy, noting that he had many good 
points, but ultimately deserved his fate because of his treachery.' Orderic admired 
William's military prowess and described him in the context of the campaign of 1106 as 
an enterprising young man.6 Orderic's use of iuuvenis is interesting in that it may reflect 
on William's status as an unmarried man, yet it should also be noted that Orderic was 
not shy of using iuuenis to describe any individual he felt lacked more prudent qualities 
and whose military prowess could not, in his opinion, mask their political failings.' 
Other writers continued with the theme of youthful impetuosity. Henry of Huntingdon 
described William as a 'most upright man, righteous in spirit, but impetuous in action'.8 
The author of the Warenne Chronicler noted William to be 'young in age, but vigorous 
3 GR, 1,720. ' .. infestus et improbus adeo ut infami arrogantia se deuotaret non induturum clam idem nisi 
apatruo ... '. 
4 ASC, E, 1104. 
'GR, 1,724. 
6 OV, 6, 84. 'Tantae nimirum strenuitatis prefatus iuuvenis erat.. .. '. 
'In particular, Orderic uses iuuvenis to describe Robert Curthose. See, W. M. Aird, 'Frustrated 
Masculinity: The Relationship between William the Conqueror and his Eldest Son', Masculinity in 
Medieval Europe, ed. D. M. Hadley (London, 1999),43. 
BHA, 452. '"animo perfecto et exercitoferuenti. uir probissimus indixit et inflXit regalibus turmis werram 
calamitate refertam.' 
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in strength and fierce in spirit, stubborn and just, very rich in his possessions on both 
sides of the Channel' . 9 
Modem commentaries on William have been no less equivocal in criticising his 
political judgement. Brian Golding has done much to reassess the reputations of both 
William and his father.lO However, this did not stop him from concluding his recent 
study of both men's monastic patronage with the suggestion that William's opposition 
to Henry was a 'fatal blunder for which he paid with his liberty and estates' . 11 There has 
been a disturbing tendency within some recent historiography to regard William as 
something of a comic figure. Commentating on his refusal to wear a cloak after the 
judgement of the royal court, C. Warren Hollister, or more probably the editor of his 
posthumous study of Henry I, commentated that Henry 'seems to have taken this dire 
threat in his stride' .12 The most recent translation of the Gesta Regum has William's 
reaction to losing the judgement of the royal court as one where he 'flounced' off to 
France in a 'passion'.13 These are two examples where it is surely more correct to think 
of William's refusal to wear a cloak as a symbolic act, a constant and visible reminder 
of a perceived injustice, which found expression in William of Malmesbury' s choice of 
verbs to describe William's reaction in 1104. Set in this context, William's vow is 
possibly an early example of the kind of chivalric vow Maurice Keen has highlighted as 
being common in the later middle ages. 14 
9 Liber Hyda, 306. ' .. Juvenis quidem aetate sed viribus strenuus et animo ferus, justitiaeque tenax 
possessionum quae ultraque citraque mare ditissimus superbia elatus implacabiliter ... '. 
10 B. Golding, 'Robert ofMortain' ANS, 13 (1991), 119-44; 'The Religious Patronage of Robert and 
William of Mortain' ,Belief and Culture in the Middle Ages, ed. R. Gameson and H. Leyser (Oxford, 
2001),211-230. See also, Soulsby, 'Fiefs of the Counts ofMortain', 40-55. 
1\ Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 230. 
12 Hollister, Henry /, 182. 
13 GR, 1,720. 'Tunc uero Willelmus, sententia iuditii expunctus, indignabundus etfremens Normanniam 
abUt.' 
14 Keen, Chivalry, 212-6. 
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The presentation of a personally appealing man who displayed such poor political 
judgement so as to lose both his status and freedom suggests close parallels to the 
behaviour of Robert de Mowbray and Robert de Belleme. There is strong evidence to 
suggest that the rupture in the relationship between Henry I and William had its origins 
not in William's claim to Odo's earldom, as William of Malmesbury suggests, but in his 
opposition to Henry's accession to the English throne. William displayed doubts over 
the legitimacy of Henry's actions and the validity of his kingship that mirrored those of 
his uncle and other members of the political elite. The question of William's claim to 
Kent does, however, occupy such a prominent place in the narrative of William of 
Malmesbury that it cannot be ignored. 
The most direct evidence for William's attitudes towards Henry's kingship comes from 
two relatively late sources, which are, nonetheless, of central importance because both 
have Norman oral traditions as their bases. The first source, the Warenne Chronicle, 
projected William of Mortain, together with Robert de Belleme and William II de 
Warenne, as refusing to accept his Henry's kingship and as a result alienated from 
him.1S The second source is Wace's account of the events of 1101 and the negotiations 
leading to the Treaty of Winchester, which gives William equal prominence as one of 
the leading baronial negotiators, along with his more experienced uncle, Robert de 
Belleme.16 Overall, Wace's narrative unequivocally locates William of Mortain as the 
leading figure behind Robert Curthose's challenge for the English throne in 1101. There 
is no hint of any longstanding enmity or jealousy between William and Henry; rather it 
was William's support for Curthose that caused the breakdown in relations. 17 The 
structure ofWace's narrative appears to give Robert de Belleme a secondary role to his 
U Liber Hyda, 304-6. 'Quidam autem et maxime potentiores superbia e/ati, nee sieut dominum suum 
nominant. nee sieut regem suum honorant.' 
16 Waee, lines, 10397-400. 
17 Waee, lines, 10475-80. 
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nephew; immediately after noting that Curthose had followed the advice of William, 
Wace recorded that Robert de Belleme was also on bad terms with Henry because he 
too had supported Robert Curthose.18 His account inverts the emphasis of many writers 
for this period, especially Orderic, but also William of Malmesbury, who noted that it 
was Robert de Belleme who recruited William to his side following his expulsion from 
England in 1102.19 
It is impossible to construct a detailed biography of William's early life and career, or to 
outline what practical military and political experience he may have brought to 
Curthose's cause in 1101. The geo-political importance of the Counts of Mortain, 
combined with William's family background and parentage, also gave him a regional, 
and more importantly, a cross-Channel importance at an earlier stage in his career than 
that of his uncle. An indication of William's importance is reflected in the proposed 
marriage between William and the daughter of Walter de Mayenne, until bishop 
Hildebert ofLe Mans objected on the grounds of consanguinity.20 Given that William's 
sisters both had cross-border marriages arranged for them to Andrew de Vitre and Guy 
II de Laval, the projected marriage suggests a process of consolidation in south-west 
Normandy, with the new count of Mortain fulfilling his family'S strategic role in the 
region. 
These factors alone would almost certainly explain the effort expended by Henry in an 
attempt to bind William closer to him, particularly with the offer of his sister-in-law, 
Mary of Scotland, in marriage.21 Yet the evidence from Wace and the Warenne 
18 Wace, lines, 10478-9. 
19 GR, 1, 720. 
20 K. Keats-Rohan, 'The Prosopography of Post-Conquest England: Four Case Studies', Medieval 
Prosopography. 14 (Spring, 1993),33-4. 
21 Liber Hyda. 306. Cf. Hollister, Henry I, 182-3. 
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Chronicle suggest that Henry's efforts had greater basis in the effect that William's 
support would have had in conferring a greater degree oflegitimacy upon Henry's 
regime, perhaps even going as far as making it acceptable to those who believed both 
that they been excluded from the political process in 1100 and that Curthose held the 
stronger claim to England. To a degree, William of Mortain's prominence in the politics 
of the early 11 OOs was inevitable given his position within the cross-Channel 
aristocracy in 1101. 
However, the very factors that made William so important and so influential ensured 
that by questioning the foundations and legitimacy of Henry's kingship, William had 
sealed his fate in the event of the collapse of the Treaty of Winchester. It seems as 
though the author of the Warenne Chronicle sought to rationalise or even justify 
Henry's subsequent actions in imprisoning him for the remainder of his life. In doing 
so, Eustace drew upon the Book of Proverbs, and in particular, verse 2 of Proverb 20, 
where it was said that those who provoke a king to anger were to forfeit their own lives 
in retum.22 Despite this, however, it is interesting to note that the fates of those captured 
at Tinchebray along with William ofMortain and Robert Curthose differed, which in 
itself points towards a situation where differences of involvement in the revolt 
determined the severity of punishment was inflicted. 
After Tinchebray, Henry wrote to Archbishop Anselm, to inform him of his victory. In 
his letter, Henry listed his named captives as Robert I de Stuteville, William de Ferrers 
22 Proverbs, 20, 2; Liber Hyda, 304. ' . .. et per Salomonem: Sicut rugitus ira regis; qui provocat ilium 
peccat in animam suam.' The full verse reads 'The dread wrath of a king is like the growling of a lion; he 
who provokes him to anger forfeits his life'. It is noticeable that, given Henry's later epithet as the 'Lion 
of Justice', Eustace chose to draw this parallel. It should also be noted that David Crouch has suggested 
that the lion might have been adopted in the twelfth century as the Norman dynastic symbol, Crouch, The 
Normans, 291. 
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and William Crispin.23 Other sources reveal the capture of Edgar iEtheling and Walter 
de Mayenne.24 In addition, Henry had custody of Robert II de Stuteville and Reginald de 
Warenne, both of whom were captured at Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives shortly before the 
battle.2s This suggests that Henry of Huntingdon's observation on the support given to 
Henry by 'all the nobility of Normandy and the flower of England' may contain a kernel 
of truth in that the majority of the aristocracy either supported Henry or avoided 
involvement.26 Beyond the fact that much of the aristocracy on both sides of the 
Channel probably realised the inevitable outcome of any conflict, there are few obvious 
connections between those captured by Henry to suggest why they would choose to 
support Curthose. Significantly, the majority obtained freedom within a relatively short 
period of time. 
William de Ferrers was the second of three sons of Henry de Ferrers, castellan of 
Tutbury in Staffordshire and an important landowner in Derbyshire and 
Nottinghamshire.27 No obvious connection between de Ferrers and William of Mortain 
exists, other than a possible family link through his younger brother's wife Hawise. She 
may have been the daughter of Andrew de Vitre through his marriage to Agnes of 
Mortain, and therefore William's niece.28 Likewise, William Crispin's involvement is 
equally difficult to judge, as is which William Crispin was actually involved.29 The 
hostility of the family towards the efforts of Robert of Meulan to bring the abbey ofBec 
under his control suggests that his close alignment with Henry may have influenced 
23 Anselm's Letters. no. 401. 
24 ASC. E. 1101; Cartulaire manceau de Marmoutier. ed. E. Laurain (Laval. 1911-1945).2. no. 7. 
25 OV. 4. 72-4.80-2; Hollister. Henry I. 199. 
26 HA. 452. 'Rex uero secum omnes pro ceres Normanniae, et robur Anglie .... • 
27 OV. 2. 264. 4.84.232; Loyd. Origins. 42; Domesday People. 247-8. William was succeeded in 
England by his youngest son Robert in 1101, while the eldest son. Ingenulf. succeeded in Normandy. 
Domesday Descendants, 459; Domesday People. 247. 
28 Keats-Rohan. 'The Prosopography·. 33-4. 
29 For the Crispin family in general see. J. Green. 'Lords of Norman Vexin'. War and Government in the 
Middle Ages. Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich. ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge. 1986). 
47-61. 
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their decision to support Curthose. The support given by William Crispin to Curthose is 
noticeably different from the family'S policy of generally trying to remain outside of 
Norman affairs, despite having land within the borders of the duchy.30 
An obvious geographical connection exists between Robert I de Stuteville and William 
of Mortain, in that both men held estates in Yorkshire that were used to restructure the 
Norman settlement of the county following 1106.31 Henry eventually released Robert's 
son, along with Reginald de Warenne, but as with William ofMortain, Robert I de 
Stuteville spent the remainder of his life as Henry's prisoner, possibly dying in the late 
1120s.32 One possible reason why Robert I de Stuteville remained in prison lies within 
the narrative of the Warenne Chronicle. Robert, together with Reginald de Warenne, 
had vehemently opposed Henry in his attempt to expel Robert de Belleme from England 
in 1102 and effectively overturn the settlement negotiated in the previous year. The 
implication from the Warenne Chronicle is that Robert left England after the exile of 
Robert de Belleme.33 The actions of Robert I de Stuteville in 1102, together with his fate 
after his capture, suggest that he had been among those members of the aristocracy who 
questioned the legality of Henry's kingship. The way in which the Warenne Chronicle 
records the tenor of his protests against Henry's attempts to expel Robert de Belleme 
suggests that he may have been involved in the negotiations of 110 I, and was possibly 
30 Green, 'Lords of the Norman Vexin', 55-6. 
31 Dalton, Conquest, Anarchy and Lordship, 80-94; EYC, 9, 1-2. The majority of Robert I de Stuteville's 
estates passed to Nigel d' Aubigny and formed the new honor of Mowbray. Greenway, Charters o/the 
Honour o/Mowbray, Introduction, 20-1. 
32 Liber Vitae Ecclesiae Dunelmensis, ed. A. H. Thompson, Surtees Society, 136 (1923), fo1. 44. 
33 Liber Hyda, 306-7. After the text notes the expulsion of Robert de Belleme from England it continues: 
'Hunc quoque secuti sunt duo fratres sui, comites Ernulfus et Rogerus, utque commoti propter fratris 
expulsionem Anglia discesserunt. Post hos autem Robertus de Stuteville et Reginaldus de Warenna 
aliique plures suam tandem dejectionem contra regem Henricum /urentes, qui pariter cum Roberto 
Comitejoederati, Henricum regen quanto majori odio tanto amplioribus conviciis potius quam damnis 
impediebant.' The Count Robert referred to in the last sentence could refer to Robert de Belleme, but it 
could also refer to Robert Curthose, who is always referred to as count and not duke by the author of the 
text. The tense of the sentence would then imply that Robert I de Stuteville was already allied with Robert 
Curthose, and attempted to hinder Henry in 1102 through protests. My thanks are due to Dr Elisabeth van 
Houts for a discussing this with me. 
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one of the guarantors to the Treaty of Winchester on Curthose's side. Certainly, Henry's 
refusal to release Robert from his custody after 1106 suggests that he regarded the 
grounds for his opposition in much the same way as he did William of Mortain. 
While both Wace and the Ware nne Chronicle unequivocally present William as the 
leading influence on Robert Curthose, there is a major difference in their chronology. 
Wace saw William as the driving force behind Curthose's challenge for the English 
throne, but Eustace of Boulogne located William's greatest impact after the treaty and 
just before the expulsion of Robert de Belleme.34 It may well be that William's 
influence on Curthose remained constant before and after the negotiations at Alton. Yet, 
the impact of William's actions on the relations he enjoyed with Henry is difficult to 
judge. Unlike Henry's relationship with Robert de Belleme, there are nearly three years 
to account for before William left England and it is noticeable that Henry only 
confiscated William's estates after he had arrived in Normandy and began to agitate 
against him.3s In this context, William of Malmesbury's assertion that the dispute 
between Henry and William originated over William's claim to the earldom of Kent 
requires examination. 
William of Malmesbury is the only source to state explicitly that William made a claim 
to his uncle's former earldom.36 Though impossible to date this claim accurately, there 
is no evidence to suggest that William made his claim before Rufus's death. William of 
Malmesbury locates the specific details of William's claim within the Gesta Regum 
after a more general assertion that many individuals made claims to lands as a pretext 
34 Liber Hyda, 306. • Veniens autem ad Robertum com item Normanniae, stimulavit eum contra regem 
Henricum. mulitisque modis concitavit.' 
3S ASC, E, 1104. 
36 GR, 1, 720. 
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for throwing off the homage that they had given to Henry in 1100.37 Therefore, the most 
likely period for William to have made a claim was that immediately following Henry's 
coronation. Throughout September and October 1100, William was present at court and 
it is in this period that Henry probably made the offer of marriage to his sister-in-law.38 
It is possible that Orderic refers to the issue within the rhetorical dialogue he creates for 
count Robert of Meulan at Alton, where he advises Henry to satisfy all demands for 
lands and riches as a short-term strategy to gain the political and military initiative in 
William's motives in raising the claim are unclear. Odo's earldom was composed of 
land in some twenty-two counties and valued at £3,050 in 1086 which, when combined 
with the earldom of Cornwall, would have given William a total income of £4,530.40 
The lands lay in two closely related blocks and largely south-east of a line drawn from 
the Humber to the Severn; it included Kent itself and an arc of lands running west to 
east around London.41 Claiming the earldom made good business and strategic sense, 
with the acquisition of further lands in the south-east and around London balancing the 
economic focus of William's English lands from their preponderance in the south-west. 
In strategic terms, William would have also controlled many of the regions through 
which the most important communications routes to the Continent lay, in themselves 
valuable assets in any cross-Channel polity that envisaged the political separation of 
England and Normandy. In addition, William's father had created a reputation 
37 GR, 1, 716. 
38 Liber Hyda, 306; RRAN, 2, no. 492. Mary was married to Eustace III of Boulogne in 1102, Hollister, 
Henry I, 183. 
39 OV, 6, 316. 
40 Hollister, Henry I, 182. 
41 D. Bates, 'The Character and Career ofOdo, Bishop of Bayeux (1049150-1097)" Speculum, 50 (1975), 
10. 
173 
throughout his career as an aggressive commercial expansionist.42 A successful claim 
would have emulated his father's achievements and appeared to offer a potentially great 
prize for relatively little effort. 
Yet, set against this are the circumstances within the former earldom itself that would 
have made the introduction of William as a new patron very unwelcome to many of 
Odo's former tenants and vassals, something William must have been aware of. The 
immediate fate of Odo' s lands after 1088 is unclear and it is possible that no one single 
method of administering the lands was adopted. In Kent itself, a precedent for 
administering the lands through royal administrators may have been set after Odo' s 
arrest in 1082, which in tum may have followed the pattern of administration used for 
Ralph de Gael's lands in East Anglia following the revolt of 1075.43 In Sussex and 
Gloucestershire, Odo's lands were included in the returns for the king's lands in the 
Domesday survey, while in Berkshire, Cambridgeshire and Warwickshire his lands 
were included with those of the sitting tenant.44 In addition, the survival and prosperity 
of many ofOdo's former vassals and tenants after 1088, especially those who held local 
office and whose conduct in 1088 and 1101 was examined in Chapter Three, created a 
large vested interest in keeping William out of the former earldom. The motivation of 
these men in supporting Rufus and Henry against their elder brother did not lend itself 
to the re-establishment of ties with the new representative of a former lord and patron. 
This extended to the failure of many of the more important tenants of the Counts of 
Mortain, men such as William de Cahagnes and Ralph Paynel, to support their lords in 
1088 and again in 1101.4s It is improbable that William would not have recognised the 
42 Golding, 'Robert of Mortain', 133. 
43 My thanks are due to Lucy Marten of the University of East Anglia for this point. See, 'The Impact of 
Rebellion on the Making of Little Domesday', ANS, 27, forthcoming. 
44 Bates, 'Character and Career', 17. 
4S Above, Chapter Three. 
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difficulties this would have created for his claim to succeed. Henry's ability to stall 
William's request in 1100, by 'a skilful and temporising reply', must have centred upon 
the practical difficulties of granting William's request and the ostensible need to 
investigate the circumstances and fate ofOdo's lands in each county.46 
This set of circumstances suggests that William's claim may have been purely 
speculative, if indeed it was serious at all. Henry's position in the period following his 
coronation was precarious, with the king isolated from many members of the Anglo-
Norman political elite. Ridicule of Henry was widespread.47 In these circumstances, 
William of Mortain may have made his claim to Kent as a piece of elaborate mockery of 
Henry's royal powers. Equally, however, William may have been attempting a simple 
piece of political opportunism. Robert de Belleme had been able to use favourable 
political circumstances in 1098 to reconstitute his father's cross-Channel complex of 
estates, while Robert de Mowbray had successfully succeeded to his uncle's English 
estates in 1093. The apparent vulnerability of Henry in the autumn of 1100 may have 
tempted William into believing that he could make an outrageous demand on Henry, 
perhaps with only a slight chance of success, yet equally with seemingly very little to 
lose.48 
It is possible that Henry's ability to stall William may actually have encouraged him to 
believe that a claim to Kent would have a good chance of succeeding. Robert of Meulan 
had, after all, advised a policy of open deception before entering into negotiations at 
Alton. The prospect of William gaining Kent may have been a tempting enough prize to 
persuade William not to support Robert de Belleme in 1102. One interpretation of the 
46 GR, 1, 720. 
47 Wace, lines, 10513-74; GR, 1,716. 
48 William's monastic patronage acts as a commentary upon this process. See, below, Chapter 8. 
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entry in the Warenne Chronicle, where William approached Curthose before Robert had 
been expelled and attempted to goad Curthose into action against Henry, is that both 
nephew and uncle recognised that Henry had no intention of honouring the agreement 
negotiated at Alton.49 Yet, it is Robert I de Stuteville, Reginald de Warenne and 
Robert's brothers who are most vocal in attempting to hinder Henry in 1102.s0 
It is probable that the underlying causes of the breakdown in relations between William 
and Henry during the period 1102 and 1104 rested on a merger of public and private 
interests, though the distinction is somewhat artificial. The conflict between Henry and 
William escalated beyond the issue of Kent and may have revolved around Henry's 
attitude towards Normandy and his elder brother. Orderic suggested that William and 
Robert de Belleme adhered to Curthose because they feared Henry and were utterly 
unwilling to submit to his rule.sl If Henry's expulsion of Robert de Belleme in 1102 
signalled a rejection of the principle of co-existence, by the time of William's departure 
from England Henry's intentions towards Normandy posed a direct threat to Curthose 
and his supporters. Henry's rejection of Curthose's conciliatory overtures in 1103 was 
followed by a consistent attempt to undermine Curthose's rule and the remaining 
support Curthose he enjoyed in Normandy.s2 By 1104, Henry was able to dictate terms 
to Curthose, whom Orderic described as 'foolish and friendless' at this point, and 
Curthose was forced to transfer to Henry the homage of William, count of Evreux.s3 By 
the time of Henry's return to England in the autumn of 1104, he could count on the 
support of the lords of Evreux, Breteuil, Eu, Beaumont, Montfort and Tosny, to name 
the most important. 
49 Liber Hyda, 306. 'Quare secutus est Robertus comes de Beiemia, Anglia de pulsus a rege Henrico 
causa rebellion is quam tam occu/te quam studiose in Anglia parabat.' 
so Liber Hyda, 307. 
SI OV, 6,84. 
S2 Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', 113-14; Hollister, Henry 1,183-4. 
S3 OV, 6, 56-8. 'Sensu quippe e amicis destitutus erat ... '. 
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In all of this, it is noticeable that William's political importance and status meant that 
Henry was more circumspect in his attitude towards him than he had been in his attitude 
to Robert de BelH=me in 1102. In his dealings with William, Henry always left room for 
manoeuvre. William of Malmesbury's account of the break down in relations is the 
chief source for this process and contains a chronology that suggests a careful escalation 
of pressure on William.54 After postponing a decision on William's claim to Kent, 
Henry then claimed the return of land that William was accused of holding 
'wrongfully'. There is, however, no indication or evidence that would point towards the 
identity of the lands that were the subject of Henry's accusation.55 It is at this point that 
William left England, vowing not to wear a cloak, with Henry only confiscating 
William's English lands after he had started to attack Henry's castles and supporters in 
Normandy.56 
The dramatic nature of William's response to Henry's rejection of his claim to Kent had 
important connotations in the messages that it conveyed to the wider political 
community. It is worth remembering that the political community as a whole would 
have been well aware of the nature of Rufus's diplomatic double standards in the early 
1090s; William's actions would have brought attention to Henry's actions in the 
aftermath of the Treaty of Winchester. An interesting parallel occurs in Wace's 
description of how the Conqueror, on hearing that Harold had been crowned king in 
1066, spoke to no one and covered his face with his cloak.57 The fact that both men used 
their cloaks as dramatic and visible reminders of what was felt to be great injustices 
may not have been lost on the wider political community, though equally it may be a 
54 GR, 1,720. 
55 Cf. Hollister, Henry I, 183, who suggests lands in the vicinity of the earldom of Cornwall, yet provides 
no reference. 
56 GR, I, 720. 
57 Wace, lines, 5860. 
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measure of Henry's success in detaching support from Curthose in this period, that 
dramatic and symbolic gestures were some of the few avenues left open for William to 
express his views. 
William emerges from the sources as the most implacable opponent to Henry during the 
final stages of the campaign of 1106, urging Robert Curthose to strike against Henry 
when it was clearly imprudent to do SO.58 Henry recalled the extent of William's 
grievance against him some sixteen years later. When confronted with another rebellion 
he reflected on the events of 1106 and noted that Curthose was persuaded to fight at 
Tinchebray only through William's advice.59 As in 1101, it seems as though William 
may have overshadowed his more experienced uncle and remained the dominant voice 
in advising Robert Curthose.60 In contrast, Robert de Belleme attempted to negotiate 
with Henry late in 1105 and his conduct at Tinchebray points towards an 
accommodation having been reached beforehand.61 
Under its entry for 1106, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle recorded that William of Mortain 
and Robert Curthose were returned to England for immediate imprisonment.62 Both 
John of Worcester and Henry Huntingdon implied that both men returned to England 
with Henry in 1107.63 Robert ofTorigni stated explicitly that Henry returned to England 
in 1107 with both captives and kept them in free custody until the end of their lives.64 
58 ov, 4, 84-6; Wace, lines, 11337-80. 
59 OV, 4, 286. 
60 ASC, E, 1105; GR, 1,722. 
61 ASC. E, 1105; OV. 4.84-6. 
62 ASC, E, 1106. . 
63 John oj Worcester, 110; HA, 454. 
64 GND, 2, 222. • .... in lib era custodia usque ad terminum uite eorum tenuit'. 
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There may have been some attempt to negotiate the release of the prisoners, but as 
Wace noted 'no one could bring about a reconciliation and they could not escape' .65 
Unlike Robert Curthose, the circumstances of William's incarceration are not well 
known. Robert of Torigni's stress on 'free custody' suggests a degree of comfort and 
privilege appropriate to his rank and status. However, rumours circulated in the twelfth 
century to suggest that Henry had had William blinded while imprisoned in the Tower 
of London which, if true, might suggest that Henry consciously imitated the punishment 
inflicted by his father on many of the rebels of 1075 who had questioned the 
Conqueror's kingship.66 What evidence there is suggests that William spent nearly all of 
his remaining years in the Tower. Wace refers to William living in 'King Henry's 
prison' until the king' s death.67 The Annals of Bermondsey Priory recorded that in 1118 
William was freed from the Tower by a miracle of the Holy Cross.68 However, if 
William was temporarily released from custody, he was back in the Tower by the late 
1120s.69 A further entry in the Annals of Bermondsey recorded that William became a 
monk there in 1140.70 
According to Leland, William was buried at Bermondsey, though the abbey of Grestain 
maintained a tradition that he was buried there.71 Though it is impossible to pinpoint the 
exact date of William's death, a date on or near 1140 seems probable. William's age in 
65 Wace, lines, 11408-9. 
66 HA, 698; Hollister, 'Royal Acts of Mutilation', MMI, 298-9. 
67 Wace, lines, 11417. 
68 The most reliable text can be found in the appendix to, M. Brett, 'The annals ofBermondsey, 
Southwark and Merton', Church and City 1000-1500 Essays in Honour o/Christopher Brooke, ed. D. 
Abulafia, M. Franklin and M. Rubin (Cambridge, 1992),298. 'Et eodem anno miraculae virtute sancta 
cruces liberatur Willelmus Comes Moritonie de turri Londonie.' 
69 Pipe Roll 3] Henry I, ed. 1. Hunter, Record Commission (London, 1831), 143. 
70 Brett, Appendix, 299. 'Hoc anna Willelmus comes Moritoni venit Bermundeseye et suscepit habitum 
monachulem.' 
71 Joannis Lelandi Antiquarii De Rebus Britannicis Col/ectanea, ed. T Hearne, 6 vols. (London, 1774),3, 
255; Breard, Grestain, 33. 
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1140 could have been anywhere from the mid sixties through to early seventies. His 
date of birth is likewise impossible to establish exactly as is the date of his parent's 
marriage. Yet, if Robert of Mortain was born around 1040, William's mother could not 
have been born until after her father's marriage between 1050 and 1054.72 As there is no 
indication of any minority on the death of his father in 1095, William's date of birth 
must have been 1074 at the latest.73 Equally, as he began to attest his father's acta 
shortly before the death of his mother in 1082, a date of birth of circa 1070 might also 
be possible, with his mother in her mid to late teens at this point.74 
The suggestion that William entered Bermondsey in 1140 and may have done so shortly 
before his death would fit with what other sources have to say on William's last years. 
Wace recorded that William remained in custody until Henry's death in 1135.15 The first 
version of the Brevis reiatio, composed between 1114 and 1120, noted that William, 
together with Robert Curthose and some unnamed prisoners were in custody 'to this 
day' .76 When the text was revised after 1140, the scribe omitted the word adhuc, which 
would imply that William of Mortain had either died by this point or had been released 
from prison.77 
The fact that Henry kept William in custody until his death belies the notion that the 
conflict between the two men centred on William's claim to Odo's earldom. To see 
72 For the date of Robert's birth, D. Bates, 'Notes sur J'aristocratie Normandie: II. Herluin de Conte ville 
et sa famille', AN, 23 (1973),29; Mason, 'Roger de Montgomery and his Sons', 1-2. 
73 An entry in the cartulary for Mont Saint-Michel, dated to between 1087 and 1091, records that William 
had a younger brother, the product of his father's second marriage to Almodis. Avranches, Bibliotheque 
Municipale, ms 210, Cartulaire du Mont Saint Michel, fo. 34r-34v. The charter in question records a 
grant by Count Robert to the monastery, with the consent of Robert, his son by his second marriage. 
William, described as 'eius alter filius', promised to grant the land in question should it return to custody. 
74 Bates, Regesta, nos 204, 215. 
7S Wace, lines, 11418. 
76 Brevis Relatio, 38. 'Atque ita omni terra sedata rediens in Angliam Rodbertum comitemfratrem suum 
et com item Moritonii et quosdam alios quos ei placuit secum adduxit eoque adhuc in captione tenere 
decemit.' 
77 Brevis Relatio, Introduction, 13. 
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William's conflict with Henry in these terms is to miss the essence of the dispute, as 
William of Malmesbury undoubtedly knew. At the centre of relations between the two 
men lay William's opposition to Henry's kingship. Like many members of the Anglo-
Norman political elite, William had questioned Henry's legitimacy and expressed a 
preference for a Curthose kingship, displaying powers of persuasion and ability that saw 
him appointed as one of the negotiators at Alton and one of the architects of the Treaty 
of Winchester. His claim to Odo's earldom most probably received encouragement from 
Henry and provided a pretext for Henry to detach William from Robert de Belleme's 
side in 1102, as a crucial step in overturning the treaty. The reaction of William to 
Henry's refusal to grant his request in 1104 points towards a recognition that William 
had been deceived, and precipitated the complete collapse in relations that ultimately 
ensured that William would spend the remainder of his life as Henry's prisoner. Many 
of the twelfth-century writers who expressed ambivalence towards William, recognised 
that by the time of his capture in 1106 Henry had completely outmanoeuvred him, as 
indeed he had outmanoeuvred Robert Curthose. 
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PART TWO 
ANALYSIS 
Chapter 7 
The Treaties of Rouen and Winchester 
The Treaties of Rouen and Winchester represented the major effort on the part of the 
cross-Channel aristocracy to find a solution to the problem of divided lordship. At the 
heart of both treaties lay recognition that all three of the Conqueror's sons had both 
claims to the English throne and responsibilities within the wider Anglo-Norman polity 
that needed to be accommodated within existing cross-Channel political structures. The 
envisaged outcomes of each treaty also reflected the views of the senior aristocracy on 
the limitation of violence to effect long-term political change, and the hope that a 
negotiated settlement would open the way to co-existence as a permanent solution to the 
problems of divided lordship.1 
Previous discussions of the treaties have been located within longer narratives and have 
tended to regard them as diplomatic interludes. The comments of Frank Barlow on the 
Treaty of Rouen encapsulate this approach, with Barlow suggesting that the treaty was 
'shrewdly negotiated and left the game nicely balanced'.2 C. Warren Hollister's initial 
judgement of the Treaty of Winchester was that it was an anti-climactic truce.3 
Christopher Holdsworth was kinder in his appraisal, but primarily concerned himself 
1 On the nomenclature of the treaties see, Barlow, Rufus, 281, n.77; Hollister, Henry I, 141. For major 
commentaries on the treaties see, Freeman, William Rufus, 2, 522-8, 688-91; David, Curthose, 59-63, 
133-7; Barlow, Rufus, 281-6; Le Patourel, Norman Empire, 199-200; Hollister, Henry I, 141-5; C. 
Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking in the Twelfth Century' ANS, 19 (1997), 3-4; Green, 'Robert Curthose 
Reassessed', 110-12. A reassessment of the Treaty of Winchester is offered in, Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman 
Civil War', 174. 
2 Barlow, Rufus, 283. 
3 Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War' MMI, 77; Henry I, 139-145. 
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with the mechanics of how treaties in general governed relations between neighbouring 
powers.4 
Overall, no reappraisal of the treaties has been attempted within the context of recent 
historiographical trends that have dealt with aristocratic political behaviour and, in 
particular, have emphasised activities that can be characterised as dispute settlement and 
conflict resolution. This omission is surprising, not least because in both the wider 
context of the debate over the nature of the 'Feudal Revolution' and in the narrow 
context of individual studies centred upon diplomatic solutions to disputed successions, 
the potential inherent in this approach has received much exploration during the 1990s, 
especially for Stephen's reign.s Professor Edmund King summed the situation up rather 
well when he remarked that the aristocratic convencio becomes the key to what might be 
termed 'high politics'.6 
An important caveat to this approach is that peacemaking and conflict resolution, 
however broadly defined, do not in themselves solely convey the aims of the aristocracy 
in 1091 and 1101. The treaties certainly aimed at peace in the present, short-term, yet it 
is clear that the treaties also attempted to remove future sources of conflict by 
addressing the root causes of the instability engendered in political relations by the 
accessions of Rufus and Henry I to the English throne. In his discussiqn of peacemaking 
in Anglo-Saxon England, Ryan Lavelle noted: 'Political peace could be as complex as 
the philosophical concepts of peace, and was defined with similar complexity by those 
4 Holdsworth, 'Peacemaking', 3. 
S For example, Crouch, The Reign of King Stephen, 234-9, 270-80. 
6 E. King, 'Dispute Settlement in AnglO-Norman England', ANS, 14 (1992), 119. 
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involved." The emphasis upon complexity is crucial in understanding the actions of the 
aristocracy as a whole between 1087 and 1106. Recognition of this immediately invites 
engagement with a wider framework of discussion that stresses the centrality of political 
ritual to any analysis of early medieval politics. In arguing for the treaties to be regarded 
as the direct responses to the problems created by the separation of England and 
Normandy in 1087 and the subsequent actions of the Conqueror's sons and their 
supporters, so the final link in understanding the motives of those members of the 
aristocracy who rejected or questioned the legality of Rufus's and Henry's kingship can 
be revealed. 
Contemporaries and those writing in the first half of the twelfth century knew the 
general contours of each treaty! Many of the most important terms in each settlement 
can be recovered from these accounts, beginning with the Treaty of Rouen. The Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle provided the most comprehensive account.9 Reflecting the extent of 
the territorial incursions by Rufus within Normandy before 1091, the Chronicle 
recorded that Rufus received the monastery of Fee amp, the county ofEu and the port of 
Cherbourg. His men were to be left unchallenged in the castles that they had taken 
within Normandy while, in return, Rufus promised to bring Maine back under Norman 
control. All those who had lost lands in the revolt of 1088 were to have them restored, 
with Curthose also to receive land in England. The treaty also attempted to regulate the 
future succession to the English throne, with each brother designated as the heir of the 
'R. Lavelle, 'Towards a Political Contextualization of Peacemaking and Peace Agreements in Anglo-
Saxon England', Peace and Negotiation. Strategies/or Co-existence in the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance ed. D. Wolfthal (Turnhout, 2000), 54. 
8 Cf. History o/the Church o/York, 16. 'Qualiter inter fratres conuenit et satis notum est et nostra nichil 
interest.' 
9 ASC, E, 1091. 
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other, should either die without a legitimate heir from a lawful marriage. Finally, twelve 
of the 'best' men on either side guaranteed the treaty. Significantly, the Chronicle also 
located the stripping of Norman lands from Edgar iEtheling as part of the treaty 
negotiations. 
Other writers recorded further details. Orderic suggested that in addition to the lordship 
of Eu, Rufus was also granted that of Aumale and the whole territory of Gerard de 
Gournay and Ralph de Tosny, together with all the castles held by them. Rufus was then 
to use his royal authority to pacify 'those insurgents ready to listen to him' .10 Henry of 
Huntingdon noted that Rufus had occupied Aumale together with Saint-Valery in 1090, 
the obvious implication being that Saint-Valery was also ceded to Rufus under the 1091 
agreement. Henry also stated that Rufus was to receive back into his custody those 
castles taken from him, suggesting that Curthose might have enjoyed an upswing in 
fortunes late in 1090 and actually re-established control over some of the castles Rufus 
had detached from his control during the course of the year." John of Worcester 
included the abbey of Mont Saint-Michel in the lands ceded to Rufus. Furthermore, his 
account of the nature of the obligations placed upon Rufus to help restore order in 
Normandy explicitly stated that Rufus was to subdue those castles within Normandy 
that were resisting the duke.12 William of Malmesbury's account is clear in that Rufus's 
projected campaign in Maine was to be undertaken on behalf of Robert Curthose.'3 
Wace appears to have confused the events of 1088, with the treaty negotiations of 1091 
10 OV, 4, 250. ' ... et dissidentes qui eidem adquiescere voluerunt regali auctoritate pacauit.' 
"HA,414-6. 
Il John of Worcester, 3, 58. On the veracity of John's statement regarding Mont Saint-Michel see, Barlow, 
Rufus, 282, n.84; Hollister, Henry 1,78, n.216. 
l3OR, 1,548. 
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and the terms of the later treaty. He located the negotiations in England and suggested 
that Curthose was to receive a payment of five thousand pounds each year.14 
The Treaty of Winchester repeated many of these terms, but contained some crucial 
differences. As with the earlier treaty, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle provides the most 
comprehensive account. 15 Unlike the situation in 1091, where Rufus was allowed to 
retain control of substantial territories and a number of castles within Normandy, under 
the terms of the 1101 agreement Henry was to give up all that he was described as 
'forcibly' holding in Normandy. Those who had lost lands in England in support of 
Curthose's challenge to Henry were to have them restored, with Eustace ofBoulogne 
specifically mentioned in that he was to have his father's lands. In return, Henry 
undertook to pay Robert three thousand marks annually. The treaty also addressed the 
question of the English succession and repeated the same terms as were applied a 
decade earlier, with each brother designated the other's heir in the absence of a 
legitimate heir from a lawful marriage. Another repeat from 1091 was that the treaty 
was guaranteed by twelve men 'of the highest rank' on each side. Orderic adds the 
crucial information that Curthose renounced his claim to England and released Henry 
from an oath of homage he had taken to him. In return, Henry gave up the Cotentin and 
everything he held within Normandy apart from Domfront.16 Orderic's information on 
Curthose's renunciation appears to be supported by Wace, whose account of Curthose's 
attempt to meet with Henry in 1103 contained a scene where Robert of Meulan is 
presented as confronting Curthose, asking him why he was in England, having 
14 Wace, lines 9421-48. 
15 ASC, E, 1101. 
16 OV, 5, 318. 'In prim is Rodbertus dux calumniam quam in regno Angliae ingesseratfratri dimisi!, 
ipsumque de hom agio quod sibi iam dudum fecerat pro regali dignitate absoluit.' 
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previously 'forsworn' it and handed 'freely' to Henry.17 John of Worcester recorded that 
Curthose undertook to restore lands in Normandy to those who had supported Henry and 
suffered confiscation as a result. ls Finally, Robert of Torigni suggested that the annual 
amount due to Curthose was four thousand marks.19 
The terms for both treaties leave little doubt that the prevailing mood among the 
aristocracy was to find a lasting political settlement to the problem of divided lordship. 
Yet, the outcomes of the treaties were only part of the process of reconciliation. The 
actual process of negotiating the treaties reveals an awareness by the participants of the 
need to engage in a ritual discourse to effect reconciliation. The preliminaries to the 
Treaty of Rouen are the less well documented. William of Malmesbury records that men 
of 'more sense' looked to their own cross-Channel interests and negotiated a settlement 
before Rufus had crossed the Channel,2° The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle noted Rufus's 
hostile intent towards his brother on departing for Normandy, yet Orderic is quite clear 
that the brothers met amicably at Rouen.21 Robert of Torigni believed that peace 
between the two men was established at Caen. 22 Taken together, the evidence would 
point towards a situation whereby negotiations, conducted by intermediaries, took place 
before Rufus crossed the Channel, with a formal ratification ceremony at which both 
brothers were present, most likely in Rouen. It is probable that Robert of Torigni's 
identifi~ation ofCaen as the site of the treaty was, in fact, the site of the negotiations 
17 Wace, lines 10575-628. 
18 John of Worcester, 3, 98. 
19 GND, 2, 220. 
20 GR, 1,548. 'Pauci quibus sanius cons ilium, consulentes suis commodis quod utrobique possessiones 
haberent, mediators pacisfuere ... ... '. Rufus was in Dover on the 27 January and crossed the Channel at 
Candlemas, RRAN, 1, no 315; John of Worcester, 56; OV, 4, 236; ASC, E 1091. 
21 OV, 4, 236; ASC, E, 1091. 
22 GND, 2, 204-6. Caen was accepted by Freeman as the site of negotiations, William Rufus, 2, 522. 
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between the intermediaries.23 Those who negotiated the treaty may have remained in 
Caen to begin preparations for the inquest into judicial rights of the Conqueror, the 
Consuetudines et Iusticie, formally ratified in Caen on the 18 July 1091.24 
Accounts of the negotiations at Alton in 1101 are much fuller. Much of what took place 
at Alton can be seen as a ritual discourse, designed to prevent further conflict and 
bloodshed. All the sources, though contradictory in places, playa variation on a theme 
of reconciliation and stress the role of negotiators. Eadmer noted the appointment of 
Archbishop Anselm as a mediator between the aristocracy and the king, before Curthose 
had landed in England and during the period just after Whitsuntide when members of 
the aristocracy were beginning to openly desert Henry.2s Once in England, negotiations 
between the two sides continued. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle succinctly noted that 'the 
chief men' went between Curthose and Henry and reconciled them.26 William of 
Malmesbury recorded that 'wiser heads' among the aristocracy were keen not to break 
the 'law of natural affection' between brothers.27 Wace identified three of the leading 
baronial negotiators in Robert de Belleme, William ofMortain, and presumably for 
Henry, Robert fitz Hamon.28 Orderic inverted the order of events by suggesting that the 
aristocracy actively sought war and it was the intervention of Henry, who negotiated 
23 Cf. the apparent confusion over the chronology and place of Harold's oath to Duke William in 1064/65, 
Bates, Conqueror, 97. 
24 Printed in Haskins, NI, 281-4. For discussions on the content of the inquest see, Bates, Normandy 
before 1066, 162-4; J. Yver, 'Les premieres institutions du duche de Normandie', I Normanni e /a Loro 
Espansione in Europa Nell'A/to Medioevo (Spoleto, 1969),349-63. 
25 Eadmer HN, 127. 
26 ASC, E, 11 0 1. 
27 GR, I, 716-8, 'Sed satagentibus sanioris consilii hominibus, qui dicerent pietatis ius uio/andum si 
fraterna necessitudo prelio concurreret, paci animos accommodauere, 
reputantes quod, si alter occumberet, alter infirmior remaneret, cum nullusfratrum preter ipsos 
superesset.' 
28 Wace, lines, 10397-8 
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with his brother on a face to face basis, that avoided this calamity, sealing their 
agreement with a kiss of peace. 29 
In addition to naming some of the participants at Alton, Wace also provides the most 
detailed account of the negotiations.30 This deserves greater prominence in discussions 
than has been accorded it.31 Not only does he build upon the wider analysis offered by 
monastic writers, but in drawing upon a secular, oral tradition for much of his 
information, he also provides additional insights into the actual arguments used by the 
aristocracy during these negotiations. Wace emphasised that conflict between the two 
brothers would tear families apart, with the awful possibility of relatives forced to fight 
and kill each other. His stress on a fear of battle among the aristocracy and its potential 
cost in terms of bloodshed suggests that violence was a serious prospect in 110 I, and 
the implications of any such violence were feared to a greater extent than the actual 
violence of 1088.32 Yet, it also points towards a situation where Robert Curthose's 
principal advisors had recognised that an overwhelming momentum in favour of a 
Curthose kingship had failed to develop. As a result, the arguments put to Curthose to 
persuade him to pull back from the brink went beyond military calculations and 
attempted to address the concerns of each side. It was emphasised by the negotiators that 
Curthose should not seek to depose a crowned king. As with William of Malmesbury, 
Wace also records that the negotiators stressed the need for good fraternal relations and 
the dangers to the wider polity if relations between Curthose and Henry remained 
strained. 
29 OV, 5, 31S. 
30 Wace, lines 10397-472. 
31 In particular, this was not discussed by Strevett, see, 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', 161-2. 
32 See the comments of Richard Sharpe, 'lOSS-William II and the Rebels', 157. 
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The most significant aspect ofWace's account of these negotiations is the evidence that 
points towards the framework used in 1087 to facilitate the succession of Rufus being 
used once more as a means to guide the baronial negotiators in 1101. The general tenor 
of the advice given to Curthose, and especially the emphasis on the impossibility of any 
attempt to depose a crowned king, reflected directly the text of the Fourth Council of 
Toledo within Pseudo-Isidore, and the effects on the person of a king of anointing by a 
primate with holy oil.33 The inviolability of the king resounded in the messages the 
baronial negotiators relayed to Curthose; that he should not seek from Henry something 
'he should not do or which could not be done' and that Henry would rather be 'struck 
dead than be toppled from the kingdom' .34 It also seems clear that Anselm acted in 
accordance with the same framework.3' Eadmer's account of Anselm's 'unanswerable 
reasoning' being in operation at Alton suggests that its foundations lay in this canon law 
collection.36 In addition to the effects on the king of anointing, the texts in question also 
stressed the necessity for preserving oaths of fidelity, while further canons from the 
Sixth Council of Toledo prohibited usurpation while the king was still alive. Anselm 
stressed the need for those who might be tempted to join the ducal party to maintain 
their fidelity to Henry, and how accursed in the sight of God they would be should they 
fail to do so. The first canon of the Seventh Council of Toledo threatened 
excommunication against all those who conspired against the king.37 Though there is no 
evidence for the application of excommunication, Eadmer hints this sanction was 
actively considered by Anselm and had an effect on Robert Curthose.38 
33 Trinity MS B.l6.44, 328; Hinschius, 373-4; Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 91-116. 
34 Waee, lines 10413-8. 'AI due dient que pais/ei'st, e I rei/aire ne deust ne que/aite estre ne peilst, ker 
pois qu'i/ esteit eoronez; meilz voldreit ester a mort/eruz que del regne/ust abatuz.' 
3' Cf. Mark Philpott, ' .... pseudo-Isidorian canon law may have been one of the forces that shaped the 
English state under its Norman kings'. Philpott, 'Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State', 107. 
36 Eadmer HN, 127.8. 
37 Trinity MS B.l6.44, 336. 
38 Eadmer HN, 127.8. 
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The fact that Maurice, bishop of London, had crowned Henry appeared to have mattered 
little once Anselm had decided to support Henry, though at an earlier stage Henry was 
afraid of Anselm approaching Curthose with an offer of the throne.39 Overall, it is 
notable that unlike Rufus in similar circumstances in 1088, Henry and his advisors, 
especially Anselm, did not see his kingship as an office from which he could resign, nor 
did Curthose's supporters see themselves in the same light as the rebels of 1075, namely 
treating kingship as an office to be assumed or discarded. Taken as a whole, there is a 
prima facie case for suggesting that attitudes toward the concept of sacral kingship had 
changed among the aristocracy over the preceding twenty-five years.40 
Increasing respect for kingship did not, however, permit a diminution in the perceived 
rights and prerogatives of the aristocracy. Despite his 'unanswerable reason', Eadmer 
stated that Anselm initially hesitated at Alton, displaying a reluctance to openly accuse 
anyone of treason, yet unwilling to allow anyone to perjure himself.41 One interpretation 
of Anselm's confusion is to suggest that the same framework used to argue for the 
inviolability of the king also stressed the rights of senior aristocracy to be involved in 
the decision-making process; rights which had been ignored or circumvented in August 
1100. The text of the Fourth Council of Toledo laid great emphasis on the need for 
consultation in the process of choosing a king. Many of the most senior members of the 
cross-Channel elite, had been excluded from the decision-making process in the 
immediate aftermath of Rufus's death. News Henry's coronation reached Robert de 
Belleme and 'many other magnates', including Hugh of Chester, all of whom were in 
39 Eadmer HN, 120, 127-8; GR, 1,716; OV, 5, 314. Thomas, archbishop of York, had expressed concerns 
that Henry had infringed his rights by being crowned by Maurice, History o/the Church o/York, 18. 'Nee 
auditum habebat nee eeclesiastice consuetudinis erat regem nisi ab aliquo regni sui archiepiscopo 
consecrari debere'. 
40 See also, Garnett, 'The Origins of the Crown', 171-214. 
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Nonnandy, no doubt awaiting the return of Robert Curthose, who of course, was also 
excluded from the process.42 Other sources hint that this was the major concern of the 
aristocracy in 1101 and very different fonn the elaborate consultations of 1066.43 
A feature of many of the accounts that deal with Henry's relationship with the 
aristocracy during the period between his coronation and Curthose's landing in England 
is the emphasis on the aristocracy breaking the promises that it had made to Henry, 
allegedly without good reason. 44 The allegations of bad faith on both sides signalled a 
significant break in the political relationship between the king and substantial sections 
of the senior aristocracy. The accusations levelled against the aristocracy of making 
outrageous demands on Henry point towards a situation where the aristocracy were 
looking for the means to circumnavigate whatever promises had been made to Henry in 
the immediate aftennath of his coronation. In response, the apparent mockery of Henry 
and his wife by the aristocracy, who called them Godric and Godgifu, stands in contrast 
to the degree of respect accorded to Henry's kingship at Alton. The mockery can be 
regarded as a further reflection of what the senior aristocracy thought of Henry's actions 
and the search for a means to justify the circumstances of his kingship, and in particular, 
his marriage and the possible use of the doctrine ofporphyrogeniture.4s 
Given the importance of the role of the negotiators and the canon law texts used to 
frame the arguments each side put forward at Alton, it rapidly becomes obvious that 
they were at home in a world that required serious intellectual ability. The implication 
41 Eadmer HN, 127. 
42 OV. 5.298. 'Hugo Cestrensis comes et Rodbertus Belesmensis ac alii optimates qui erant in 
Normannia .... •. 
43 Brevis relatio. 37; OV. S. 290. 
44 OR. 1. 714. 
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from Eadmer's account is that the arguments put to potential rebels by Anselm had little 
effect on them. The narratives ofWace and William of Malmesbury point towards the 
negotiators bringing their own rationale to proceedings. They recognised the urgent need 
to restore relations between the two brothers and to repair their relations with the wider 
cross-Channel aristocracy. This sprang not merely from a practical standpoint of 
avoiding great bloodshed, but also as the means to underpin future political and legal 
relationships. The arguments put to Curthose repeatedly emphasised the dangers of 
instability if a lasting settlement could not be reached. 
Despite the ability of the negotiators to work within a complex theoretical framework, 
there was also an urgent need to be seen to effect a wider reconciliation and restore 
political equilibrium. 46 The reluctance of either side to engage in battle, portrayed 
vividly by Wace, suggests a political discourse at Alton heavily reliant on ritual to 
prevent a potentially dangerous situation escalating and to provide the means to transmit 
to the wider political body the message of peace and reconciliation.47 Supporters of 
Curthose urged him to offer a challenge to Henry to meet him in battle or renounce the 
crown.48 The advice given to Curthose to offer battle undoubtedly sprung from a 
recognition that it provided a mechanism to postpone bloodshed and open up renewed 
avenues of dialogue.49 Henry's behaviour before Alton suggests that he was not slow to 
recognise the need to observe correct forms and rituals. One of Henry's first writs after 
his coronation granted the abbeys at traditional crown wearing locations full livery and 
an ounce of gold for their chantries on each occasion the king wore his crown at those 
45 GR ,I, 708. 
46 Wace, linesI0435-439. 
47 Wace, lines 10397-472. 
48 OV, 5, 314. 
49 cr. Strickland, 'Provoking or Avoiding Battle', 325. 
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abbeys.50 Henry continued the practice of crown wearing, first at Gloucester for 
Christmas 1100 and then at Winchester for the following Easter.51 Even his decision to 
base his forces at Pevensey Bay in the summer of 1101, while awaiting his brother, 
suggests a possible ritual link to the events of 1066 and a desire to prevent his brother 
landing in the place his father had come ashore when pursing his claim to the English 
throne some thirty-five years earlier.52 
The response of Robert Curthose to Henry's action and his seizure of the English 
throne, his indignari, can also be located within a ritual framework and a distinctive 
political culture that emphasised the anger of one or both parties to a dispute as a 
necessary prerequisite for a restructuring of social and political relationships.s3 Such a 
display is not a purely emotional response, but a public expression of a political 
dissatisfaction. 54 Curthose's indignari signalled the beginning of the public process of 
reconciliation or satisfaction. Examples of such responses are found in similar 
circumstances. The Vita .lEwardi Regis, for example, recorded that Edward the 
Confessor's response to the negotiations at Southwark and reluctance of his men to fight 
the Godwins in 1052 was to be mad with anger. 55 
Torigni's characterisation of Curt hose's indignation has to be set against his earlier 
rhetorical scene, where Curthose response to William Rufus's succession is set out in 
so RRAN, 2, no. 490. 
51 ASC, E, 1101. 
52 Hollister, Henry I, 137; RRAN, 2, nos. 529, 530. Cf. Crouch, The Normans, 171, where Henry's 
decision to base himself at Pevensey is characterised by Crouch as a 'lack of originality'. 
53 GND, 2, 218; R. E. Barton, "Zealous Anger" and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in 
Eleventh and Twelfth Century France, Anger's Past, ed. B. Rosenwein (Cornell, 1998), 153-170; S. D. 
White, 'The Politics of Anger', 127-152. See also, S. Airlie, 'The history of emotions and emotional 
history', EME, 10 (2001),235-241. 
54 White, 'Politics of Anger', 139-40. 
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some detail.s6 There would have been no need to emphasise the implicit message in each 
scene. Avenues of expected consultation had been ignored and the political balance 
upset. Despite or perhaps because of this, both sides displayed a behaviour that signalled 
their belief in their legitimate rights to the wider political community. Likewise, once 
events had reached the stage where violence was a distinct possibility, the urgent need 
for a visible process of reconciliation found expression through ritual political 
behaviour. 
Wace's use of 'covenant' to describe the agreement reached at Alton suggests an 
atmosphere redolent in political ritual. S7 If ritual in itself maintains the belief in order, 
then the negotiations at Alton were clearly an elaborate piece of political theatre aimed 
at restoring order. S8 They were stage managed and conducted by intermediaries who 
understood the nuance of protracted and complex negotiations and would have been 
trusted by both sides.s9 This almost certainly accounts for the emphasis on negotiators in 
nearly all of the sources. In the cases of Or de ric and Eadmer, their respective stress on 
Henry and Robert settling the dispute personally or through the effort of Archbishop 
s, Vita &wardi Regis, ed. and trans. F. Barlow (Oxford, 1962),28; Edward the Confessor (London, 
1970), 123-4. 
56 GND 2 204' 
" , 
" Wace, line 10451. The Anglo Saxon Chronicle: A Collaborative Edition, MS E, 102; The Peterborough 
Chronicle Early English Manuscripts in Facsimile, ed. D. Whitelock, vol. 4 (Copenhagen, 1954), 135. 
Professor Michael Swanton used 'covenant' to describe the agreement of 1091 in his recent translation of 
the Peterborough recension of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, ed. and trans. M. 
Swanton, revised ed. (London, 2000) 226. The Old English noun used to describe the agreement of 1091 
isforwarde. The most recent English translations offorwarde, have rendered the noun as agreement, 
compact or treaty, A Thesaurus of Old English, ed. J. Roberts, C. King, L. Grundy (London, 1995), 1, 
630. This reflects the usage of the noun in all previous translations of the Chronicle, for example, The 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, trans. G. N. Garmonsway (London, 1955),221. Unless Swanton thought that the 
swearing of oaths significantly changed the meaning and interpretation offorwarde, it is difficult to see 
how his rendering of 'covenant' can be sustained in this context. Wace's use of the term to describe the 
agreement of 1101 is unambiguous and in the context of the information he provides concerning 
negotiations at Alton, carries connotations of ritual political activity. By contrast, the noun used in the 
Chronicle is, gesehtodian, meaning reconciliation, ASC, Swanton, 237. My thanks are due to Dr. Katie 
Lowe of the University of Glasgow for discussing this with me. 
58 Buc, 'Political Rituals and Political Imagination', 204. 
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Anselm, were a convenient way to side-step some tricky issues; notably the framework 
of separation for England and Nonnandy, something which Orderic thought was wrong, 
and Anselm's ineffectiveness.6o The evidence reveals that the agreement negotiated at 
Alton was the work of men with considerable political experience, who were deeply 
aware of the issues at stake, who knew precisely what was expected of them and how 
best to achieve their objectives. 
Nor should one imagine that the process was smooth. Wace's account leaves little doubt 
that both brothers were pressurised into accepting a settlement, a sentiment reflected in 
most sources. Eadmer suggested that Curthose lost confidence in the 'princes' who had 
supported him.61 Alternatively, Orderic's emphasis on the somewhat machiavellian 
advice of Robert of Meulan, not only covers Henry's duplicity in agreeing to an 
agreement he clearly had no intention of honouring, but also points to the pressure he 
must have been under to accept an agreement that would guarantee his crown.62 Only 
men of sufficient stature and standing could have had the prestige and power necessary 
to negotiate with both Henry and Curthose. 
Though both treaties contain similarities in many of their provisions, the aims of each 
treaty were fundamentally different. The essential difference between the two treaties 
lay in the circumstances of their negotiation. In 1091, account had to be taken of the 
unprecedented nature of Rufus's intervention into Nonnandy and the territorial gains he 
had made. Consequently, many of the provisions of the Treaty of Rouen were concerned 
59 See the comments of Timothy Reuter, 'Assembly Politics in Western Europe from the Eighth Century to 
the Twelfth', Medieval World, 432-450. 
60 OV, 5, 318; Eadmer HN, 127-8. For Orderic's attitude to the aristocracy and negotiations for the 
separation of England and Normandy, see, Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War Reconsidered', 172-3. 
61 Eadmer HN, 128. 
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with dealing with this, as well as with the wider issue of the disputed English 
succession. The framework thus devised by the negotiators was one that stressed the 
reciprocal nature of the relationship between the two brothers, and sought to 
accommodate the legacy of their actions over the previous four years in a cross-Channel 
framework, though one that ultimately had a permanent separation of England and 
Normandy as the ultimate long-term aim. By contrast, the aims of the Treaty of 
Winchester were far more definite in seeking the permanent separation of England and 
Normandy from the start. Apart from Henry's reluctance to relinquish Domfront, there 
was no attempt to tie Curthose or Henry into any sort of cross-Channel political 
structure. 
The crucial question in 1091 was the effects and impact of Rufus's intervention into 
Normandy during the previous year, and in particular, the terms on which the lordships 
and castles ceded to him were to remain in his possession. The extent of the lands 
granted to Rufus would seem to have included Aumale and possibly Saint Valery, and 
support the assertion that Rufus exercised a wide lordship over many of those who lived 
north of the Seine and who had joined with Rufus in 1090 and received gifts in retum.63 
One such individual, Gerard de Goumay, had handed Rufus custody of his castles of 
Goumay, La Ferte-en-Bray and Gaillefontaine, all of which occupied the high ground 
between the Epte and Bresle.64 
The immediacy of Rufus to some of their most important lordships may have 
encouraged the likes of Gerard de Goumay and Ralph de Tosny in their loyalty to 
62 OV, 5, 316. 
63 GND, 2, 206; OV, 4, 182. 
64 OV, 4, 182. 
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Rufus, and stimulated the search for a framework to establish peace. During the fighting 
between Ralph and William, count of Evreux, in 1090, Ralph appealed to Rufus for 
help, who then ordered Stephen of Aumale, Gerard de Gournay and the 'other military 
leaders who were in charge of his retainers in Normandy' to lend Ralph full support.6S 
The obvious threat to any lasting prospect of peace would be the mixing of private, 
localised warfare with the wider struggle between Rufus and Curthose. An attempt to 
forestall this was built into the treaty with the stipulation that those lands and castles 
held by Rufus and his supporters were to remain in their hands, without interference. 
Whether this had any bearing on Orderic's observation that under the terms of the 1091 
treaty the whole lands of Gerard and Ralph were granted to Rufus is a moot point.66 
Gerard had interests in lower Normandy around Ecouche and Exmes, while Ralph de 
Tosny held lands around Conches itself and in the strategically important Eure valley.67 
Orderic was certainly the most detailed observer when analysing the extent of Rufus's 
inroads into Normandy. At one stage, Orderic suggested that Rufus controlled twenty 
castra within Normandy and had the support of many important members of the 
political elite, particularly the frontier and cross border magnates, including Robert, 
count ofEu, Stephen of Aumale, Robert, count of Me ulan, Walter Giffard, Philip de 
6S 0 V, 4, 214. 'Deinde Stephano comiti et Girardo de Gornaco aliisque tribunis et centurionibus qui 
preerant in Normanniafamilis eius mandauit ut Radulfum totis adiuuarent nisibus, et oppida eius 
munirent necessariis omnibus.' 
66 OV, 4, 236. 
67 For Gerard de Gournay see; OV, 3, 322, 4, 186; F. M. Powicke, Loss o/Normandy, 1189-1204: Studies 
in the History o/the Angevin Empire, 2nd Revised Edition (Manchester and New York, 1961),341, 
Recueil des Actes de Henri II, ed. L. Delisle and E. Berger, 4 vols (Paris, 1909-27),2, no. 744; Sauvage, 
Saint Pierre-sur-Dives, 131-9. For the Gournay lands in general see, D. Gurney, The Record o/the House 
0/Gournay, 4 vols (London, 148-58), 1, 167. It is possible that Gerard also held a claim to the lands of 
Robert of Gace, see Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', 108. It is not clear whether the area known as 
Conquets Hue de Gournay was included at this point. In her translation of Orderic, Majorie Chibnall 
followed Lemarignier and certainly thought so. OV, 4,182, n. 4; Lemarignier, Homage en marche, 21.21. 
See also, Tabuteau, Trans/ers 0/ Property, 223-4. For the possible extent of the lands of Ralph de Tosny 
see; Lucien Musset, 'Aux origines d'une classe dirigeante: les Tosny, grands barons normands du Xe au 
XIIIe siecle', Francia, v (1977),53; OV, 3, 126; Bates, Regesta, nos. 61, 164, 165, 192. 
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Briouze and Richard de Courcy.68 IfOrderic's assertion is taken seriously, then the 
greatest extent of the lands and castles granted to Rufus may have exceeded the areas he 
directly controlled in the north-east of Normandy and around Cherbourg. 
Even a moderate assessment of the extent of Rufus's inroads suggests that the keystone 
to any future relationship between Rufus and Curthose lay in the degree of reciprocity 
and trust in the relations between the two men created by the Treaty of Rouen. Despite 
Rufus's success, the majority of the aristocracy within upper Normandy had remained 
loyal to Robert Curthose. In these circumstances, the most ambitious aim of the treaty 
was to create a legal and political framework that acknowledged the changed 
circumstances and relations between the two brothers, yet would allow future relations 
to be stable and peaceful. The means to do this was that Rufus probably had to accept 
and acknowledge his status, as Curthose's subordinate for the lands he held in 
Normandy.69 
The nature of this new relationship found immediate expression in a number of ways. 
One was the judicial inquest into the ducal rights held under the Conqueror.70 In the 
documentation, Curthose is consistently referred to as 'count' and always precedes 
Rufus, who is addressed as king of England. Both brothers are jointly styled the sons 
and heirs of King William.71 The participation of Rufus in this process, and his 
appearance by name in the clause which safeguards all the rights of interested parties not 
recorded in the document, reveal that a very real effort was made to give him a lasting 
68 OV, 4,236; Barlow, Rufus, 282. 
69 Barlow, Rufus, 282-3. 
70 Haskins, NI, 277. 
71 Haskins, NI, 281. 
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political role.72 Though Rufus had done much to undermine Curthose's rule, the timing 
and wording of the inquest into ducal rights suggest an attempt to give further clarity to 
Curthose's rights as duke, not necessarily because they had been undermined per se, but 
also to take account of the new relationship that had emerged between the two brothers 
within Normandy. The explicit investigation into ducal rights as they stood under the 
Conqueror suggests a conscious attempt to create a template of conduct in order to 
prevent further disruption and dispute. 
If the Consuetudines et Iusticie looked to the past to redress present wrongs and secure 
the future, the key short-term obligation placed upon Rufus in the treaty was to 
campaign against all challenges to ducal authority within Normandy. The earliest 
manifestation of this came in the joint campaign by both brothers against their younger 
sibling at Mont Saint-Michel. John of Worcester is the only source to suggest that Rufus 
was to have possession of Mont Saint-Michel under the terms of the Treaty of Rouen, 
but it seems unlikely that Rufus actually gained possession of Mont Saint-Michel, given 
that Rufus subsequently departed from Normandy 'unappeased' after a long siege.73 Yet, 
in the context of the relationship between Rufus and Curthose created by the treaty, it 
seems highly likely that Rufus campaigned against Henry as a subordinate of Curthose. 
William of Malmesbury's account of the siege of Mont Saint-Michel contains a story 
traditionally used to interpret Curthose's 'compassion'. According to William of 
Malmesbury, during the course of the siege, Henry complained ofa growing water 
72 Haskins, NI, 284; Barlow, Rufus, 283. 
73 John of Worcester, 3, 58. The implication from John of Worcester is that Rufus departed without 
gaining possession of Mont Saint-Michel. This would depend upon the translation of impacatus as 
'unappeased'. However, Barlow suggested alternative meanings for impacatus including, 'unpeacefully', 
'without having settled the matter' or even, 'angrily', Barlow, Rufus, 285, n. 96. 
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shortage among the defenders. Henry reminded Curthose of how access to water was a 
common right of all people. In turn, Curthose ordered that the besiegers relax their 
guard and Henry's men be allowed to bring water through the blockade. Rufus was 
furious and questioned the conduct of the war. Curthose's reply was that if Henry was 
allowed to die of thirst, where would they find another brother.74 The various sources for 
this story all contain a degree of consistency and plausibility. Robert of Torigni stated 
that Rufus and Curthose quarrelled during the siege, enabling Henry to evacuate the 
Mount unchallenged.7s Orderic states that with water running short, Henry negotiated 
the surrender of the Mount on honourable terms.76 
The crucial factor is that Curthose's supposed clemency needs to be seen within the 
context of the relationship between the two elder brothers created by the Treaty of 
Rouen, and the wider relationship enjoyed by all three brothers. It is significant that 
Henry appealed to Curthose over the lack of water. Though the traditional interpretation 
has always been that Curthose was the weaker of Henry's two elder brothers, it might 
equally be true that the terms of Henry's appeal were those ofa subordinate to his lord, a 
relationship created by the grant ofthe Cotentin, if not an earlier oath.77 Charter 
evidence from the year after the death of the Conqueror reveals that both Curthose and 
Henry had close collaborative relations.7s Curthose's apparent clemency in allowing 
Henry water was an effective demonstration of lordship over both his younger siblings. 
Rufus's response to this episode can be interpreted as that of the commander in the field 
seeing his efforts undone, but also an expression of the genuine animosity he felt 
740R, 1,552 
7S GND, 2, 206. 
76 OV, 4, 250. 
77 Davis, 'Norman Succession', 131-40; OV, 5, 318. 
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towards Henry.79 Wace went so far as to suggest Rufus hated Henry, largely due to the 
money he had supplied to Curthose in 1088.80 Though the campaign against Henry may 
have suited both brothers, Rufus may have felt that Curthose lacked a sense of urgency. 
Curthose's participation in Rufus's campaign to Scotland in 1091 only makes sense 
when seen within the context of the collaboration enjoined by the Treaty of Rouen. 
Robert had previously commanded an expedition into Scotland in 1080 as a 
representative of the Conqueror, when he and Malcolm III had met.81 By participating in 
Rufus's expedition eleven years later, Curthose was not only recognising the legitimacy 
of Rufus's kingship in an extremely practical and forceful way, but also providing 
service as a subordinate of Rufus, almost certainly in anticipation of a grant oflands to 
Curthose within England, as stipulated in the treaty. In essence, the actions of both 
brothers were public recognition of their respective rights and tied them into a 
relationship that balanced itself in terms of their obligations to one another. 
The creation of a subordinate relationship between Rufus and Curthose within 
Normandy ensured that those Norman lords who had defected to Rufus in the course of 
1090 would not be penalised. This framework would help to explain the role of the 
French king Philip I in the peace process. Robert of Torigni is clear in his account that 
peace was established in 1091 through the intervention ofPhilip.82 The importance of 
78 Both Henry and Curthose appear on several charters in the aftennath of the Conqueror's death. See, D. 
Bates, 'A Charter of William the Conqueror and Two of His Sons', Tabularia, forthcoming. My thanks 
are due to Professor Bates for allowing me to see a copy of the article prior to publication. 
79 The differentiation in roles may explain why Rufus established his headquarters at Avranches, with 
another body of knights at Ardevon, close to the abbey, while Curthose established himself at the village 
of Genets, some ten kilometres from the abbey, on the north shore of the Baie de Mont Saint-Michel. 
Wace, lines, 9535; Barlow, Rufus, 2S4; Hollister, Henry I, SO. 
80 Wace,lines, 9449-94. 
:~ On Curthose's status in 10SO, see Holt, Colonial England, Appendix 2, 150. 
GND, 2, 206. 
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Philip's intervention was not so much in its military value to Curthose, but in the legal 
status of the duchy of Normandy as a county within the wider regnum Francorum, and 
the theoretically subordinate relationship between the Norman duke and the French 
king.B3 This made it possible to get around the problem of previous homage having been 
given to Curthose by all of the Norman aristocracy, including, almost certainly, 
Curthose's younger brothers.84 
The Treaty of Rouen also addressed the question on the English succession. In stark 
terms, unlike the situation in 1101, there is no evidence that Curthose renounced his 
claim to the English throne in 1091. Despite this, it appears that the treaty dealt with 
many of the outstanding issues relating to the succession. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle 
noted that 'during the course of the reconciliation' between Rufus and Curthose, Edgar 
iEtheling was deprived of the Norman lands that had been given to him. Afterwards, 
Edgar found refuge in Scotland for a second time, with his sister Margaret and her 
husband Malcolm 111.8' Edgar's status as one of Curt hose's chief counsellors in 1090 
suggests that the exile of Edgar was a concession granted by Curthose to his brother!6 
John of Worcester certainly implies this, noting that action against Edgar took place 
after the campaign against Henry at Mont Saint-Michel, and at the instigation of Rufus.87 
Orderic offers the most convincing motive for depriving Edgar of his lands. In addition 
to acting as a counsellor to Curthose, Orderic suggests that the two men enjoyed a close 
personal relationship to the extent that they were considered to be akin to foster 
83 See also, Bates, 'England and Normandy', 861-2. 
84 Davis, 'Norman Succession.', 131-40; Barlow, Rufus, 283. 
:: ASC, E. 1091. See also, G. Barrow, 'Companions of the IEtheling', ANS, 25 (2003),35-45. 
OV,4,186. 
87 John of Worcester, 3, 58, 60. 
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brothers.88 Rufus's concerns over Edgar appear therefore not to be motivated out of a 
fear that Edgar might lay claim to the English throne with Curthose's support, but rather 
that any future claim by Curthose could attract support from Edgar. In practical terms, 
Edgar's status as the last legitimate 'native' claimant to the English throne was 
potentially important in two ways. First, the framework for selecting a king, contained in 
Pseudo-Isidore and used to crown Rufus in 1087, stressed the consultative role of the 
'headmen of the people' to be involved in the process, a role Edgar fulfilled. Second, 
though there is no evidence that Edgar had been involved in the selection of Rufus in 
1087, the legacy of the English support in 1088 suggests that his status vis-a.-vis the 
native English could prove crucial in guaranteeing the legitimacy of any future Curthose 
kingship. It is noticeable that when Curthose and Rufus quarrelled at the end of 1091, 
Curthose ensured that Edgar returned to Normandy with him.s9 In this context, Frank 
Barlow's argument for a proposed marriage between Rufus and Malcolm Ill's daughter 
Mathilda, takes on an added significance and suggests that as late as the autumn of 
1093, Rufus was open to suggestions to further secure his throne.90 
The hostility of Rufus and Curthose towards their younger brother is an intrinsic part of 
the treaty negotiations.91 According to William of Malmesbury, Henry was left almost 
destitute by the greed of the two brothers in dividing up their paternal inheritance and 
occupied Mont Saint-Michel as a result.92 Orderic puts things differently, noting that 
Henry brought 'important pleas' against both brothers and demanded a share in the 
88 ov, 5, 272. 
89 Barlow, Rufus, 296. 
90 Barlow, Rufus, 310-17. 
91 GND, 2, 206. 
92GR, 1,550. 
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possessions of his father.93 No source suggests that Rufus and Curthose thought that 
Henry had any designs on the English throne, and Henry had been completely excluded 
from consideration in 1087; porphyrogeniture was not a factor in anyone's thinking. The 
emphasis in 1091 appears to have been on Henry's position within the cross-Channel 
polity as the youngest son of the Conqueror. Robert ofTorigni certainly phrases his 
account in that context, noting that instead of providing Henry with an 'honourable' life 
as befitting the son of a king, Rufus and Curthose tried to drive Henry from all of his 
father's lands.94 
By way of contrast, the provisions of the Treaty of Winchester present a simplified 
situation. Both Warren Hollister and Judith Green have noted some of the difficulties 
and contradictory provisions within the treaty.9S Unlike the treaty of 1091, there was no 
attempt to create any sort of reciprocal relationship. The emphasis was very much on 
creating a framework that achieved short-term peace and security, but aimed to sustain 
the long-term separation of England and Normandy as political units. The crucial clause 
is not so much Curthose's repudiation of his claim to the English throne, but the 
provision that related to future succession. Christopher Holdsworth has suggested that 
this 'represented no very significant concession' for either brother.96 However, Henry's 
wife was approaching her fourth month of pregnancy at the time the treaty was 
negotiated, while Curthose had been married for a year and could probably expect to 
93 ov, 5,250. 
94 GND, 2, 206. 'Cum igitur fratrem suum Henricum debuissent adiuuare eique prouidere, ut sicutfrater 
eorum et filius regis honorabiliter posset uiuere, de tota terra patris sui eum expellere conati sunt'. 
Brevis Relatio, 36. According to the Brevis, ' ... Henry remained in Nonnandy with his brother Robert who 
gave him some land in Normandy, but he did not enjoy it for long. For shortly afterwards on some 
despicable pretext Robert took it away from him.' 
9S Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', MMI, 92-3; Green, 'Robert Curthose Reassessed', 112. 
96 Holdsworth, 'Peace Making', 3. 
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produce a child in the near future.97 It seems incredible, therefore, that the negotiators 
would insert this particular provision, and in these circumstances, unless their intention 
had been to achieve what the Conqueror had attempted to do in 1087, namely to 
separate England and Normandy and to establish the future means to transmit the 
English crown as smoothly as possible. 
Contemporaries, near-contemporaries, and modern historians have all struggled to 
understand the aims and importance of the two treaties. In part, no doubt, this is due to 
the fact that neither treaty achieved its aims. Many of those involved in the negotiations, 
such as Robert de Belleme and William of Mortain, paid a heavy price for their failure 
to create a lasting peace. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicler contented himself with the single 
comment that the Treaty of Rouen did not last for long.98 Orderic concluded that though 
Robert Curthose had ceded a great part of Normandy to Rufus for nearly two years, 
during that time Normandy was free from war and disturbance, a statement that can only 
be interpreted in the context of relations between Curthose and Rufus, and not the 
general state of peace within Normandy. 99 
Robert of Torigni thought the treaty was 'shameful' and 'injurious' to Curthose.lOo Yet 
Torigni's comments are perhaps a little unfair. It must be remembered that Rufus's 
actions were a departure from previous conflict among the ducal kin precisely because 
he was the king of England. He had achieved an extraordinary and unprecedented 
97 Hollister, Henry I, 142; 'Anglo-Nonnan Civil War', MMI, 92, n.4. Hollister calculates the length of 
Mathilda's pregnancy based upon entries by the Winchester annalist, Symeon of Durham and the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle, on the age at which Mathilda was sent to Gennany in 1110, to be betrothed to the 
Emperor Henry V, Annales Monastici, 2, 43; Symeon, Opera, 2, 241, ASC, E, 1110. Hollister relied upon 
the entry in BL MS Caligula, A viii, fol. 41 for the date of William Clito's birth on 25 October 1102. 
98 ASC, E, 1091. 
99 OV, 4,252. 'Nunc Robertus dux magnam partem Normanniae Guillelmo regis concessit fereque 
duobus annis a bellis Normannia quieuit.' 
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situation within the Norman polity. Sailing in what were uncharted waters, the Treaty of 
Rouen sought to 'normalise' the situation by reducing Rufus's status in Normandy to 
that of a ducal vassal, albeit an extraordinarily powerful one. What is even more 
remarkable is that Curthose apparently made a concerted attempt to make the settlement 
work. It not until the Christmas of 1093 that messengers arrived from Robert at 
Gloucester where Rufus was holding court to inform him that unless he fulfilled his part 
of the agreement Curthose would repudiate it. 101 Though it is far from clear precisely 
what terms Rufus had failed to fulfil, there is no record of any grant of lands to Curthose 
within England. Moreover, John of Worcester provides reason to believe that Rufus may 
have continued to undermine, rather than support, Curthose's rule within Normandy, 
noting that in 1093, the new count of Mortain abandoned 'his natural lord' in favour of 
Rufus's promises of gold and honours. l02 
The recruitment of the new Count of Mortain may also be evidence that would suggest 
that Rufus had not entirely given up any ambitions to reconstitute his father's cross-
Channel realm and actively sought support within Normandy.l03 Significantly, at some 
point between the summer of 1096 and January 1098 Rufus gave Saint-Etienne in Caen 
an English manor in exchange for the monastery relinquishing to him his father's 
regalia. l04 Whether this is conclusive evidence of Rufus's ambitions is a moot point. 
Rufus's protectorate of the duchy after 1096 meant that for the first time since 1087 a 
single ruler was the defacto ruler of England and Normandy.los More importantly, his 
100 GND, 2, 206. ' .. . probrosa atque damnosa'. 
101 ASC, E, 1094; John o/Worcester, 3, 68. 
102 John of Worcester, ' .. a naturali domno suo Rotberto ..... de/ecit ... ' . 
103 If so, this appears to have been the only significant recruitment and must be set against Rufus's 
inactivity in recruiting supporters late in his protectorate of Normandy, once it was clear that Curthose 
was returning home from the Crusade. Barlow, Rufus, 413-6 
104 RRAN, 1, no. 397; Musset, Abbayes Cannaises, no. 24. 
lOS English, 'William the Conqueror and the Anglo-Norman Succession', 235. 
207 
decision to petition for the regalia was done with the advice of the senior members of 
the aristocracy and Church on both sides of the Channe1.106 
In 1094, however, the guarantors of the treaty judged Rufus to be at fault, a decision he 
refused to accept. 10' The judgement was not without significance. For Rufus, though 
able to ignore the judgement and resume hostilities against Curthose, the decision added 
to his growing difficulties and contributed to the revolt of 1095. Even more remarkable 
perhaps, was that the guarantors of the treaty had actually judged Rufus to be at fault in 
the first place, acting as impartial judges, rather than partisans to each side. lOS Though 
ultimately unable to hold Rufus to the treaty, the role and decisions of the guarantors at 
least suggest that the aristocracy had little wish to see the uncertainty and instability of 
the previous five years. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, the Treaty of Winchester envisaged a much simpler 
relationship between Curthose and Henry than had been the case with Rufus. The treaty 
itself reflected the awareness of the limitations of violence to effect long-term political 
change, but also the sheer intractability of the conflicting ambitions of the Conqueror's 
sons. Arguably, what the treaty did not account for was the determination of Henry to 
reconstitute his father's cross-Channel dominions, though the evidence explored in 
Chapters Five and Six, suggest that the two greatest Anglo-Norman magnates doubted 
that Henry would honour the agreement. There is no mention within the sources of any 
106 Musset, Abbayes Cannaises, no.24. 'procerum et religiosarum personarum Anglie et Normannie 
consilio .. '. 
107 ASC, E, 1094. 
108 Tabuteau, 'Transfers of Property', 165. 
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repeat of the guarantors of the treaty judging Henry to be at fault for its failure. 109 
Professor Edmund King concluded his discussion on dispute settlement in Anglo-
Norman England with the observation that in the context of medieval disputes, 'nineteen 
long winters' was not a particularly long time. The evidence from the Treaties of Rouen 
and Winchester suggests that for those among the Anglo-Norman aristocracy who were 
most intimately affect by the issue of divided lordship 'nineteen long winters' could 
indeed be a very long time. \10 
109 See below, Chapter 6, for the actions of Robert I de Stuteville and Reginald de Warenne in 1102. 
\10 King, 'Dispute Settlement', 150. 
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Chapter 8 
Religious Patronage, Marriage and Inheritance 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine specific aspects of the religious patronage, 
marital strategies and inheritance patterns of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy for the 
period between 1087-1106. The effect will be to suggest that these patterns of activity, 
when analysed within the broader context of the political framework advanced 
throughout this thesis, can be read not only as a response to the wider politics of the 
1090s and early 1100s, but also as a commentary on them. As such, it is crucial to stress 
that the material handled in this chapter will be selective rather than comprehensive and 
an attempt to open up new insights on an already well defined corpus of work that 
relates to these areas. In terms of inheritance practices, the rejection of the framework of 
acquets and propres to explain the partition of 1087 shifts the thrust of analysis towards 
understanding how partition provided an impetus for their further development. I In all 
areas, there is an urgent need for further in-depth study that will fully integrate these 
aspects of the wider social and political culture of the aristocracy into a wider narrative, 
something that is quite clearly beyond the scope of a single chapter in a thesis. 
The work of Emma Cownie on Anglo-Norman religious patronage is notable starting 
point for any analysis.2 Her recent and important study has done much to illuminate the 
plurality of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy's experience and motivation in founding and 
patronising religious institutions. In particular, Cownie identified some general patterns 
of activity between 1087 and 1106, the character of which she attributed to the political 
I Cf. J.C. Holt, 'Notions of Patrimony', reprinted Colonial England, 215. 'The rule, like the acquisitions 
themselves, was probably a product of the Conquest.' 
2 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, and in the context of this thesis, especially 
Chapter 11, 'Religious Patronage and the Anglo-Norman Realm', 185-206. 
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'crises' of the 1090s and early 1100s. In broad terms, Cownie traced a shift in activity 
away from establishing alien priories by founders of Norman origins, to a situation 
where new foundations were largely without continental connections and generally 
regarded as expressions loyalty and commitment to the new regime, often founded by 
men who had remained loyal to Rufus in 1088.3 Thus, before 1096 only two alien 
priories were established as the cells of Norman institutions; Roger de Bully's 
foundation of Blyth as a cell of La Trinite- du-Mont, Rouen, in 1088 and Lancaster, 
founded as a cell of Saint Martin de Sees by Roger Le Poitevin in 1094.4 In contrast, 
founders from other regions in France were still active, establishing the seven remaining 
alien priories for this period.' Under Henry I, founders of Norman origin resumed their 
activities and the balance swung back in favour of establishing cells of Norman houses, 
though the founders active in this period were not among the elite of the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy. Cownie concluded by suggesting that under Rufus, potential founders with 
Norman interests adopted a wait-and-see stance, whereas under Henry, there was a 
recognition among sections of the aristocracy of the need to buttress the bonds that 
existed between their holdings on that existed on either side of the Channe1.6 
As Cownie freely admitted, it is not easy to pinpoint the changes between 1087-96 and 
1100-06 that explain these patterns of activity within England.' Her comment on the 
aristocracy adopting a 'wait-and-see' attitude can, however, be refined much further. 
There is little doubt that among the aristocracy many men continued to think in cross-
Channel terms in the years immediately after partition. The most obvious example is 
3 For example, William II de Warenne founded Castle Acre as a cell of his father's Cluniac foundation of 
Lewes, while Hugh, earl of Chester, re-founded St Werburgh abbey in Chester. 
4 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 188. 
5 The mother-houses of new cells in England were the abbeys of La Charite-sur-Loire, Marmoutier, Saint-
Vincent ofLe Mans, Saints Sergius and Bachus, Angers. 
6 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 191. 
, Cownie, ReligiOUS Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 190. 
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Roger de Bully's foundation of Blyth in Nottinghamshire, as a cell of La Trinite-du-
Mont, Rouen, in 1088.8 There are several aspects to this grant that are of significance. 
Fortunately, and somewhat unusually, the actual dating of the foundation can be 
established with some certainty. The pro anima clause of the foundation charter stated 
that the priory was founded 'pro stabilitate regis Anglorum Willelmi sueeessorumque 
eius nee non et pro anime regine Matildis'. A writ of Henry I to the sheriffs of Suffolk, 
Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire, ordered that the monks of Blyth should have their 
tithes and customs' ... . tempore patris mei et jratris mei et Rogeri de Rulli'.9 As there is 
no record of the priory in Domesday, these two statements suggest that the priory must 
have been founded between 1086 and September 1087, with the charter recording in 
1088 what had been done earlier.lo Though impossible to date further, to either before or 
after the rebellion of 1088, the significant point is that during a period where tensions 
must have been building or in the immediate aftermath of the revolt, Roger was still 
thinking in cross-Channel terms and patronising an institution which had previously 
been under the Norman dukes' special protection. ll 
Though the largest landholder in Nottinghamshire, whose honour may well have been 
based upon the lordship of the pre-Conquest earl, Edwin, Roger de Bully's Norman 
connections were pronounced.12 His association with La Trinite had begun before the 
Conquest. 13 Significantly, despite gaining the honour ofTickhill, Roger retained the 
8 Cartulary of Blyth Priory, ed. R. T. Timson, 2 vols, Thornton Society Record Series, HMSO (London, 
1973),2, no. 36l. The first volume of the cartulary contains an expanded later version of this 'simple' 
foundation charter, I, no. 325. See, R. Mortimer, 'Anglo-Norman Lay Charters, 1066-c.1100', ANS, 25 
(2002), 173-4. 
9 Cartulary of Blyth Priory, no. 295. 
10 Cartulary o/Blyth Priory, I, 'Introduction', 27-8. DB, 1,285. 
11 See, J. Yver, 'Autour de l'absence d'avouerie en Normandie', BSAN, 57 (1965), 202-7. 
12 D. Roffe, Domesday. The Inquest and the Book, (Oxford, 2000), 37. 
13 Cartulaire de /'abbey de /a Sainte Trinite-du-Mont de Rouen, ed, A. Deville, in Cartulaire de /'abbaye 
de Saint-Bertin, ed. B. Guerard (Paris, 1840),403-87, no. 63; Faroux, no. 200. 
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Norman toponymic of Bully. 14 Orderic suggested that Roger was a kinsman of Robert 
de Belleme, though, as Majorie Chibnall has suggested, probably no more than a distant 
cousin, and he held Blackburn as a gift from Roger the Poitevin. IS Links to the counts of 
Eu also existed, as Roger's daughter or possibly sister, Beatrice, was the first wife of 
William, the son of Robert, count of Eu.16 In addition, Roger's wife, Muriel, had 
belonged to the entourage of Queen Mathilda, and may have been a relative since 
Mathilda gave the manor of Sandford in Devon to Roger and his wife on their 
marriage." During 1088, Roger was in the company of Rufus, and his allegiances 
appeared to have been confirmed by his patronage of St Peter's, Gloucester, along with 
other notable loyalists.18 He also appears on Rufus's charter for Bath abbey in 1091, and 
may have been part of the negotiations that preceded the Treaty of Rouen in 1091.19 
Though the crucial point about Blyth is the date of the foundation, there are several 
aspects to its foundation charter that warrant close attention and may, in part, hint 
towards the difficulties of this period. Roger's foundation must have had the sanction of 
Rufus, though no record of any confirmation survives.20 The implication from Henry's 
writ is that Rufus did at some point confirm the monks with tithes and privileges and 
may have confirmed the actual foundation. However, given the date at which the charter 
was drawn up, the text is somewhat ambiguous in noting that Blyth was to confer 
spiritual benefits on the 'successors' of the Conqueror, rather than explicitly naming 
14 J. C. Holt, 'What's in a name?', Colonial England, 186. 
IS OV, 5,224-6; DB, 1, 270a; Chibnall, 'Robert of Belle me and the Castle ofTickhill', 151-2. 
16 Domesday People, 404. COEL, Person no. 605. Under the entry for William ofEu, Beatrice is 
identified as Roger's sister. COEL, Person no. 2150. This undoubtedly reflects the entry in the Complete 
Peerage, 5, 151-6. Judith Green favours regarding Beatrice as Roger's daughter. Green, Aristocracy, 90. 
" DB, 1, 113a; Chibnall, 'Robert of Belleme and the Castle ofTickhill', 152. 
18 Barlow, Rufus, 95; Sancti Petri Gloucestriae, 2, 126. Bates, Regesta, no. 157. 
19 RRAN, 1, no. 315; Above, Chapter 7. 
20 Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 188. 
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William Rufus.21 This is reinforced ifthe Blyth charter is compared to the charter of 
Ilbert de Lacy, who gave La Trinite the manor of Tingewick in Buckinghamshire, and 
where the donation was made explicitly for the soul of 'his lord king William', and may 
date from the same period as the Blyth charter.22 Ilbert is recorded in Domesday holding 
Tingewick from Odo of Bayeux with no mention of La Trinite.23 Ilbert's ability to grant 
Tingewick to La Trinite undoubtedly reflected his loyalty to Rufus in 1088, where the 
manor must have been given to Ilbert as a reward, who subsequently deemed it a 
suitable donation to give to La Trinite. Though conjectural, the difference between the 
two texts may reflect the strength of Roger de Bully's Norman ties, with the Blyth 
charter the slightly earlier of the two and Rufus perhaps reluctant to confirm the 
foundation of Blyth, until Roger had proved his loyalty in 1088. 
Earl Hugh of Chester's re-foundation of the abbey of abbey of St Werburgh in 1092 has 
been interpreted as a sign of political commitment to the regime of William Rufus.24 
Analyses of the donations made by Hugh's tenants to St Werburgh reinforce the sense 
ofhonorial integrity.2' Yet the foundation charter for St Werburgh also suggests that 
Hugh was fully aware of the cross-Channel dimension to politics in the early 1090s and 
this was reflected in the vast list of individuals and groups of individuals whose souls 
21 Cartualry o/Blyth Priory, no. 361, 'pro stabilitate regis Anglorum Willelmi successorumque eius nec 
non et pro anime regine Mati/dis'. 
22 The MS is Winchester College Muniments 1134 and reads: 'Notum sit omnibus Christian is tam 
uiuentibus quam/uturis quod ego Hilbertus de Laceio una cum Haduide uxore meas do mansionem 
Tinsuicz Sancte Trinitati de Monte Rotomagensi, terram scilicet cum aqua & pratis & siluis omnibusque 
ad ipsam mansionem attinentibus pro anima mea atque domini mei Willelmi Regis & animabus parentum 
et amicorum meorum necnon & uxoris meefiliique mei Hugonis pro eo quod et ipse supradictusfilius 
meus in loco requiescit & decimam de Fraiteuilla'. Printed in Mortimer, 'Anglo-Norman Lay Charters', 
157, n. 17. A facsimile and commentary can be found in, M. Clanchy, Memory to Written Record, 2nd 
Edition (Oxford, 1993), Plate I. 
23 DB, 1, 14Sa; Mortimer, 'Anglo-Norman Lay Charters', 158. 
24 For the re-foundation ofSt Werburgh see, Eadmer HN, 27-9. For an interpretation of its political 
significance see, Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman England, 189. 
2' The Charters o/the Anglo-Norman Earls o/Chester, c. 1071-1237, ed. G. Barraclough, The Record 
Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 126 (1988), no.3; The Cartulary or Register o/the Abbey o/St 
Werburgh, ed. J. Tait, Chetham Society, new ser., 79 (1920), 82 (1923), no. 3; Cownie, ReligiOUS 
Patronage, 176-77; C. P. Lewis, 'The formation of the honor of Chester 1066-1100', The earldom 0/ 
Chester and its Charters, Journal o/Chester Archaeological Society, 61 (1991),37-68. 
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the monastery was meant to benefit, namely 'King William, and William his father the 
most noble king, and his mother Mathilda the queen, and his brothers and sisters, and 
King Edward, that for the salvation of their souls, and for the souls of his father, mother, 
and antecessores, and heirs, and kin, and the barons and all the Christians alive and 
deceased' .26 
The significant part of this list is the specific linking together of Rufus, the Conqueror 
and Edward the Confessor, as ifto emphasise the continuity in English kingship, and 
may be further evidence of the wider cultural changes brought about by Domesday, and 
which are so prevalent in the writs from this period.27 Significantly, also listed in the pro 
anima clause was a mention of Rufus's brothers. Given the date at which this charter 
was drawn up, the wording of this clause may reflect the immediate aftermath of the 
Treaty of Rouen, and the first attempt to establish a separate co-existence of England 
and Normandy. With substantial estates in western Normandy, it may have been 
politically prudent for Hugh to make reference to the Conqueror's heirs, even in the 
most general of forms, in a foundation charter for a specifically English institution. In 
this context, Hugh's foundation charter ought to be included in a wider array of texts, 
including the double confirmations that reflect the wider perceptions of the political 
process during this period. 
In the case of Robert de Mowbray, evidence of cross-Channel or extensive patronage 
within England is non-existent. However, Robert's relations with Bishop William de St 
Calais and the monks of St Cuthbert in Durham, provide an effective commentary on 
26 Anglo-Norman Charters, no. 3, '.,pro utilitate anime Regis Willelmi et Willeimi patris regis nobilissimi 
regis et atris eius Mathi/dis reginefratrumque et sororum eius atque regis Eadwardi, quam pro 
animarum suarum salute et pro animarum suarum salute et pro animabus patrum et matrum et 
anteeessorum heredamque et parentum et baronum suorum, omnium que Christianiorum tam vivorum 
~uam deJunetorum " 
7 See above, Chapter 2. 
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the politics of the early 1090s and reinforce the argument that the break-down in 
relations with Rufus was precipitated by the events of 1093.28 The impression gained of 
Robert is of a despoiler of church property rather than a benefactor. The only 
substantive evidence for his attitude towards the Church is a mention as one of the 
despoilers of La Trinite, Caen, in 1088, and his seizure of the priory of Tynemouth and 
subsequent expulsion of the monks from their, probably between 1089 and 1090.29 
Perhaps because of its strategic prominence in controlling access to the Tyne, Robert 
was unable to keep hold of Tynemouth and was persuaded to grant it to St Albans 'with 
the good wishes of the King and Archbishop Lanfranc' .30 Abbot Paul of 8t Albans, 
contrary to the wishes of the Durham community and prior Turgot, sent monks from St 
Albans to occupy the priory and visited it in 1093, only to be taken ill in November of 
that year and die while trying to return to St Albans.31 
Despite his reputation as a despoiler of church property, Robert had apparently given 
gifts to Tynemouth while in possession of it. Rufus notified Thomas, Archbishop of 
York, and Bishop William de 8t Calais, that he was confinning Tynemouth's 
subordination to St Albans in the aftennath of the 1095 rebellion, and also confinning 
the gifts made by Robert and his men before their rebellion.32 Further links to St Alban's 
cannot be rule out as Robert possibly became a monk there shortly before his death.33 
However, for a magnate of Robert's importance, the relative lack of religious patronage 
that can be traced is noticeable, and in a Northumbrian context, is suggestive of a 
28 My thanks are due to Dr. Emma Mason for discussing aspects of Robert de Mowbray's relationship 
with the Church with me. 
29 For Nonnandy see, Charters and Custurnals of the Abbey of Holy Trinity, 2, 126. For the background 
and date of Robert's seizure of Tynemouth see, Libel/us de Exordio, 234-236, n.29-30; Symeon, Opera, 
2,261. 
30 Gesta Abbaturn Monasterii Saneti Albani, ed. H. T. Riley, RS (London, 1867-9), 1,56-7. 'Regis et 
Arehiepiseopi Lanfranci benevolentia'. 
31 Symeon, Opera, 2, 261; Libel/us de Exordio, 236. 
32 RRAN, 1, no. 368. E. Mason, 'William Rufus and the Benedictine Order', ANS, 21 (1998), 113-44, 119-
20. 
33 Chroniea Majora, 6, 372. 
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relative lack of resources with which to patronise the church in that region. Added to 
this is the dispute with Bishop William de St Calais concerning Aycliffe, which once 
again not only points to a lack of settlement and resources with which to found or 
endow local institutions, but also suggest that the traditional mechanics of religious 
patronage as a vehicle for political consolidation and settlement had somehow become 
unstable in the unique religious and political atmosphere ofNorthumbria.34 It is 
therefore hardly surprising that Rufus intervened in Northumbria in settle the dispute 
between bishop and earl. 
. In part, what made Northumbria unique was the potency of the cult ofSt Cuthbert and 
the willingness of the monks of Durham to look for patrons outside of North umbria, and 
in particular, to the king of ScotS.3.5 In 1093, the opportunity arose for the monks to 
recruit Malcolm III as a royal patron. His presence at the foundation of the new 
cathedral at Durham while on the way south to meet with Rufus was highly provocative 
and tantamount to making a general announcement that he claimed authority in the 
region, and an expression of his ambition to reunite Lothian with the rest of 
Northumbria.36 For their part, the monks at Durham pledged to remember Malcolm, his 
wife and their family.3' Taken together, all of these factors, along with Rufus's 
treatment of Malcolm at Gloucester, may have encouraged Robert to believe that he 
could defend his interests with lethal force in the event of Malcolm launching any cross-
34 Libellus de Exordio, 236-8, 238, n. 31 where the properties in question are listed. On the role of 
religious patronage as source of 'colonisation' and control, Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-
Norman England, 173-84. 
3,5 W. M. Aird, 'St. Cuthbert, the Scots and the Normans', ANS, 16 (1993),1.20. 
36 Aird, 'S t Cuthbert', 18. 
37 Durham Liber Vitae, BL Cotton MS Domitian VII. Facsimile published as, Liber Vitae Ecclesiae 
Dunelmensis: A Collotype Facsimile of the Original Manuscript, ed. A. Hamilton, Surtees Society, 136 
(1923), fo1. 48v. See also, G. Barrow, 'Scots in the Durham Liber Vitae', The Durham Liber Vitae and its 
Context, ed. D. Rollason, A. J. Piper, M. Harvey and L. Rollason (Woodbridge, 2004), 109-116; V. Wall, 
'Malcolm III and the Foundation of Durham Cathedral', Anglo-Norman Durham, 325.37. 
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border incursion. It is noticeable in the light of the events of 1093 that Malcolm's body 
was initially taken for burial to Tynemouth, before being transferred to Dunfermline.38 
What is also noticeable is that it is in 1093 that Abbot Paul of St Albans chose to visit 
the priory ofTynemouth. It is not clear whether he was present at the foundation of 
Durham cathedral, but his presence in the Northumbria appears to have unsettled the 
monks. 39 The presence of Abbot Paul was clearly a not so subtle reminder by Rufus to 
the community at Durham not to seek alternative royal patrons. Though there is no 
evidence that Abbot Paul was particularly close to Rufus or that St Albans received 
favourable treatment from the king, nonetheless, Paul's status as a kinsman of Lanfranc 
ensured that he was not without a degree of influence, and he was able to secure a 
confirmation of the abbey's rights 'as on the day of Lanfranc's death,.40 The pattern of 
royal writs issued after the rebellion of 1095, where the monks of Durham received 
various judicial liberties, including the right to hold a court, were balanced with the writ 
that confirmed Tynemouth to the authority of St Albans.41 Overall, the evidence of 
Robert de Mowbray's relationship with the Church and the religious and political 
atmosphere of North umbria, reinforces the argument advanced in Chapter Four that it 
was the events of 1093 that precipitated the period that lead to the rebellion of 1095. 
Robert de Bel1eme's religious patronage reveals that his elevation to cross-Channel 
status in 1098 did not alter his priorities, which continued to be focused upon northern 
France. In comparison to his father and younger brothers, Robert was not an 
38 Symeon, Opera, 2, 222. 
39 Symeon, Opera, 2, 261; Libel/us de Exordio, 236. 
40 Gesta Abbatum, 1, 56; William of Malmesbury, De gestis pontificum Anglorum libri quinque, ed. N. E. 
S. A. Hamilton, RS, 90 (1870), 72; RRAN, 2, no. 314c. 
41 RRAN, 1, nos 366-8. 
218 
enthusiastic religious benefactor.42 Within England, Robert contented himself with 
tidying up the existing grants of his younger brothers Hugh and Amulfto Shrewsbury.43 
However, it is noticeable that Hugh de Montgomery's religious patronage was also 
limited in comparison to his father and younger brothers, with Hugh content to confirm 
Shrewsbury's foundation charter and charter ofliberties.44 The lack of activity on the 
part of Earls Hugh and Robert may have reflected the rather uncertain political 
circumstances during the period in which they held the earldom. In both cases the large 
relief of £3,000 set on the earldom may have been a further disincentive to be generous 
in the early years of their tenure. In general, both men were content to confirm what had 
been granted previously, yet did not feel the need to go beyond this. 
Robert's activities within Normandy are of a different dimension. His reputation for 
appropriating monastic and episcopal property is well-documented, affecting a wide 
number ofinstitutions including the abbeys ofSaint-Vincent-du-Mans, Saint-Pierre de 
Solesmes and the monastery of Saint-Evroult.4s Unlike in England, Robert did feel the 
need to make relatively liberal endowments, including Saint-Vincent-du-Mans, granting 
the abbey property throughout the Sarthe region and possibly including a restoration of 
the churches at Saosnes, which he may have appropriated at an earlier date.46 Robert's 
overall relationship with the Church was complicated by the pressure he was under in 
42 For a succinct summary of Roger de Montgomery's activities see, Green, Aristocracy, 399-402. Amulf 
founded a cell of Saint Martin de Sees at Pembroke. Livre Blanc, fo.123r, CDF. No.666. Amulfalso 
granted Barrow and Bytham in Lincolnshire to the abbey of La Sauve Majeure, Grand Cartulaire de La 
Sauve Majuere, no. 1360. For Rufus's confirmation, no. 1354, calendared, RRAN, 1, no. 483, CDF, no. 
1236. Roger the Poitevin granted Saint Martin de Sees the church of Lancaster, CDF, nos 664, 665. 
43 Shrewsbury Cartulary, no. 35; Grand Cartulaire de La Sauve Majuere, no. 1354. 
44 Shrewsbury Cartulary, nos 3, 4. 
45 Cartulaire de Saint-Vincent du Mans, ed. R. Charles and S. Menjot d'Elbenne (Le Mans, 1886-1913), 
no. 587; Cartulaire des abbayes de Saint-Pierre de la Couture et de Saint-Pierre de Solesmes, (Le Mans, 
1881),8; OV, vi, 180. There is also evidence to suggest that Robert appropriated the property ofthe 
Abbey of Troam to provide for his men. L 'abbaye Saint-Martin de Troarn au diocese de Bayeux des 
Origines au seizieme siecle, ed. R. N. Sauvage, MSAN, 34 (Caen, 1911),22-3. 
46 Cartulaire de Saint-Vincent du Mans, no. 630. For the churches at Saosnes see no. 587 and Thompson, 
'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 280, n. 82. 
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southern Normandy from rivals, and his determination to uphold rights and position of 
his family, a potentially de-stabilising feature of his conduct that played into the hands 
of his enemies, and by extension undermined what remained of ducal authority in the 
region. In this context Robert pressed his claims to exercise authority over the bishopric 
of Sees, granted to him by Robert Curthose in 1101, possibly the subject ofa letter from 
Paschal II to Robert Curthose in 1102 where he complained of the tutelage and defence 
of the church being entrusted to secular powers.47 Robert's activities led Bishop Serlo to 
excommunicate him in 1104, the second such excommunication in Robert's career.48 
Yet Robert displayed the confidence one would expect from one of the architects of the 
Treaty of Winchester by appealing to Ivo of Chartres.49 
Though clearly not as religiously inclined as his father and younger brothers, Robert's 
attitude to the Church was undoubtedly conditioned by the circumstances which 
confronted him throughout much of the 1090s and early 11 OOs, namely the mixing of 
private, localised warfare with wider question ofthe English succession, and later, 
Henry's desire to rule both England and Normandy. The departure of Bishop Serlo and 
Ralph, abbot of Sees, who subsequently found favour under Henry and eventually 
became archbishop of Canterbury, for England in 1104, exemplified the polarisation of 
the rival parties in southern Normandy, with the Church aligning itself with Henry.so 
Most assessments of Robert's career emphasise his religious failings, yet the simpler 
question is whether Robert de Belleme was in a position to make endowments to the 
Church through out much of the 1090s and early 11 OOs. 
47 OV, 4, 296, n. 4. 
48 OV, 4, 296; 6, 46. 
49 Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 281. 
so OV, 6, 48; Thompson, 'Robert de Belleme Reconsidered', 281. 
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William of Mortain's religious patronage, together with that of his father, has been the 
subject of recent study." What makes William especially valuable is that his patronage 
can be interpreted as a commentary on his relationship with Henry I, and in particular, 
his motives in claiming his uncle's earldom of Kent. In the context of his religious 
patronage, there is strong evidence to suggest that William continued to think in cross-
Channel terms up until his expulsion from England and that his claim to Odo' s earldom 
of Kent was purely opportunistic in the circumstances of 1100. 
Overall, the pattern of William's patronage closely followed that of his father, with the 
abbeys of Grestain and Marmoutier well provided for. This included an attempt to 
found a cell of Marmoutier at Wingale in Lincolnshire, on condition that Marmoutier 
provided twenty monks for the establishment.s2 As the earliest record to survive for 
many of these grants is the confirmation charter of Richard I for Grestain, it is 
impossible to accurately date them. However, as majority of William's other grants 
have been dated to between 1100 and 1104, this appears to have been the period in 
which William was most active and it is likely that the grants to Grestain and 
Marmoutier can be placed in this period.s3 
The geographical pattern of these endowments within England suggests a concern for 
itineration, both within England and across the Channel. Many of William's 
endowments to the abbey of Grestain were concentrated near Watling Street in 
Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Buckinghamshire. In Sussex, many of his grants 
were located along the route of the Eastbourne and Lewes road.s4 Therefore, the explicit 
"'The Religious Patronage of Robert and William of Mortain', 211-230. 
:~ CDF, no. 1210; Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 220. 
Soulsby, Fiefs of the Counts ofMortain, 45. 
S4 Breard, Grestain, 207-8;. D. Matthe~, The Norman Monasteries and their English Possessions (Oxford, 
1963),53. The grants are listed and dIscussed in Soulsby, Fiefs of the Counts ofMortain, 134-7. 
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pattern of William's patronage might indicate a heightened awareness of the need to 
cope with the possibility of a permanent political separation of England and Normandy 
as envisaged in the Treaty of Winchester. 
Unlike Robert de Belleme or even Robert de Mowbray, the scale and extent of 
William's patronage is notable, possibly a reflection of deeper religious convictions, but 
it may also indicate a situation where William did not appear to anticipate any problems 
in his future relationship with Henry I. Moreover, there is nothing in any of William's 
patronage to suggest that he venerated the memory of his uncle, and that his claim to 
Kent was anything other than opportunistic. This stands in contrast to two confirmations 
in favour of Marmoutier and his gift of Grenested to Lewes, where the pro anima 
clauses frequently list his parents, the Conqueror and Queen Mathilda.ss By contrast, the 
only visible connection to Odo is the presence of William's attestation to Odo's former 
tenant, Eudo dapifer's, foundation charter for Colchester in 1104.s6 William's gifts to 
Marmoutier are also noticeable in that those whom the monks were to pray for included 
'all the heirs' of the Conqueror and Mathilda; Henry and his wife Mathilda confirmed 
both gifts. S7 
William's preference for Cluniac monasticism is a noticeable trait. Most of William's 
giving in England was concentrated on his foundation of the Cluniac priory of 
Montacute, possibly founded as late as 1102.s8 The choice of Bermondsey as William's 
last place of refuge before his death undoubtedly reflected the close association between 
William of Mortain and the Cluniac order. The alleged release of William from custody 
ss CDF, nos 1209, 1210. The Cartulary of the Priory of Saint Pan eras of Lewes, ed. L. F. Salzman, 2 
vols., Sussex Record Society 35, 11 (1933-5), 1,75. 
S6 RRAN, ii, 677. 
57 CDF, no. 1209. 
58 Golding, • Religious Patronage' , 224-7. 
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in 1118 through the miracle of Holy Cross would seem to indicate a tradition of an 
especial attachment to the Cluniacs by William, since Montacute was the site of the 
discovery during Cnut's reign of the relic of the Holy Cross.S9 The entries relating to 
William's final years in the Bermondsey annals are not without their problems. Martin 
Brett's reconstruction of the annals reveal them to be a composite text, probably derived 
from a series of now lost London annals and based on material collected at Bennondsey 
which ended by the mid 1220s.60 However, much of the infonnation on William of 
Mortain is unique to Bermondsey, and probably reflects a tradition specific to the priory 
from the early thirteenth century, perhaps earlier.61 
Religious patronage serves as a vehicle to explore the impact of national politics on 
local politics and suggests that the ability of religious patronage to act as a factor in 
honorial integrity could be limited by other interests at moments of political tension. In 
the case of William of Mortain, the failure of his tenants to support him in 1104 is 
noticeable. In the aftennath, however, William's relationships with some of his tenants 
clearly survived, especially those with strong cross-Channel interests. For example, 
Ralph Paynel attested a grant of William's, for the abbey ofMarmoutier, at some point 
between 1103 and 1106. 62 Ralph's appearance on this grant suggests that he may have 
had custody of the family's Nonnan lands at this stage before passing them on to his 
son, William. The most likely hypothesis being that Ralph assumed control after the 
death of his elder brother Hugh, who had custody before this period. Other links are 
reflected in Ralph's second marriage to a daughter of Richard de Sourdeval, a major 
tenant of Robert of Mortain, and through whom he gained a share of the lands held by 
S9 Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 225. 
60 Brett, Annals of Bermondsey, 296. 
:~ My thanks are due to Dr Brett for discussing this with me in a personal communication. 
CDF, no. 1210; EYC, 6, 3-4. For Hugh Paynel, Cartulaire Saint-Etienne, fo.49r-50r, no. CLIIl. 
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Richard de Sourdeval as a tenant of Robert of Mortain in Yorkshire.63 Between 1089 
and 1100, Ralph re-founded the priory of Holy Trinity, York, as a cell of Marmoutier.64 
In terms of religious patronage providing a focus for honorial integrity, the activities of 
some of the Mortain tenants suggest a certain degree of detachment, particularly in 
Sussex where the focus of giving was William I de Warenne's Cluniac foundation of 
Lewes. The priory gave the local political community a great deal of stability, and 
received patronage from the tenants of both the rapes of Arundel and Pevensey, after the 
removal of Robert de Belleme and William of Mortain in 1102 and 1104 respectively.6s 
Yet in the case of William of Mortain, the scale of patronage before and after his exile is 
significantly different. Prior to 1104, nine Mortain tenants patronised Lewes, whereas in 
the period up to 1134 that figure rose to thirty former tenants. By contrast, figures for 
the former Montgomery rape of Arundel remained fairly constant, with ten gifts before 
1120 and twelve in the period between 1120 and 1140.66 
Before 1104, William was happy to confirm the gifts of some of his more prominent 
Sussex tenants to the priory of Lewes, including Alvred pincerna, William de 
Cahagnes, Herbert Fitz Rannulf and Hugh de Dives, as well as giving the priory 
demesne lands at Ripe in Surrey and one virgate at Laughton in Sussex.67 Yet it should 
be noted that several important Mortain tenants did not patronise religious institutions 
associated with the counts. In Cornwall, for example, Richard Fitz Turold and his 
63 Bates, Regesta, no. 158; Dalton, Conquest. Anarchy and Lordship, 91. 
64 EYC, 6, 2; CDF, no.1180; Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 219-20. 
65 E. Cownie, 'Conquest, lordship and religious patronage in the Sussex rapes, 1066-1135', Sussex 
Archaeological Collection, 136 (1998), 118. 
66 Cownie, 'Conquest, lordship and religious patronage', 118; M. Clarke, The Early Endowment of Lewes 
Priory: with Special Reference to its Spiritual Possessions c. 1 o 77-c. 1200, Unpublished University of 
Reading M. Phil Thesis (1996), Appendix 5, 32-3, 35-8. 
67 Cartulary of the Priory of Saint Pancras, 1,75, 119-20; CDF, no. 391 
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descendants chose not to patronise the counts' Cornish institutions.68 William de 
Cahagnes is further striking example. A major tenant of the William of Mortain in 
Sussex and Northamptonshire, William was also sheriff of Northamptonshire until the 
early years of Henry I's reign.69 The pattern of the de Cahagnes family'S gifts to Lewes 
suggests that Northamptonshire was the focus of their power within England.70 Of the 
four grants to Lewes, all the land in question was in Sussex.71 Overall, it might be 
possible to interpret the actions of William de Cahagnes as one of loose association with 
the counts of Mortain, and William of Mortain in particular. William of Mortain's 
preference for Cluniac monasticism and his patronage of institutions such as Lewes, 
provided a vehicle for his tenants to identify with him, yet remain sufficiently detached 
to steer a different course from their lord in the crisis of 1104, and probably during that 
of 1101 before it. Indeed, the popularity of the Cluniac monasticism in general during 
this period may owe much to its perceived political 'neutrality'.72 
One noteworthy change is the increased patronage of selected English houses after 1087 
by sheriffs and royal officials. The most striking example is St Peter's Abbey, 
Gloucester, which, as Emma Cownie has explored in some detail, attracted gifts from 
men who were prominent figures at COurt.73 Unsurprisingly, the sheriffs of 
Gloucestershire figure prominently. Roger de Pitres, his brother Durand, their sons, 
68 Golding, 'Religious Patronage', 228. 
69 RRAN, 1, no. 476; 2, nos 694, 732, 770. 
70 VCH, Northamptonshire, 1,357-92. 
71 L. F. Salzman, 'Some Domesday Tenants III. William de Cahagnes and the Family of Keynes', Sussex 
Archaeological Col/ection, 63 (1922), 180-202, esp. 70; J. H. Round, 'Some Early Grants to Lewes 
Priory', Sussex Archaeological Collection, 40 (1896), 58-74. 
72 See, B. Golding, 'The Coming of the Cluniacs', Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-
Norman Studies, 3 (1980),65-77, esp. 77, 'Cluny offered a unique chance to build French, ifnot Norman, 
monasticism on English soil. ' 
73 E. Cownie, 'Gloucester Abbey, 1066-1135: An I11ustration of Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman 
England', England and Normandy in the Middle Ages, 143-58; Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-
Norman England, 54-65. See also, D. Bates, 'The Building of Great Church: the Abbey ofSt Peter's 
Gloucester, and its Early Norman Benefactors', Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire 
Archaeological Society, 52 (1984), 129-32. 
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Walter and Roger, and Roger's wife Adeliza, all made regular grants.74 Gloucester also 
received gifts from those Normans at the forefront of the penetration into Wales, 
including, Bernard de Neufmarche and Robert Fitz Haimo.75 Yet the sporadic visitations 
of the royal court to Gloucester gave many individuals the opportunity to patronise an 
institution that they had little or no connection too including, Hugh de port, Roger 
Bigod, William d' Aubigny and the royal constables, Robert and Nigel d'Oilly.76 Indeed, 
Hugh de Port entered Gloucester as a monk shortly before his death in 1096, and was 
subsequently buried at the abbey.77It is interesting that Hugh was styled as vicarious 
Wyntoniae on his entry into Gloucester, reflecting his local power base in Hampshire. 
Though a tenant of the bishop of Winchester, New Minster and Chertsey abbeys, the 
evidence for Hugh's relationship with the Church in Hampshire indicate a business like 
approach, with any religious or spiritual leanings finding expression elsewhere.7s 
It is possible that the patronage of Gloucester was a variation on Christopher Harper-
Bill's observation on the patterns of Anglo-Norman piety in general, that 'the support of 
a particular house was frequently the expression of corporate solidarity with a feudal 
grouping' .79 In the context of the argument advanced in this thesis, patronage of 
Gloucester by royal officials may also be an indication of their acceptance of the 
legitimacy of Rufus's kingship. Though Gloucester was only one site associated with 
royal power and crown wearing its success in attracting patronage on a large scale 
suggests that it was perceived as special. 80 
74 Sanet; Petri Gloueestriae, 1,69, 112, 118,235. 
" Saneti Petri Gloueestriae, 1,64-5, 80,93, 122,314-5; Cownie, Religious Patronage in Anglo-Norman 
England, 58. 
76 Sanet; Petri Gloueestriae, 1,65,74,93, 123. 
77 Sanet; Petri Gloueestriae, 1,93. 
78 DB, 1, 40d, 41a, 42a, b, c, d, 43a, 43c, 49c; D. Bates, Odo ofBayeux, Unpublished University of Exeter 
Ph.D. (1970), 123-5. 
79 C. Harper-Bill, 'The Piety of the Anglo-Norman knightly class', Proceedings of the Battle Conference 
on Anglo-Norman Studies, 2, (1980), 63-77, 67. . 
80 Cownie, St Peter's Abbey, 153-4. 
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Likewise, the cathedral priory of Rochester received gifts from many of the same men 
including, Roger Bigod, Hugh and Henry de Port, alongside grants from Eudo dapifer, 
William d' Aubigny and Haimo dapifer.81 Connections to former lords and patrons, in 
particular ado of Bayeux, may playa part in explaining this pattern of behaviour, as 
well as the influence oflocal geography. Yet this patronage of Rochester by this group 
of individuals is likely to have been connected to the events of 1088 and the successful 
defeat of the rebellion. Rufus' success set the seal on his kingship and the process of 
reconciliation between the king and the major rebels, except ado of Bayeux, began 
almost immediately.82 William of Malmesbury displayed sensitivity to the significance 
of this process when he noted that many rebels 'were admitted to take the oath of 
allegiance'.83 Underpinning this process was the knowledge that the rebels had been 
confronted with a display of the powers available to an English king, particularly the 
ability to summon an effective and loyal military force in the fyrd, and the potential to 
condemn to death those judged guilty of treason. This might explain Orderic's comment 
that some of those implicated in the revolt served Rufus with devotion in the years that 
followed.84 For many connected to the royal court, patronage of Rochester, even if 
mainly in the form of tithes, undoubtedly resonated in much the same way that 
patronage of Gloucester did. 
81 Textus RofJensis, ed. P. H. Sawyer, Early Manuscripts in Facsimilie (Copenhagen, 1962), foIs 182r-v, 
182r, 184v, 188v, 198v. See also, H. Tsurushima, 'The Fraternity of Rochester Cathedral Priory about 
1100', ANS, 14 (1991), 313-37. 
82 Sharpe, '1088-William II and the Rebels', 156-7. 
83 GR, 1,548. 'eeteri omnes in fidem recepti.' 
84 OV, 4, 134. It is interesting to speculate as to whether the events at Rochester may have influenced 
Bishop Gundulf. The implication from the Vita Gundulfi episcopi is that Gundulfwent freely between the 
two sides in 1088, perhaps as a negotiator. However, in 1101 there is no suggestion of this and Gundulf 
supported Henry. Vita Gundulfi episcopi, ed. R. M. Thomson (Toronto, 1977),50,58. 
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Patterns of religious patronage are not the only vehicle through which to comment on 
contemporary politics. Before considering the evidence of inheritance patterns it is 
appropriate that something is said on the nature of marriage patterns. The purpose here 
is not to add to the abundant material on the marital strategies of the aristocracy, but 
merely to chart some of the marriages that are relevant to the case studies outlined in 
Part One and offer some observations on what these reveal about contemporary politics. 
The uneven nature of the evidence means that the marriages in question largely belong 
to the elite members of the aristocracy. Perhaps the most striking marriage of this period 
is that of Robert de Mowbray to Mathilda de L' Aigle in 1095.85 The coronation charter 
of Henry I stated that he expected to be consulted in relation to the marriages of his 
barons and tenants.86 It seems unlikely that Rufus would not have demanded similar 
consultation. In these circumstances, it is striking, therefore, that Mathilda came from a 
family based in southern Normandy, and whose political allegiances had firmly been 
with Robert Curthose in the early 1090s.87 Moreover, Robert de Mowbray's connections 
with the family may have stretched back to the 1080 and participation of Richer de 
L' Aigle, Mathilda's father, on the expedition into Scotland in that year, alongside 
Robert and Curthose. Given these factors, either Rufus was completely unaware of what 
Robert was planning in 1095, or more likely, he was aware of growing difficulties in his 
relationship with one of his most important magnates, but judged that these were not a 
serious long-term danger. The simple fact that Robert's bride came from a family 
closely associated with Robert Curthose reinforces the analysis offered above, that by 
1095 Robert Curthose's claim to the English throne appeared to have been settled, yet 
for many within the aristocracy continuing questions over the legitimacy of Rufus's 
kingship remained under the surface. 
85 OV, 4, 282. Orderic states that Robert married Mathilda shortly before the outbreak of the revolt. 
86 EHD, 2, 433. 
87 See, K. Thompson, 'The Lords ofLaigle: Ambition and Insecurity on the Borders of Normandy' ,ANS, 
18 (1995), 177·201. 
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Orderic believed that Robert's marriage was prelude to expansion within the north of 
England.88 Given the prominence of the L' Aigle's within southern Normandy this is a 
somewhat curious statement. Yet it must be remembered that there was an important 
English dimension to Robert's marriage, which merely reinforces the observations made 
on Robert's status within the wider polity made in Chapter Four. His bride was the 
niece of Earl Hugh of Chester through his sister's marriage to Mathilda's father.89 
Connections between the de Mowbray family and Earl Hugh may have also existed 
independently of the proposed marriage and may have actually facilitated the union. 
Hugh gave an estate he held at Montbray to his abbey of Saint-Sever, most probably on 
the foundation of the abbey in 1085.90 Yet when it is remembered that another of Hugh's 
sisters was married to Rannulf, vicomte of Bayeux, and their son was given the lordship 
of Carlisle, possibly as early as 1092, then Orderic's statement appears to make sense, 
in that Robert was marrying the niece of the earl of Chester and the cousin of the lord of 
Carlisle.91 
In part, the notable differences between the aftermaths of the revolt of 1088 and that of 
1095 can be seen in the failure of family and cross-Channel connections to save the 
rebels. Robert de Mowbray's wife presented an opportunity for Rufus to exert pressure 
on him to surrender Bamburgh castle in 1095. It is noticeable that another rebel from 
1095, William ofEu, had earned the enmity of his brother-in-law, Hugh d' Avranches, 
81 ov, 4, 278. 
89 K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, 'The Prosopography of post Conquest England: Four Case Studies', Medieval 
Prosopography, 13 (Spring, 1993),24. 
90 L. Musset, 'Les origins et Ie patrimoine de l'abbaye de Saint Sever', La Normandie benedictine au 
temps de Guillaume Ie Conquerant (X/e siecle), ed. J. Daoust (Lille, 1967) 357-67 361-3 91 ' , . Keats-Rohan, 'The Prosopography of post Conquest England', 24. For Carlisle see, J. A. Green, 
'Aristocratic Loyalties on the Northern Frontier of England, c. 1100-1174', England in the Tweljih 
Century. Proceedings of the 1988 Bar/axton Symposium, ed. D. Williams (Woodbridge, 1990),83-101, 
84. 
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earl of Chester, on account of his flagrant infidelities and neglect of his second wife, 
Hugh's sister.92 Both William d' Audrieu and Hugh de Montgomery were unfortunate in 
that their close associations with relatives involved in the conspiracy threw suspicion 
onto them. Whereas the politics of 1088, and in particular its cross-Channel dimension, 
constrained Rufus his treatment of the rebels captured in Rochester, in 1095, the nature 
of the conspiracy against the king removed these constraints.93 In part, this must account 
for Orderic's comment, that in 1102, when Henry I had defeated Robert de Belleme, the 
other magnates attempted to negotiate a settlement, fearing that they would be trodden 
underfoot by royal power.94 
The aristocracy pursued what might be termed normal marital strategies during this 
period. At one stage, a marriage was planned between William of Mortain and the 
daughter of Walter de Mayenne, until bishop Hildebert ofLe Mans objected on the 
grounds ofconsanguinity.9.5 The strategic importance of Robert de Belleme's marriage 
to Agnes, daughter and heir of Guy, count ofPonthieu has already been noted.96 It is 
notable that many of those who rebelled or were implicated in rebellion contracted 
cross-Channel and trans-regional marriages. Paradoxically, though this is undoubtedly a 
reflection of wider geo-political interests, it might also suggest that the political events 
in which these men were caught up in were not regarded as anything outside of the 
normal discourse of high politics. The marriage patterns of the upper echelons of the 
aristocracy indicate a situation that was defined by underlying continuity in terms of the 
mechanisms that might facilitate a marriage, punctuated by occasional political crises. 
92 OV, 4, 284. 
93 OV, 4, 128-32. 
94 OV, 4, 26-32. 
9.5 K. Keats-Rohan, 'The Prosopography of Post-Conquest England: Four Case Studies', Medieval 
Prosopography, 14 (Spring, 1993),33-4; Domesday People, 258. 
96 See above, Chapter 5. 
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In terms of the inheritance laws and customs of the aristocracy, the rejection of acquets 
and propres to explain the partition of 1087, together with an emphasis upon the 
concept of political legitimacy to explain the politics of the 1090s and early 11 OOs, 
necessitates a reappraisal of the importance of the distinction within the wider socio-
political culture of the cross-Channel aristocracy. Quite clearly, this is a study that is 
beyond scope of this current chapter or indeed this thesis. Yet there are certain 
observations that can be raised in this context, and provide the basis for future enquiries. 
In particular, it must be questioned, whether the politics of the period between 1087 and 
1106 gave impetus to the development of this distinction.97 The evidence from the Leges 
Henrici Primi, though perhaps not quite as clear-cut as it appears, suggests that within 
little more than a generation the firm distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies 
had been accepted and an attempt made to give it clarity.98 
Perhaps the most significant point to make is the sheer weight of evidence for the period 
between 1087 and 1106, which suggests the political circumstances of this period gave 
families an incentive to divide their lands along customary lines that they would have 
been familiar with. Most of the examples are well known, but when listed in a rough 
chronological order give a sense of momentum. Hugh de Montfort-sur-Risle became a 
monk at Bee around 1088, with his two sons from his second marriage succeeding to his 
lands; the elder son, Robert, taking over his Norman lands, while his younger son, Hugh 
II, gained the English lands.99 Richard fitz Gilbert retired to the priory he established at 
St Neots and was dead by 1089 or 1090.100 His son, Roger, succeeded his father as lord 
97 Cf. Holt, 'Notions of Patrimony', Colonial England, 215; Tabuteau, 'Role of Law', 165-6. 
98 Leges Henrici Primi, ed. and trans. L. J. Downer (Oxford, 1972), C. 70.21; Holt. 'Politics and 
Property' • Colonial England, 121. For Normandy before 1066. compare the observations of Judith Green. 
where 'nothing can be said for certain'. Green. Aristocracy. 335. 
99 Domesday Monachorum. 68-70; COEL. Person no. 682; Domesday People. 265-6. 
100 COEL. Person no. 306; Domesday People. 363-4; J. Ward. 'Royal Service and Reward. The Clare 
Family and the Crown', ANS, 11 (1989),265. 
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of Bienfaite and Orbec in Normandy, while Gilbert succeeded to the lordships of Clare 
and Tonbridge in England.lol Richard's brother, Baldwin fitz Gilbert, was succeeded by 
his son, Robert, in the lordship of Meules and Le Sap in Normandy and William in 
England. The estates of Roger de Montgomery divided along clear lines, with the eldest 
son, Robert de Belleme, receiving the Norman lands and Roger's second son Hugh 
receiving the English lands.l02 Gilbert de Gand was succeeded by his eldest son, Hugh, 
in Normandy, and by his younger son, Walter, in England. 103 The death of Hugh de 
Grandmesnil in 1098 saw his eldest son, Robert, received the Norman lands, while the 
next eldest son, Ivo, received the English lands. l04 At some point between 1086 and 
1101, Henry de Ferrieres' eldest son, William, succeeded to his Norman lands, while his 
second son, Engenulf, received the English lands. lOS Richard de Courcy divided his 
lands between his sons at some time between 1086 and 1105, possibly before 1089.106 
In addition to these cases are further examples of division, based upon the distinction 
between acquisitions and patrimonies, though with variation in terms of which son 
received what. On the death of William I de Warrenne in 1088, his English lands went 
to his eldest son, William II, while the family's Flemish lands went to his younger son, 
Rainald. Eventually, the Norman lands of William I de Warenne came into the 
possession of William II, possibly because Rainald died without heirs, though it is far 
from certain that the Norman lands went to Rainald on the death of his father.l07 Emily 
Tabuteau identified further partitions in the families of Abetot, Bacon, Burdet, Harcourt, 
101 Tabuteau, 'Role of Law', 158-59 
102 OV, 3, 148-50. See above, Chapters 1 and 5. 
103 COEL, Person no. 644; Domesday People, 210-11; Tabuteau, 'Role of Law', 158, n. 75 for a full 
discussion of the family. 
104 OV, 4, 338; COEL, Person no. 652; Domesday People, 262-3. 
lOS COEL, Person no. 639; Domesday People, 247-8. 
106 COEL, Person no. 2689; Domesday People, 359. 
107 For William I de Warenne, see, COEL, Person no. 645; Domesday People, 480-2. For William II, see, 
COEL, Person no. 1093; van Houts, 'Warenne View ofthe Past', 104-5. 
232 
Marshal, Paynel and Talbot. l08 Division appears to have been contemplated by Robert, 
count of Mortain.l09 The scale of the evidence appears to indicate that once the Conquest 
generation began to die, the disturbed contemporary political circumstances gave the 
impetus to division. 
The evidence from the literary sources reveals that later writers were almost certainly 
aware of this dynamic. Orderic's rhetorical set piece on aristocratic motives for 
rebellion in 1088, particularly the dilemma of having to serve two lords who were 'so 
different and lived so far apart' suggests that the aristocracy may have actively looked 
to the distinction between acquisitions and patrimonies as the means to mitigate their 
entanglement in the politics of the English succession. Orderic explored the dilemma 
further: 'If we serve Robert duke of Normandy as we ought we will offend his brother 
William, who will then strip us of great revenues and mighty honours in England. 
Again, if we obey King William dutifully, Duke Robert will confiscate our inherited 
estates in Normandy.Hlo 
This was an analysis shared by William ofMalmesbury, who observed that the 
negotiators of the Treaty of Rouen were motivated by their own interests as they had 
possessions on both sides of the Channel' .m The central obligations the treaty sought to 
place on Rufus and Curthose and the attempt to create a reciprocal relationship between 
the two brothers, suggest the baronial negotiators were constructing the treaty in the 
light of their own experiences of the previous four years. Likewise, the stipulation 
108 Tabuteau, 'Role of Law', 161-3, n. 91-102. 
109 Bibliotheque municipale d' Avranches, MS, 210, fot. 34. Discussed in, Tabuteau, 'Role of Law' , 162, 
n.90 
110 av, 4, 122. 'Si Roberto duci Normannorum digne seruiermus, Guil/elmumfratrem eius offendemus. 
Unde ab ipso spoiliabimur in Anglia magnis redditibus et precipu;s honor;bus. Rursus s; reg; Guillelmo 
congrue paruerimus. Robertus dux in Normannia penitus priuabit nos paternis hereditat;bus. ' 
III GR, 1,548. ' .... consulentes suis commodes quod utrob;que possessiones haberent ... ' 
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within the treaty that each brother was to be the other's heir in the absence of children 
from a marriage, reflected the later chapter within the Leges Henriei Primi, where in the 
absence of children on the death of a landholder, the brother of the deceased would have 
the strongest claim to the inheritance in the absence of a living relative.1I2 However, the 
Montgomery inheritance of 1098 reveals that where more than one brother was alive the 
success of any claim would depend upon political considerations. The same is true also 
of William ofMortain's claim to his uncle's former earldom of Kent, where Henry's 
ability to temporise and delay flouted his own laws. \l3 
In this context, therefore, one would expect partition to act as a centrifugal force driving 
the partition of England and Normandy. Yet for many of the elite of the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy this does not appear to have been the case. The comments of William of 
Malmesbury and Orderic are clearly applicable to Odo of Bayeux, Robert of Mortain, 
Bishop Geoffrey ofCoutances, Robert de Mowbray and Roger de Montgomery. Yet it 
is noticeable that many of those who were implicated in the revolt of 109S, or who 
supported Curthose in 1101, most notably Gilbert fitz Richard, William II de Warenne, 
Robert de Belleme, Ivo Grandmesnil and Eustace III, count of Boulogne, were the 
beneficiaries of inheritance practices whereby they came into possession of huge estates 
that had once been acquisitions. 1 14 Therefore, the fact that these men imperilled their 
gains by opposing Rufus and Henry I point towards deep-seated concerns and 
motivations. The career pattern of these men and their ability to construct cross-Channel 
complexes necessitates a modification of Professor's Holt observation on the structure 
112 Leges Henriei Primi, C. 70,20. 'If anyone dies without children, his father or mother shall succeed to 
the inheritance, or his brother or sister, if neither father nor mother is living.' 
\l3 Leges Henriei Primi, C. 70, 20a .. 'Ifhe does not possess these relatives then his father's or mother's 
sister and relatives upto the fifth 'joint', whoever are the nearest in relationship, shall succeed by the law 
of inheritance' . 
114 Strevett, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', 160-61. See below, Chapter 4, for an assessment of Hugh de 
Montgomery's role in the conspiracy of 1095. 
234 
of inheritance requiring a single feudal lord. 11.5 In the case of Roger de Mowbray and 
William of Eu, their preference for Stephen of Aumale as a replacement for Rufus in 
1095 would not have made a complex cross-Channel framework of landholding any less 
complicated. 
Given this behaviour, a significant question is whether the questions and doubts 
expressed over the legitimacy of Rufus's and Henry's kingships raised reciprocal 
questions over landholding and lordship within England. The evidence from Orderic for 
aristocratic motives for rebelling against Rufus in 1088, and particularly his distinction 
between the English acquisitions, termed by Orderic as 'great revenues and mighty 
honours', and the 'inherited' Norman lands implies that this might have been a 
consideration.116 Likewise, William of Malmesbury created a scene in his Gesta Regum 
where Rufus persuades Roger de Montgomery to accept his kingship in 1088 by not 
calling into question the judgement of the Conqueror who had made Rufus king, the 
same man who had made Roger de Montgomery a magnate. 117 The implication of 
Malmesbury's observation was just as Rufus was dependent upon his father's 
designation in 1087 for much of his legitimacy, so the magnates who held English 
estates were dependent upon the Conqueror's own legitimacy for the rights to their 
English estates. The 'E' version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle stated the Normandy 
was the Conqueror's birthright, and equated England with Maine.118 In this context, 
William of Poi tiers' description of the initial distribution of estates after 1066, where 
'nothing was given to any Frenchman, which had been unjustly taken from any 
lIS Holt, 'Politics and Property', Colonial England, 128. 
116 cr. Jane Martindale's observation: 'Inheritance and doubts over succession in a county, principality or 
still more, a kingdom, could have repercussions which would destroy political equilibrium and endanger 
the conduct of government'. Matindale, 'Succession and Politics', 40. 
117 GR, 1,546; Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 95. 
118 ASC, E, 1086. 
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Englishman', reinforces the sense that the Normans' titles only had legitimacy if the 
Conqueror's kingship had legitimacy.119 
The emphasis upon the links between political legitimacy and landholding was a theme 
that also ran through Orderic's treatment of the rebellion of 1075. Though much of what 
Orderic says needs to be treated with care, especially his comments that one of the 
factors conditioning the rebellion was William's illegitimacy, the rhetorical complaints 
about the distribution of English estates in the aftermath of 1066 at the very least reveals 
a recognition that political legitimacy and lawful entitlement to acquired lands went 
hand-in-hand.120 The rebels of 1075, Roger of Hereford and Ralph de Gael, when 
attempting to recruit Waltheofto the conspiracy, recognised that when one of them was 
created king and the other two 'dukes', 'all the honors of England' would be subject to 
the three of them.121 To reinforce his analysis, Orderic drew upon the Book of Judges 
and the rebellion of the men of Shechem against Abimelech, an illegitimate son of a 
concubine by Jerubaal and the former ruler of Shechem, who was crowned king after 
slaying Jerubaal's seventy sons.122 At the heart of the Old Testament account is the fable 
told by Jotham, the surviving son of Jerubaal, who warns the people of Shechem ofthe 
need to serve Abimelech faithfully otherwise destruction will fall upon them all, 
including Abimelech. 
Professor Holt made the point that that for the first generation after the Conquest, all the 
land held in England was an acquisition. 123 The proliferation of inheritances outlined 
above suggest that the crucial stage for many families, where an acquisition was 
119 Gesta Guilleimi, 'Nulli tam en Gallo datum est quod Anglo cuiquam injuste fuerit oblatum.' Quoted in 
Garnett, 'Coronation and Propaganda', 95. 
120 For the question of illegitimacy, see Bates, 'The Conqueror's Adolescence', 12. 
121 OV, 2,314. 'Unus ex nobis sit rex et duo duces, et sic nobis tribus omnes Anglici subicientur honores'. 
122 Judges, 9; OV, 2, 320. 
123 Holt, 'Notions of Patrimony', Colonial England, 216. 
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transformed into an inheritance by the first succession, coincided with a period of 
political turbulence where doubts were expressed over the legitimacy of the kings under 
whose lordship the land in question was to be held. John Hudson has traced the growth 
of inheritance language in charters. Though he has emphasised the influence of the 
Church reform movement and usefulness of confirming inheritance with stricter 
language, his observation on the doubts over royal succession provoking a more general 
discussion of succession needs further investigation and may yield important results in 
the light of the observations made in this chapter, and the framework of analysis 
advanced throughout this thesis.124 
This chapter was not intended as a comprehensive examination of religious patronage, 
marital strategies or inheritance patterns. In terms of religious patronage, though the 
broad conclusions of Emma Cownie's study remain valid, the nuances of religious 
patronage are of particular importance in acting as a commentary on wider political 
events. The wider political narrative of the period must be central to any analysis of the 
religious activity of the aristocracy. The same is true of the marital strategies pursued by 
the cross-Channel aristocracy. One striking feature is sheer adaptability of the 
aristocracy in relation to the broader crosscurrents of succession politics. In terms of 
inheritance patterns, the evidence points towards the period between 1087 and 1106 as 
being of supreme importance in the hardening of the distinction between acquisitions 
and patrimonies and providing the impetus for their embodiment in written legal codes. 
The basis for this was undoubtedly the wider discussions on the nature of royal 
succession and royal legitimacy. 
124 Hudson, • Land, Law and Lordship', 101-06, esp.l 03. 
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Conclusion 
The dominant theme within this thesis has been the importance of the concept of 
politicallegitimacy as one of the defining influences in shaping the political culture of 
the Anglo-Norman aristocracy between 1087 and 1106, and its role as the central 
dynamic in determining how the cross-Channel elite responded to the issue of divided 
lordship and a disputed English succession. This emphasis has been a deliberate 
reaction to the widespread acceptance of an Anglo-Norman political culture that owes 
its shape and structure to the historical traditions of constitutional, administrative and 
legal history. This has resulted in a historiography that has not considered to any great 
degree the ability of the aristocracy to think, discuss and act upon the central political 
issues of the day. As such, the Anglo-Norman aristocracy have come to occupy a 
peculiar situation, where political instability is perceived to be part of a wider 'tenurial 
crisis', and causes of political disputes and actions are seen primarily in terms of 
protecting family lands and cross-Channel estates, ensuring continuity of office holding 
across a change of regime or engaging in aggressive expansion. 
As the examples of Robert de Mowbray, William of Mortain and Robert de Belleme 
have shown, this framework does not provide the means to understand fully the actions 
of these men in opposing both Rufus and Henry I. Nor does it necessarily provide the 
means to explain the consistent support given to Rufus and Henry by their royal 
officials and sheriffs. The paradox, exemplified by Robert de Mowbray and the revolt of 
1095, is why so many of the central events of this period have such a prominent place in 
contemporary and near-contemporary sources, yet struggle to be understood in modem 
analyses. 
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The question is one of balance. As such, the concept of heterogeneity and the political 
conduct of the aristocracy being determined by opportunities for material advancement 
must remain central. Yet as David Crouch has begun to suggest was the case in the mid 
twelfth century, a further layer of interpretation is needed in order to understand the 
events and complexity of the problems faced by contemporaries. In short, questions of 
political legitimacy and fears of tyranny were fundamental to the accepted norms of 
political behaviour and values. In this context, those sections of the Anglo-Norman 
aristocracy who felt that their rights to be consulted in the selection of a new king had 
twice been ignored, and who also felt marginalised in the restructuring of the Anglo-
Norman polity after 1087, were thus prepared to mix selfinterest with more 
fundamental concerns and resort to violence on three occasions to effect political 
change. 
The failure of violence to bring about decisive change by 1091, and once more in 1101, 
ensured that a fully detailed settlement would be devised on each occasion, which not 
only dealt with the short-term effects of instability, but also addressed the more 
fundamental and deep-rooted problems. Crucially, the means by which political stability 
was to be achieved and these problems addressed was through the 'concept of co-
existence for England and Normandy as separate political and legal units. A caveat is 
that in 1091, provision had to be made for Rufus' relatively successful intervention into 
Normandy during the previous two years. In this context, the complexity of the Treaty 
of Rouen in attempting to create a reciprocal relationship between the two brothers was 
notable, and suggests that the cross-Channel framework in which the aristocracy moved 
and acted was far more subtle than the notion of a homogeneous aristocracy responding 
to centripetal forces allows for. Many of the problems faced by Rufus in the mid 1090s 
arose directly from his contravention of its terms. Yet it is also clear from the terms of 
the Treaties of Rouen and Winchester, that the problems faced by the aristocracy and 
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their responses to them were nothing that they were not equipped to tackle, both 
intellectually and in terms of pragmatic political experience. Likewise, the evidence 
explored in Chapter Eight suggests that the aristocracy as a whole could adapt to 
changing political circumstances with alacrity. Overall, it must be thought that though 
the politics of the 1090s and early 1100s retained the capacity to engender relatively 
widespread human suffering and misery, they were, nonetheless, not alien to the 
experiences of the Anglo-Norman political elite. 
Central to this analysis is the narrative histories written by contemporaries, near 
contemporaries and those in the latter half of the twelfth century. The concern of later 
writers to explore the issues that had relevance to the problems their contemporary 
societies faced gave their writing an urgency and found expression in the framework of 
analysis used to explore these issues in drawing upon classical and biblical paradigms. 
Allied to this, is the need to fully utilise the analytical tools employed by scholars who 
study the early and late medieval aristocracies, especially ritual and ceremony, in order 
to understand just how deeply contemporaries felt about the issues they faced. Patterns 
of religious patronage, marital strategies and inheritance provide the means to chart 
contemporary perceptions. These activities, when analysed within the broader context of 
the political framework advanced throughout this thesis, can be read not only as a 
response to the wider politics of the 1090s and early 1100s, but also as a commentary on 
them. 
The effect of this study is to allow the politics and events of the years between 1087 and 
1106 to be placed in their historical context, both in terms of the effects of the Conquest 
on cross-Channel political life and also the wider process of politics in the early 
Medieval West. The Anglo-Norman aristocracy to emerge from this study is one that 
sits more easily with the Carolingian, post Carolingian and late medieval aristocracy. Its 
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political culture continues to be defined by opportunities for material advancement. 
Control of land and offices remain the basis of the exercise of serious political power. 
However, the power of ideas and principles as sources of motivation in shaping political 
action must be central to any analysis. 
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